The applicability of procedural fairness to actions by members of the South African National Defence Force by Malatsi, Nanoga Claudia
i 
 
THE APPLICABILITY OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS TO ACTIONS BY MEMBERS OF THE 












Submitted in accordance with the requirements  




MASTER OF LAWS                                       






Department of Public, Constitutional and International Law 
 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 










I declare that 
 
“The applicability of procedural fairness to actions by members of the South African 
National Defence Force” 
 
is my own work and that all the sources that I have consulted, used or quoted have been indicated 





Nanoga Claudia Malatsi                                                Date:  11 April 2019 






I wish to thank my supervisor, Prof Dr HCAW Schulze, for his guidance in the preparation of this 
dissertation.  I would like to thank him in particular for his meticulous and critical comments and 
advice. Thanks must go to my Chair of Department, Dr DT Mailula, for his support and assistance 
throughout this journey. It is because of his listening to my stories, giving me advice, words of 
encouragement and indirect mentorship that I was able to complete this dissertation. 
 
I must also thank my mentor, Prof A Spies for agreeing to step in and assist with guidance to 
finalize and submit this dissertation when my supervisor was admitted in hospital and unable to 
finalise the dissertation with me. 
 
Thanks must also go to my family (my daughter, Mmaletsholo, my son, Tshireletso, my husband, 
Tebogo, and my mother, Josephine) for their love, support and understanding throughout this 
journey. Their emotional and physical support made this journey bearable and my goal attainable. 
 
My deepest gratitude goes to the Almighty God, who favoured me with a healthy body and mind 






The dissertation examines the applicability of procedural fairness to actions by members of the 
South African National Defence Forces (SANDF). The research focuses on and uses the South 
African Defence Force Union v The Minister of South African National Defence Force (SANDU 
2010 judgment) to illustrate how procedural fairness should find application in the SANDF, given 
the sui generis nature of the defence forces. This judgment presented an opportunity to investigate 
whether the legislative framework that is available in the SANDF is adequate to protect the right 
to procedural fairness of the members of the SANDF encapsulated in section 33 of the 
Constitution, 1996.  
The dissertation examines the relevant sections of the Defence Act, Military Discipline 
Supplementary Measures Act, Labour Relations Act (LRA), and the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act (PAJA) read with sections 23 and 33 of the Constitution to determine whether there is 
a gap that exists in so far as the protection of the right to procedural fairness of members of the 
defence forces is concerned. It also examines the Military Discipline Code and the rules and 
regulations of the Defence Forces.  
The analysis of the SANDU 2010 judgment demonstrates that PAJA could find application in 
dismissal or employment related disputes within the SANDF. The scenario that is evidenced from 
the analysis of the defence force legislative framework is that the legislative framework that is 
available within the SANDF is inadequate to protect and deal with disputes which arise from 
allegations of infringement of the right to procedural fairness. This scenario is compounded by the 
fact that the LRA which is the empowering legislation that was promulgated to give effect to the 
right to section 23 of the Constitution and to deal with dismissal and employment related disputes, 
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1. CONTEXT OF RESEARCH 
 
In November 2010, the Northern Gauteng High Court handed down an important judgment in the 
case of the South African National Defence Force Union v The Minister of South African National 
Defence Force.1 The judgment is critical for the understanding of how and when administrative 
law principles, as encapsulated in section 33 of the Constitution2 read with sections 1 and 3 of 
the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA),3 should be applied to dismissal cases in the 
context of South African National Defence Force (SANDF); their relevance to the defence 
legislative framework and defence force legal system and their applicability to disciplinary 
proceedings within this system.4 This study seeks to suggest how, with proper application; 
administrative law principles can enhance and develop “Military Administrative Justice” or Military 
Procedural Justice, if any,5 and also further the development of administrative law jurisprudence 
in general and in particular within the SANDF legal system or Military Justice System.   
                                            
1  South African National Defence Union v South African National Defence Force, unreported case no 
55001/09 (hereinafter referred to as SANDU 2010 judgment). 
2  Section 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the 
Constitution) is the just administrative action clause and it states that ‘Everyone has the right to 
administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. (2) Everyone whose rights 
have been adversely affected by administrative action has; the right to be given written reasons. (3) 
National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights and must- 
 (a) provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where appropriate; 
 (b) impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in subsections (1) and (2); an independent 
and impartial tribunal; and 
 (c) promote an efficient administration’. 
3  The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (hereinafter referred to as the PAJA) was 
promulgated to give effect to the rights in section 33 of the Constitution.  
4  South African National Defence Force (hereinafter referred to as SANDF). SANDF is governed and 
managed through the legislative framework, which comprises amongst others, the Constitution, the 
Defence Act 42 of 2002, Military Justice System, the Public Service Act 103 of 1994, the Public 
Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 and the Rules and Regulations of the Defence. See also Le 
Roux L “The Post-apartheid South African Military: Transforming with the Nation” in Rupiya M (ed) 
Evolutions and Revolutions (2005) 235 at 235. 
5  Heinecken L, Nel M and Van Vuuren JJ “Military Discipline: Where are we going Wrong” Strategic 
Review for Southern Africa (2003) 89. Military justice is a term, which is made up of Military Justice 
System otherwise referred to as the criminal law of the soldier. The function of Military Criminal 
Justice is to set out the course of action to follow concerning disciplinary offences and violations of 




For the purpose of this study, Military Administrative Justice6 means a combination of military 
justice and administrative justice into a single system. Military justice is described as a system or 
the criminal law of the soldier which aims to set out the course of action to be followed concerning 
disciplinary offences and violations of law by military personnel.7 Administrative justice is 
explained in PAJA as the promotion of an efficient administration, good governance, the creation 
of a culture of accountability, openness and transparency in the public administration, or in the 
exercise of a public power or the performance of a public function by giving effect to the right to 
just administrative action.8 To a large extent, the military law system does not embrace the general 
principles of procedural fairness which are found in administrative law and in constitutional law. 
In this dissertation, it is argued that, because of its design, military law or the defence force 
legislative framework does not adequately address issues that are connected to procedural 
fairness. These issues are still not adequately provided for by the SANDF legal system and its 
Rules and Regulations which was largely based on the nature and principles of the apartheid 
system of government.  
 
Being mindful of the sui generis nature of the SANDF,9 it will be shown that, through proper 
application and interpretation by the courts, administrative law principles are well placed to 
provide the basis for developing rules and regulations of procedure for disciplinary proceedings 
before dismissal within the SANDF. These principles may also form the basis for developing 
procedural requirements to be met within the context of the military law system. Although the field 
of military law is wide and aimed at fulfilling a specific constitutional mandate, it is submitted that 
administrative law principles should find application within this system to address issues related 
to the right to procedural fairness in dismissal cases adequately, thereby providing procedural 
                                            
6  Military Administrative/Procedural Justice is a term specifically coined for this study. It is a 
combination of military justice and administrative justice. Gibson M “International Human Rights 
Law and the Administration of Justice through Military Tribunals: Preserving Utility while Precluding 
Impunity” Journal of International Law and International Relations (2008) 4 at 7.  
7  Military Criminal System was created with a separate system of courts, this system is mainly based 
on the Military Discipline Supplementary Measures Act 16 of 1999 (hereinafter referred to as 
MDSMA) read with its Rules of Procedure Government Notice R747 in Government Gazette No 
20165 of 11 June 1999 (hereinafter referred to as Rules) and the Military Discipline Code as 
amended First Schedule to the Defence Act 44 of 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the MDC). The 
terms Administrative justice and procedural justice will be used interchangeably in the research 
study. 
8  Preamble of PAJA. 
9  See Minister of Defence v Potsane; Legal Soldier (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Defence 2002 (1) SA 1 




justice to members of the SANDF.10 It will further be argued that the fact that the defence force is 
considered to be sui generis, its authorities should not be exempted from acting within the scope 
of the Constitution in order to enforce discipline.11  
 
Because of the wide ambit of military law, this study will be limited to the examination of defence 
legislative provisions that deal with administrative and procedural requirements which should be 
applied to disciplinary proceedings before dismissal. This study will also identify 
omissionsOmissions that seem to exist in the Defence Act, in the Rules and Regulations of 
Procedure, and in the defence legislative framework in general. The study will, therefore, not deal 
with military criminal procedural law, the Defence Act in general, the rules and regulations of the 
defence force in general other than rules of procedure. The focus is to explore the applicability of 
administrative law principles encapsulated in PAJA to military disciplinary proceedings in cases 
of labour related transgressions, such as participation in strike actions, misconduct, absenteeism 
without leave (AWOL), and other matters before dismissal.  
 
In the case of SANDU,12 the CCourt had to deal, amongst other issues, with unfair dismissal 
based on the ground of procedural unfairness through the application and interpretation of 
relevant constitutional law, military law, labour law, and administrative law provisions. The Court 
opted to deal with this issue through the application and interpretation of labour law principles, 
the Constitution and some of the relevant provisions of the Defence Act. The Court was silent on 
the provisions of administrative law, particularly the relevant provisions of PAJA, other than to 
mention section 33 of the Constitution.  
2. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
The SANDF is a national defence force which like all other military forces around the world, is 
based on a code of discipline. The defence force legislation, including rules and regulations of the 
defence force and its framework, was not designed to consist of any labour or administrative law 
related provisions that directly deal with issues of procedure and other labour related disputes. 
                                            
10  Section 200(2) of the Constitution, 1996 mandates the Defence Force to protect the Republic, its 
territorial integrity and its citizens. In order to achieve this objective, the Constitution prescribes that 
the Defence Force must be structured and maintained as a disciplined organisation.  
11  The Constitution of South Africa is the Supreme law of the Republic; all law and conduct should be 
consistent with the provisions in the Bill of Rights. See chapter 2 of the Constitution, 1996. 
12  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1). 
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Disputes in the defence force were dealt with through the application and interpretation of military 
law within the then Military Justice System.  
 
The design of military legislation was influenced by the national mandate which all the military 
forces have to fulfill, that is to protect the country, its territorial borders and the citizens.  In South 
Africa another factor that influenced this design is the government system that existed before 
1994 which was based on parliamentary supremacy.  
 
After 1994, the Constitution, which was based on democratic principles, was introduced in South 
Africa. The system of government evolved from parliamentary supremacy to constitutional 
supremacy. All departments, including the defence force, the legislative frameworks and the 
conduct of all organs of state must now comply with the Constitution. Through the Constitution, 
human rights also became applicable to the members of the defence force. Some of the rights 
which were introduced include the right to procedural fairness, the right to just administrative 
action, and the right to fair labour practices. The design, the development, and application of the 
provisions of defence legislation and the defence force legislative framework must comply with 
the principles and values provided in the Constitution.  
 
One of the challenges which the SANDF authorities faces is to amend and repeal some of its 
legislative provisions contained in the Defence Act and other defence rules and regulations in 
order to become compliant with the Constitution in terms of section 2.13 Another challenge is to 
include other legal disciplines, such as labour and administrative law which were not present in 
the defence force context and provided for in the defence force legislation. To a certain extent, 
some of these challenges were overcome. The Defence Act14 was repealed and replaced by what 
was known as the New Defence Act.15 Chapter XX was promulgated to deal with labour related 
matters, and the Military Discipline Code was amended.16  
                                            
13  Section 2 of the Constitution provides that the “Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic, and 
any law or conduct which is inconsistent with it is invalid”. 
14  Defence Act 44 of 1957. 
15  Defence Act 42 of 2002. 
16  Chapter XX of the Defence Act 42 of 2002 in Government gazette 20376 of 20 August 1999. More 
on the circumstances surrounding the promulgation of chapter XX of the Defence Act, see South 
African National Defence Union v The Minister of South African National Defence Force 1999 (4) 
SA 469 (CC).  See also South African National Defence Union v The Minister of South African 
National Defence Force 1999 (6) BCLR 615 (CC). Chapters 1-20 of First Schedule to the Defence 
Act 44 of 1957 in Government Gazette 20165 of 11 June 1999, see also MDSMA (note 7). 
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The problem is the presence of a trail of legal disputes between the South African National 
Defence Union (SANDU) and the Minister of the SANDF that indicate that, although the processes 
to amend and repeal some provisions of the Defence Act and other defence force legislation were 
undertaken, there are OmissionsOmissions that still exist in this legislative structure. This is 
evidenced in the application of procedural fairness and fair labour practices in the defence force 
and disciplinary proceedings, as exposed in the SANDU trail of cases that took place between 
2009 and 2015.  
 
The solution to this problem may be provided by a further development of defence legislation and 
its legislative framework. This development may be achieved through the ordinary process of 
legislative review and also when the Courts, upon deciding a legal dispute that involves the 
defence force, properly apply and interpret relevant provisions of the Constitution, the Defence 
Act, the LRA, and the Promotion of Administrative Act.  
 
By choosing not to interpret and apply any of the relevant provisions of PAJA to resolve the legal 
dispute in the SANDU 2010 judgment, the Court missed an opportunity to develop administrative 
law or military administrative law. 17 The approach followed by the Court is not unique. There are 
a number of Court decisions, such as Chirwa18 and Sidumo19, which indicate the reluctance to 
apply principles of administrative law to dismissal cases of public sector employees.20  In most 
instances, the reasoning of the Courts includes the view that, because public sector employees 
are currently protected by the LRA,21 principles and provisions of labour law should find 
application in all dismissal matters.22  
 
There is, however, an essential difference between the reasoning of other Courts which dealt with 
the application of administrative law to dismissal cases of public sector employees and the 
reasoning of this Court that has to be noted. Other Courts dealt with dismissal cases of public 
service sector employees who are included in the scope of application and protection of the 
                                            
17  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1). 
18  Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (4) SA 367 (CC); 2008 (3) BCLR 251 (CC); (2008) 2 BLLR 97 (CC). 
19  Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Ltd 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC); 2007 (12) BLLR 1097 (CC); 2007 (28) ILJ 
2405 (CC). 
20  Chirwa (note 18). 
21  The Labour Relation Act 28 of 1956 and the LRA 44 of 1957 excluded public service employees 
from the scope of application. Both pieces of legislation were repealed and replaced by the Labour 
Relation Act 66 of 1995 (hereinafter referred to as the LRA). 
22  Chirwa (note 19) at para 34. The Constitutional Court held that administrative law should not find 
application to dismissal cases of public service employees. 
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LRA.23 The court in the SANDU24 case dealt with the unfair dismissal of members of the SANDF 
who are expressly excluded from the scope of application and protection of the LRA.25  
 
This situation leaves open the question concerning which law should find application when the 
right to fair labour practices, including the right not to be unfairly dismissed and the right to 
procedural fairness of members of the SANDF, have been infringed? 
3. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
 
The aim of this study is to investigate the administrative law requirements which are currently 
available in the SANDF for disciplinary proceedings before a dismissal can be imposed as a 
sanction. This is an important component of fair procedure, and it is crucial that, before a dismissal 
can occur, some or all requirements for fair procedure must be complied with to ensure that 
administrative justice is achieved. The study will also examine the relevant provisions within the 
defence force legislative framework that deal with requirements for procedural fairness.  
 
If there are any Omissions in the Defence Force legislation, such as chapter XX, Military Discipline 
Supplementary Measures Act (MDSMA) and Defence Act Rules and Regulations of Procedure, 
they will be identified. It will be shown that administrative law should find application in the 
dismissal cases in SANDF to provide adequately for fair processes before dismissal and to 
guarantee procedural justice.  
 
Another objective of the study is to analyse the reasoning of the Court in the SANDU 2010 
judgement.26 This analysis will indicate that, despite the context of the Defence Forces, the 
Minister, given his/her  duty to maintain discipline, is not excused from complying with the 
principles of just administrative action provided for in section 33 of the Constitution unless 
otherwise limited through section 36. In that regard the study will postulate that the principles of 
                                            
23  Chirwa (note18). See also Sidumo (note 19). 
24  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1). 
25  Section 2 of the LRA is an exclusionary clause. The following categories of employees are excluded 
from the scope of application, members the South African National Defence Force, the National 
Intelligence Agency, and the South African Secret Service. Although members of the SANDF are 
considered public sector employees they are not considered public servants for purposes of the 
application of Public Service Amendment Act 30 of 2007 (hereinafter referred to as PSAA); they are 
also excluded from the scope of application of the Public Service Labour Relation Act 105 of 1994 
(hereinafter referred to as PSLRA).  
26  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1). 
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administrative law, as captured in section 33 of the Constitution read with the provisions of PAJA27, 
should have been applied and interpreted in this case. This study will also postulate that, if the 
court had opted for this approach, this matter might have been concluded and not escalated to 
the appeal stage. Another effect of this approach, as will be shown, is that administrative law 
jurisprudence would be further developed and the SANDF legislation framework will be expanded 
to include administrative law provisions that form the basis of labour related Defence Force 
procedural provisions.  
 
The research will further argue that, where the cause of action is procedural in nature in the 
particular context of defence force, PAJA is the relevant legislation that should be applied, either 
directly or indirectly. The relevance of PAJA in the context of the defence force is important 
because members of the defence force are expressly excluded from the application of the LRA 
which could adequately give protection to their employment rights, if the available defence force 
legislation is inadequate. Another important aspect of the application of PAJA is that the decision 
to dismiss members of SANDF can be regarded as an administrative action. 
 
Should the court consider it undesirable to apply the provisions of PAJA directly, the study seeks 
to suggest that the principles of administrative law should find indirect application in the SANDF 
through the infusion of of section 33 of the Constitution read with section 3 of PAJA to the relevant 
Defence Force Rules and Regulations of Procedure or within chapter XX of the Defence Act. In 
order to achieve the objectives of the study, the following research questions will be answered: 
3.1  Research questions 
 
 What was the historical, conceptual and procedural legislative framework of the SANDF before 
1994, if any?  
 Are there Omissions in the SANDF legislative framework? 
 Did the court in SANDU 2010 judgment avoid the application of the principles of administrative 
law or did the court make an omission in its reasoning? 
 Are members who are dismissed from the SANDF eligible for the protection of section 33 of 
the Constitution and section 3 of PAJA? 
 How can procedural fairness be applied to members of the SANDF without threatening the 
culture of discipline which must be maintained because of the unique context of defence? 
                                            
27  The PAJA (note 2). 
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 How has the introduction of the Constitution in South Africa affected the applicability of 
procedural fairness in the defence force and the relevant legislative framework in that regard? 
 What procedural measures were available in the SANDF to deal adequately and fairly with the 
issues of discipline before and after 1994? 
 Is the Minister of Defence entitled to dismiss members of the SANDF summarily without 
following the appropriate procedures in the interest of maintaining discipline?  
 What is the available relevant applicable legislative framework in the SANDF to ensure that 
the rights of members of the SANDF to procedural fairness and fair labour practices are 
adequately protected? 
 What lessons can be learnt from the SANDU 2010 judgment in the context of developing 
military administrative law? 
 Is there a need to amend some of the provisions of the MDSMA, the Defence Force Rules and 
Regulations of Procedure and schedules dealing with disciplinary procedures within the 
SANDF and chapter XX of the Defence Act, 2002 which deals with labour disputes? 
4. JUSTIFICATION 
 
The study will contribute to the administrative law knowledge that will influence further 
development of defence force legislation, particularly those provisions which are relevant to issues 
connected to the applicability of procedural fairness to action by members of the SANDF. The 
study will contribute to the development of the defence legislative framework by identifying and 
indicating the omissions which might exist in this framework proposing how administrative law 
principles might narrow these omissions.  
 
In this regard it is important to understand the development of the defence legislation over the 
years and why members of the defence force have always been treated differently. This will assist 
in influencing the drafters of defence force policies and white papers to evaluate whether the 
changes in the current defence force legislative framework which were made after 1994, are 
merely rehashing age-old concerns still under the influence of parliamentary supremacy and 
outdated legal frameworks or effecting actual change and complying with the constitutional 
mandate in the true sense. 
 
It has been stated that not much has been written on military law.  This implies that the current 
legislative framework might still be lacking important aspects such as those which are aimed at 
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addressing procedural requirements in disciplinary enquiries and processes before a decision to 
dismiss can be made. Some of these procedural requirements are covered in most cases by 
legislation such as the LRA which gives effect to the rights in section 23 of the Constitution.  
Administrative law, on the other hand, deals extensively with the related procedural requirements 
for process and procedures when public law and power are exercised. The research will, therefore, 
influence policy on how to develop defence legislation which deals with labour disputes further, in 
particular, chapter XX and MDSMA which is the code of conduct in the SANDF. 
5. DELIMITATION 
 
This study is limited to, and will focus only on, the applicability of administrative law principles to 
dismissal cases of members of the SANDF. The study will only discuss how PAJA should be 
applied in the context of the SANDF to protect the right to procedural fairness. The study will not 
discuss the applicability of administrative law to the dismissal of public service employees in detail. 
The debate on the applicability of administrative law to dismissal cases of public sector employees 
has been undertaken by various authors, such as Grogan,28 Hoexter29 and others. The reason the 
study is limited to the dismissal cases of members of the SANDF is to enable an exploration of 
the possibility of PAJA finding application and, in that regard, narrowing the gap which seems to 
exist in the SANDF legislative framework.  
  
                                            
28  Grogan J “Administrative law in labour matters” Annual Survey of SA Law (2006) 605; Steenkamp 
A “W[h]ither the labour courts? The superior courts bill and the future of the labour courts” (2006) 
27 ILJ 18; See also Grogan J Workplace Law 10 ed (2009) 434.  
29  Hoexter C “Clearing the intersection? Administrative law and labour law in the Constitutional Court” 
(2008) 1 CCR 209 at 210. 
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6. FRAMEWORK  
 
Structurally, the dissertation will consist of six chapters. Chapter one will be the general 
introduction in which background information of SANDU v Minister of South African National 
Defence Force will be discussed. The relationship between the applicability of administrative law 
to dismissal cases and the SANDU 2010 judgment will also be briefly discussed in chapter one. 
In chapter two the nature of a national defence force and military law system will be discussed. 
This chapter will also look at the historical background of the development of the SANDF military 
law system and its defence legislative framework.  Chapter three will deal with the facts of the 
SANDU 2010 judgment.  Chapter three will also look at all the judgments that seemingly led to the 
SANDU 2010 judgment.  Chapter four will examine the concepts that the Court had to deal with 
in the SANDU 2010 judgment.   Chapter four will discuss discipline and procedural fairness in 
general and in the particular context of SANDF. Chapter five will analyse the reasoning of the 
Court in relation to the legislative provisions applied by the court.  This chapter will also critically 
analyse the approach of the court to exclude the provisions of PAJA in its reasoning. Chapter six 
is the conclusion of the study. 
 
Recommendations will be made which will propose the feasibility of crafting and developing a 
defence force legislative framework couched in the principles of administrative law, particularly 
section 3 of PAJA.  
7. CONCLUSION 
 
In the preceding discussion, the study was introduced by briefly referring to and explaining the 
SANDU 2010 judgment.30 The chapter mentioned why this judgment is important for paving the 
way for PAJA to be applied within the context of SANDF to disputes that involves application of 
procedural fairness. The chapter also briefly mentioned what the Court in SANDU 2010 judgment 
had to deal with and the approach it followed.  All relevant legislative provisions that the court had 
to interpret and which the research will focus on were mentioned. The concept of Military 
Administrative Law was introduced.  
 
                                            
30  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1). 
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The problem statement was also discussed. It was indicated that there seems to be an omission 
in the SANDF legislative framework that must deal with the application of procedural fairness. 
The design of defence force legislation and the circumstances under which this legislation was 
promulgated was discussed. The inadequacy of this legislation and the possible cause was also 
mentioned.  It was also discussed that the introduction of the democratic Constitution also 
contributed to the challenges that were faced by the Minister of SANDF. This chapter looked at 
how the SANDF dealt with some for the challenges that were introduced by the democratic 
Constitution. 
 
This chapter also discussed the aims and objective of the research, the arguments that will be 
advanced, research questions, justification and delimitation of the research. 
 
In the next chapter, the nature and historical background of procedural fairness in the SANDF will 
be discussed. The chapter will also trace the history of the application of procedural fairness in 






NATURE, HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SANDF AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 




In the previous chapter the introduction to the study and the problem statement were discussed. 
It was indicated that one of the reasons, amongst others, that seemingly gave rise to some of the 
legal disputes between the SANDF and the SANDU is the introduction of a constitutional 
democracy in South Africa.  Through the Constitution, the system of government changed from 
that of parliamentary sovereignty which dominated before 1994. Since 1994 the South African 
government system has been based on the supremacy of the Constitution which demands 
compliance with its provisions by all laws, organs of state and government departments, including 
the SANDF.31  
 
The Constitution changed the manner in which the actions of organs of state would be accounted 
for and how functionaries of state departments, including the national defence force, exercised 
public power.32  The Constitution, through the Bill of Rights, introduced what can be described as 
a culture of human rights in the defence force. Included in the Bill of Rights are the fundamental 
rights to procedural fairness and fair labour practices that are extended to ‘everyone’, including 
members of the SANDF.33 In order to extend those rights to members of the SANDF, the 
legislative framework of the defence force had to evolve from its traditional military justice system 
which was based on the culture of discipline informed by principles of parliamentary supremacy, 
                                            
31  Section 2 and section 8(1) of the Constitution confirms the supreme status of the Constitution and 
the consequences of non-compliance with its provisions by any law and conduct of organs of state.  
Section 2 of the Constitution is the supremacy clause and section 8(1) refers to the application of 
the Bill of Rights.  
32  Section 195(1) of the Constitution, 1996 provides for principles governing public administration and 
section 198 provides principles governing security services. 
33  Sections 23 and 33 (1) of the Constitution provide for the right to fair labour practices and for lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair administrative action. 
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to the transformed military law system and the legal framework that is founded on the culture of 
human rights in terms of the democratic principles and values of the Constitution.34  
 
One of the landmark developments in the defence force based on the Constitution was the 
introduction and establishment of a military trade union.35 This development was necessary, 
particularly in the light of the political history of South Africa.36  To this end, the role and approach 
of the Courts whose function it is to guard and protect the Constitution by interpreting its provisions 
and the Bill of Rights, with a view to developing the law and promoting the values contained in 
the Constitution, is crucial. The Courts are encouraged to follow an inclusive approach when 
interpreting the Bill of Rights.37 
 
The Court in the SANDU 2010 judgment had to deal with the allegation of an infringement of the 
right to procedural fairness of members of the SANDF.38 The court found that the Minister’s action 
of dismissing members of the SANDF was procedurally unfair.39 While the Court order is 
acceptable, it could be suggested that the approach followed by the Court in interpreting some of 
the legislative provisions and constitutional provisions that are relevant to this matter was 
restricted and that, to some extent, it denied any further development of military administrative 
law or the applicability of administrative law in the context of the national defence force.  
 
In order to understand the approach adopted by the Court and its reasoning in this judgment, it is 
important firstly to trace the evolution of a national defence force and the history of the 
development of a military justice system, military law and, in particular, South African defence 
                                            
34  The preamble, sections 1 and 195 of the Constitution firmly establish the values and principles by 
which South Africa must be governed. Section 1 sets out the values on which the Republic of South 
Africa is based and section 195 set of the principles and values governing public administration. 
35  Heinecken L “Military unionism and the management of employee relations within armed forces: A 
comparative perspective” International Journal of Comparative Labour and Industrial Relations 
(2010) 401 at 410. The South African National Defence Union came into existence on 2 August 
1995.  
36  The political history of South Africa is beyond the scope of the research. Suffice it to mention that 
South African politics before 1994 were such that the introduction of a trade union in the military 
after 1994 could be justified. See also Heinecken L and Nel M “Military unions and the right to 
collective bargaining: Insights from the South African experience” The International Journal of 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations (2007) 23 463 at 468. 
37  Section 39(1) of the Constitution states that “when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a Court, Tribunal 
or Forum must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom”. 
38  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1). 
39  Ibid. 
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force legislation and its legislative framework.40 Secondly, in order to place this line of reasoning 
by the Court into context, it is necessary to discuss the kind of relationship that exists between 
the Minister and the SANDU. The application of military justice through military law and the 
defence force legislative framework seem to have created an adverse effect on the relationship 
between the Minister and some members of the SANDF who are also members of the SANDU 
and its officials.41 
 
This chapter will discuss the nature of a National Defence Force including that of the SANDF. The 
historical background of the development of a Military Law System in general and within the 
particular context of South Africa from 1800 to 1957, the era of parliamentary supremacy which 
was dominant from the 1960s to the 1990s and the era of constitutional supremacy which was 
introduced after 1994 will be traced and discussed. Lastly, the relationship between the Minister 
of Defence and the SANDU in so far as the introduction of this military trade union into the defence 
force is concerned, and the subsequent conflicts which led to a number of legal disputes, including 
the main SANDU judgment, will also be discussed.  
2.  THE NATURE OF A NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE AND MILITARY LAW SYSTEM 
 
The rationale for the existence of any military force is two-fold, to protect the state, its territorial 
borders, its boundaries and its citizens, and to maintain order, peace and stability in the country 
in times of war and in times of peace.42 During peacetime, the purpose of a military force is mainly 
to maintain order, peace and stability in the country and to prevent internal trouble. In wartime, it 
is to protect the country against foreign violence and invasion.43  Discipline is the backbone of the 
                                            
40  Ibid. 
41  The relevant defence legislative framework includes the Defence Act 44 of 2002, the Military 
Discipline Code, Military Discipline Supplementary Measures Act of 1999 and Chapter XX of the 
Defence Act read with Rules and Regulations of the Defence Force. See also Heinecken L “South 
Africa: Facing the challenge of military unionism” Military Unionism in the Post-Cold War Era: A 
Future Reality? (2006) 157. 
42  Theron FH “The union defence forces of South Africa” Royal United Services Institution Journal 
(2009) 75 744 at 754.  
43  In terms of the South African Defence Policy, the primary role of the SANDF is to defend the country 
against external aggression. The secondary function is to ‘defend and protect its people in 
accordance with the Constitution and principles of international law’, that the SANDF has been most 
operational since 1990. Most recently the objectives set in the African Union (AU) and the new 
partnership for Africa’s development (NEPAD). See also section 200 of the Constitution 1996, 
Defence Review and the White Paper on Defence of May 1996. 
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military force in any particular period. Captain FC Theron sums up the environment of the military 
force as follows:44 
 
“[e]ach man in the time of peace trained daily and automatically as a horseman and rifleman, 
because the Horse was his only means of movement, and Game his principal meat diet. In 
time of war every male citizen was mobilized, that is commandeered, and had to appear 
mounted, armed, and carrying three days’ provision, all at his own expense”.45 
 
The above view may suggest the reason why disciplinary measures for breach of orders, acts of 
insubordination or ill-discipline were met with harshness and were not tolerated in any given 
period in the military force.46 This is mainly because in earlier times the world was often at war. 
Peacetime was short-lived. For example, the South African Defence Force participated in both 
the First and Second World Wars as well as in the Korean War.47  The purpose of protecting the 
country is viewed by Rupiya as a national mandate which means that members of any defence 
force must always be ready and prepared to safeguard the country or the Republic’s national 
security.48 Since the natural characteristic of the military or defence forces is the endowment of 
national security, the military or defence forces are regarded as symbols of a country’s 
sovereignty and nationhood.49 It is through this lens that discipline could be viewed as being the 
pillar of a successful military force. As a result it could not be negotiated or sacrificed in the interest 
of procedural justice.   
 
Because of the nature and purpose of a national defence force, it can be suggested that 
administration of the defence force discipline did not place much emphasis on issues related to 
justice as understood by a civilian. In the context of defence forces, what was regarded as military 
justice was understood within purpose of the defence force. The circumstances which existed in 
former times and the method which was used to join most defence forces also gives background 
to the nature and purpose of the defence forces.  
                                            
44  Theron FH (note 42) at 754. 
45  Ibid. 
46  Schlueter D “The military justice conundrum: Justice or discipline” Military Law Review (2013) 215. 
See also United States v McCarty 1960 (29) at para 761, where the severity of punishments during 
World War II were noted.  
47  Le Roux L (note 4) at 243.  
48  Rupiya M “Context of study” in Rupiya M (ed) The Enemy within: Southern African Militaries’ Battle 
with HIV/AID” (2006) 1-4 at 1. 
49  Rupiya M and Simapuka L “Southern African militaries’ battle with HIV/AID” in Rupiya (ed) The 
Enemy within: Southern African Militaries’ Battle with HIV/AID” (2006) 7-19 at 8. 
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The usual way of joining the defence force at the time was not voluntary but mandatory, through 
conscription.50 Because the main purpose of most national defence forces around the world was 
to protect their respective countries from foreign invasion and any kind of violence, eligible men 
were conscripted into the defence forces. In order to achieve the purpose of the defence force, 
and to maintain and enforce discipline within the force, an instrument that would give powers to 
commanders had to be developed.51  
 
The nature and purpose of most national defence forces formed the basis for developing this 
instrument which is known as military law. According to Morris, Military Law was a tool that was 
developed to enforce discipline in the military force.52 Its primary purpose was to promote military 
justice, to assist in maintaining good order and discipline in the military forces, to promote 
efficiency and effectiveness in the military establishment, and to strengthen the national security 
of the country.53 It granted powers to the commanders to encourage preserve and administer 
discipline. In order to maintain and effectively enforce discipline, command powers were 
concentrated in one person who had the discretion to exercise those powers without necessarily 
being accountable, and, as a result, these discretionary powers were often subjected to abuse. 54  
 
The authority to enforce discipline was historically derived from the concept of the paterfamilias, 
who, as head of the household, held absolute power over his family and household.55  Owing to 
the circumstances of that period, in most instances, the approach adopted by commanders in 
exercising the powers to maintain and enforce military discipline could, therefore, be justified and 
accepted. 
 
Soldiers were also trained to obey commands readily and accept the punishments that were 
meted out in case of breach of the expected discipline. This implies that, in order to enforce 
discipline, expedient sanctions were taken and requirements related to procedural justice were 
neither considered nor complied with. Renn supports this approach and argues that the standards 
of procedural fairness must of necessity be violated in order to discipline a unit into combat 
                                            
50  Theron FH (note 42) at 746.  
51  Section 1 of Defence Act of 1912.  
52  Morris L Military Justice: A Guide to the Issues (2010) at 3. 
53  Schlueter D (note 46) at 6. 
54  Morgan EM “The existing court martial system and the ansell army article” Yale Law Journal (1919) 
29 50 at 66. 
55  Nel M Sentencing Practices in the Military Courts (Unpublished LLD thesis UNISA 2012) at 36. 
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readiness.56 He argues further that the slightest form of breach of discipline might have led to 
grave results not only to the individual soldier but to the country at large.57 In this regard, military 
law through a military law system, was considered to be a tool that might properly and speedily 
enforce discipline in the military forces.58  
 
This is because the functional requirements of war or combat efficiency are that the defence force 
must display unity, group solidarity and inter-dependence, as Downes argues.59 Other legal 
disciplines, such as labour law and administrative law, did not traditionally form part of military 
law. Farnham is of the opinion that this is because, traditionally, labour relations in the defence 
forces were managed from a unitary perspective and not from the pluralist point of view. 60  
2.1  The SANDF context 
 
The nature and purpose of the Union Defence Force (UDF), as it was known before it changed 
to SADF and ultimately the SANDF, is no different from the nature of any other national defence 
force around the world. The SANDF has as its objective two functions. Firstly, it serves to protect 
the Republic, its territorial boundaries and its citizens from any external attacks. Secondly, it 
protects and maintains peace and stability in the Republic from internal unrest or civil commotion.  
 
Military discipline is required to achieve the objectives of the SANDF and to maintain an efficient 
and professional national defence force. In order to regulate, maintain and enforce discipline, 
South Africa had to develop a tool that would legitimately provide commanding powers. In this 
regard the main legislation that was promulgated was modelled on the British Army Act61 was the 
Defence Act of 1912 which was amended in 1922.62 The objective of this legislation, amongst 
other things, was to make it compulsory for white male citizen above the age of 18 years to join 
the defence force. This objective was in line with the system of government of the time.  
 
                                            
56  Renn E “The dilemma of military discipline and procedural justice” Student Law Journal (1971-1972) 
15. 
57  Ibid. 
58  Morris L (note 52) at 3. 
59  Downes CJ “To be or not to be a profession: The military case” Defence Analysis (1985) 1 147 at 
161. 
60  Franham D and Pimlott J Understanding Industrial Relations (1995) at 46. 
61  British Army Act of 1881. South Africa was a British colony and was under the British monarch 
therefore Britain was the supreme commander of the Union Defence Forces; consequently the 
British Army Act of 1881 was applied to all matters of the defence forces. 
62  Defence Act 1922. 
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Section 1 of the Defence Act provided that all male citizens between ages seventeen and sixty 
must render their services during the time of war to defend the Union.63  This section advanced 
the purpose of the defence force which was also supported by the defence policy. The main 
purpose of this legislation was to provide for the statutory enforcement of discipline in both 
wartime and peacetime. It is unclear whether the disciplinary provisions of this legislation made 
any distinction with regard to the requirements to be met for disciplinary procedures and 
processes for breach of discipline in each period. What is clear is that sanctions imposed by the 
commanding powers were intended for maintenance and enforcement of discipline.    
 
The origins of this legislation come from the British Act referred to above and this legislation 
continued with the same structure it inherited.64 The challenge with the crafting of legislation in 
this manner is that, although its focus is to instil, maintain and enforce discipline which is in line 
with the purpose and nature of a defence force, it does not evolve as circumstances change. It 
still retained the previously created harsh punishments for transgressions which do not 
necessarily currently require such harshness, and it also did not distinguish between minor and 
major transgressions during the relevant periods.  
 
Since the nature of the defence force laid the foundation for the design of the military law, the 
design did not include a distinction between punishments meted out for breach of discipline during 
wartime and for those in peacetime. This is also influenced by the inherent function of the military 
or defence force.  Burroughs states that: 65  
 
“[t]he aim of military law is to enforce the discipline which is deemed essential to military 
efficiency and victory in battle and to cultivation of high morale”.66  
 
This suggests that, generally, the military law system and its legislative framework had a 
constrictive focus which aimed only at enforcing discipline and providing for the punishment of 
acts of military criminal offences. Similarly, in the South African context, the political 
circumstances at the time had an influence on the manner in which the military law system was 
developed, crafted and administered.  
                                            
63  Section 1 of Defence Act 1912. See also Captain Theron FH (note 42) at 746. 
64  British Army Act (note 61). 
65  Burroughs P “Crime and punishment in the British Army 1815-1870” The English Historical Review 
(1985) 545 at 550. 




This strict focus did not accommodate changing circumstances. For example, the South African 
political circumstances began to change during the 1980s until 1994. The effect of this change 
was that the military law system and its legislative framework, such as the Defence Act, its Rules 
and Regulations, Defence Policies and the implementation strategies, also changed to 
accommodate emerging threats and changing circumstances.  Although it is noted that the nature 
of the SADF was to remain intact, some aspects of the organisational culture of the defence force 
needed to be adapted to these changes. The aim, objective and core function of the defence force 
would also be maintained and kept intact through the changing military law system.  
 
The rigid and arbitrary command structures which existed within the defence force system 
required the introduction of a military justice system through the intervention of ordinary courts to 
ensure some form of accountability.67 In the case of O Callahan v Parker which was decided in 
1969, the Court held that there was evidence of procedural injustice and other forms of injustices 
which made it necessary to separate crimes which are not service-connected from military 
jurisdiction.68 It can be deduced from this decision that this was a proposal to introduce some form 
of distinction between procedural requirements to be complied with for disciplinary processes to 
deal with transgressions committed in wartime and in peacetime and their related sanctions.   
 
Tshabalala is of the opinion that the rigid military justice system and the organisational culture of 
the SADF promoted the abuse of power by the apartheid leaders and also the advancement and 
protection of the apartheid regime. 69 The court, in SANDU v The Minister of Defence and others, 
noted that a change of dispensation warrants a change in the legislation governing the defence 
force. 70 Post-1994, the drafters of the defence legislation had to pay attention to chapter 3 of the 
Interim Constitution,71 which was superseded by chapter 2 of the final Constitution.72  
There are two important historical eras which could be perceived to have influenced the need to 
consider an approach that included administrative law in developing the defence force legislative 
framework. This era is the post-constitutional era. In order to set the scene and to describe the 
                                            
67  O Callahan v Parker 1969 (395) 258 (U.S.) See also Renn E (note 56) at 15. 
68  O Callahan v Parker (note 67) at 264. 
69  Tshabalala L Transformation in the Military Police Agency of the SANDF (unpublished MA 
dissertation (2004) at 25. 
70  South African National Defence Union v The Minister of South African National Defence Force 1999 
(6) BCLR 615 (CC). 
71  Chapter III of the 1993 Interim Constitution provided for the Bill of Rights (hereinafter the interim 
Constitution).  
72  Chapter 2 of the Constitution provides for the Bill of Rights. 
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development of the military law and the defence legislative framework, however, a brief 
discussion about the era before the new Constitution is necessary.   
3. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE MILITARY LAW SYSTEM AND ITS DEFENCE 
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK  
3.1  Era before 1993 
 
According to Nel the history of the South African military law is based on British military law which 
was transplanted into South African law after the country’s colonisation by the British Empire. 73 
This view is different from that of Oosthuizen in so far as the origin of South African military law 
is concerned.74 Oosthuizen is of the opinion that the South African military common law is, in fact, 
based on Roman military law influenced by English military law.75 Suffice it to mention that the 
South African military law has undergone minimum development since the time of the Anglo Boer 
War, 1899 to 1902.  
 
 
The peace accord which marked the end of the Anglo Boer War was signed in 1902.76 It also 
brought an end to the traditional defence structures of the two Boer Republics which existed at 
the time.77 According to Nel, in the period between 1903 and 1910, South Africa consisted of four 
coloniesof the British Empire.78 Consequently Britain handled all South African military matters, 
including those of a disciplinary nature.79 For a number of reasons, apart from the imperial forces, 
Britain allocated to each colony an independent military force.80 Because military forces were 
independent from one another, problems were experienced with regard to the military 
organisation, training and discipline of the different military forces.81  
 
                                            
73  Nel M (note 55) at 36. See also Brand C E Roman Military Law (1968) at 3. 
74  Nel M (note 55) at 36. 
75  Ibid.  
76  Nel M (note 55) at 98. 
77  Ibid. 
78  Ibid. 
79  Ibid. 
80  Ibid. 
81  Ibid. 
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This led to a London colonial conference in 1907 which resulted in discussions about those 
problems and a subsequent proposal for imperial military uniformity.82  In 1908 a decision was 
reached in a conference in Durban to create a uniform name for all divisions of the military 
forces,83 to have a uniform disciplinary approach, as well as uniform disciplinary procedures and 
uniform offences and punishments for all military forces.84  In addition, with a view to unite the 
colonies and the military forces, the British officers and some citizens began to formulate new 
defence legislation for the envisaged Union Defence Force.85  
 
The Defence Bill was drafted with a view to creating a new structure of the defence force by 
borrowing some ideas from the defence force structures and legislative provisions of other 
countries, such as Switzerland, Australia and Norway, amongst others.86 The structure of the 
Union Defence Force was, therefore, influenced by these different models.  
 
The crafting of the legislative provisions, processes and procedures to maintain and enforce 
discipline, related offences and punishments was informed and influenced by the British model.87 
Chapter VII of the Defence Bill made provision for offences and punishments.88 This chapter was 
drafted borrowing ideas from the Army Act of Britain and Ireland89 and from the Defence Act of 
the Cape of Good Hope.90  
 
  
                                            
82  Ibid. 
83  Ibid. 
84  Ibid. 
85  Ibid. 
86  Ibid. 
87  Nel M (note 55) at 101. 
88  Ibid. 
89  Army Act of Britain and Ireland Act 25 of 1898. Sections 94 and 123 of the Defence Bill were 
incorporated and published in an extraordinary Government Gazette 1911 Notice no 1970 of 191 1 
of 30 November. 
90  Nel M (note 55) at 101. 
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The establishment of the Union caused the South African authorities to start taking over more 
responsibilities in the Union Defence Force. The Zuid Afrika Verdedigingswet came into operation 
on 13 June 1912, and it replaced the British Army Act of 1881.91 The Union government was not 
under any obligation to renew the Union Defence Force legislation, although this was a 
requirement with which Britain had to comply.92 
 
SADF and military law system in terms of the Defence Act of 1912 under the South 
African Union Government 
 
The South African Defence Force (SADF) developed from the Union Defence Force which had 
been established in 1912.93 It consisted of the army, the air force, the navy and the military health 
service.94 The main legislation relative to the South African Defence Force was the Defence Act 
of 1912.  This Act retained the approach of the British Act which distinguished between the navy 
and the rest of the defence force. Consequently, a different code of military discipline applied to 
members of the navy.95  
 
The strategic position of the SADF was based on the operationally offensive approach.96 The 
fundamental principle was that all threats, whether internal or external, must be contained, and, 
as a result, discipline was of the utmost importance. The executive control of the defence forces 
resided in the prime minister and his cabinet, and civil control was further enhanced by a civilian 
Ministry of Defence and a civilian Secretary for Defence.97 The Defence Act of 1912 remained in 
force until the promulgation of a new Defence Act on 10 June 1957. This Act created a uniform 
Military Discipline Code that was applicable to all arms of the military service, including the navy. 
The distinction between the navy and other defence forces was consequently abolished.98 
 
                                            
91  Section 95 of Defence Act 13 of 1912 (as it was known) provides that the British Army Act of 1881 
would continue to apply regarding disciplinary matters, which included offences and punishments. 
See also Nel M (note 55) at 102. 
92  Nel M (note 55) at 102. 
93  Le Roux L (note 4) at 243. 
94  Ibid. 
95  Nel M (note 55) at 103. 
96  Le Roux L (note 4) at 244. 
97  Le Roux (note 4) at 243. 
98  Nel M (note 55) at 103. 
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The Defence Act of 191299 was later amended by the Defence Act and Dominion Forces Act of 
1932.100 In terms of this Defence Amendment Act, the set of rules governing the discipline of the 
Union Defence Force became known as the Military Discipline Code.101 Chapter VII of the South 
Africa Defence Act 13 of 1912 provided for matters of discipline, related offences and legal 
procedure. This chapter was shaped by the provisions of the British Army Act of 1881. Section 
95 of the Defence Act of 1912 provided that the British Army Act would still apply to disciplinary 
matters in the Union Defence Force. Although section 95 was subsequently repealed by Act 32 
of 1932, section 2 of the Act of 1932 determined that the law applicable up to the date of the 
Amendment Act would remain applicable.102 The Defence Act 44 of 1957 was promulgated, and 
it retained the MDC as it had been introduced by the Defence Act 32 of 1932.103 Chapter XI of the 
Defence Act 44 of 1957 governs military discipline and military legal matters. Provisions of the 
MDC are still applicable to date.104 
  
Before the introduction of the Interim Constitution, the South African National Defence Force 
(SADF)105 was administered and governed under military law106 which had its focus on the 
discipline of the members of the defence union.107  Legislative control over the defence forces in 
this era was vested in parliament.108  
 
Dlamini109 is of the opinion that the focus of the defence system was not necessarily only on 
military discipline but also on the protection of the apartheid system which had a total disregard 
                                            
99  Defence Act of 1912. 
100  Defence Act and Dominion of Forces Act 32 of 1932 (hereinafter referred to as the Defence 
Amendment Act). 
101  MDC (note 7). 
102 Defence Act and Dominion of Forces Act (note 100). 
103  MDC (note 7). 
104  Ibid. 
105  The South African National Defence Force was established and recognised as the only defence 
force of the Republic in terms of the section 199 of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996. 
106  Morris L J (note 52) at 3 explains that military law is a tool that may properly assist in the 
enforcement of discipline. See also Nel M (55) at 14. 
107  “Military Discipline” in Defence Review (2014) 12 at (1-6). The Union of South Africa came into 
being on 31 May 1910, before the establishment of the Republic. The defence was therefore the 
defence union before it was South African Defence Force. Discipline is still the primary and 
important focus of the SANDF; the South African Defence Review states that “Sound military 
discipline, founded upon respect for, loyalty to, and properly constituted authority is the cornerstone 
of a professional and functional Defense Force” item 46 (c) 2014.  
108  Le Roux L (note 4) at 244. 
109  Dlamini S “Towards a new Defence Force in South Africa: The SADF and the problems of transition” 
University of Amsterdam (1991) at 38. 
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for human rights.110 Parliamentary supremacy in the pre-democratic era shielded state power and 
promoted state interests over public interests and human rights.111  
 
The main legislation with regard to defence was the Defence Act 44 of 1957, read with its Rules 
and Regulations.112 Military law,113 including the Defence Act was not developed and amended 
frequently, but from time to time, as and when the need arose.114 The military law system 
emphasised the importance of discipline.  Section 104 of the Defence Act 44 of 1957 was known 
as the Military Discipline Code. As already indicated, chapter XI of the Defence Act dealt with 
military discipline and military legal matters as captured in the MDC. 
 
Military Commanders were empowered to exercise their command discretionary powers to 
enforce and maintain discipline through the military law system and by the application of the 
provisions of the MDC in the Defence Act. Because the system of parliamentary supremacy 
allowed procedures and laws that limited the judicial review of administrative decisions at the 
time, access to Courts that facilitated Court intervention in cases where the actions or decisions 
through the exercise of state power by commanders adversely affected individual rights was not 
available. Discipline was regarded as the most important attribute for any member of the defence 
without due consideration of his/her individual rights.115  
 
Discipline was, and is still, regarded as the most important feature in the military in many 
countries. Rowe116 argues, however, that some military discipline uniquely exhibited harsh 
penalties for relatively non-serious offences.117 According to Rowe, this disciplinary pattern was 
mostly prevalent in the periods between nineteen and twentieth century. In South Africa, 
punishments for offences were regulated under section 104 of the Defence Act 44 of 1957 and 
regulations. Issues of procedural fairness in enforcing discipline within the existing military justice 
                                            
110  Ibid. 
111  Monyakane M An Evaluation of the Transformation of Public Service Delivery through the 
Development of Administrative Justice in South Africa (unpublished LLM dissertation, 2007) at 31.  
112  Defence Act read with Rules and Regulations of the Defence (note 7). 
113  For the history on Military Law see Brand CE Roman Military Law (1968). See also Williamson C 
The Laws of the Roman People: Public Law in the Expansion and Decline of the Roman Republic 
(2005) at ix. See also Nel M (note 55) at 36. 
114  In 1912, the Defence Act was passed, then it was amended in 1922, with another amendment in 
1957 (Defence Act 44 1957) and the latest amendment in 2002 (Defence Act 42 2002). For the 
history of the defence see Theron FH (note 42). 
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system were not provided for by the Defence Act. This view is supported by Dlamini who believed 
that the South African defence legislative system did not consider human rights.118 Nel is of the 
opinion that, in order to instil the required discipline on individual soldiers who were unwilling to 
submit to the disciplined regime, military discipline needed to be harsh.119 Consequently the main 
objective for the drafting of the defence legislative framework was to enforce discipline and not to 
recognise or protect individual rights.  
 
Chapter VII of the South African Defence Act 120 applied to matters of discipline, offences and 
legal procedure.121 The legal procedure referred to did not embrace the culture of human rights. 
As has already been indicated, the Defence Act of 1912 was subsequently amended by the 
Defence Act and Dominion Forces Act 32 of 1932 that made provisions for the promulgation of 
Defence Act 44 of 1957.122 All these Acts shared a similar feature, which was a lack of sections 
or a chapter dedicated to the protection of human rights. 
 
For the first time in the history of defence forces, a separate Military Discipline Code (MDC) was 
drafted and included in the Defence Act.123 The MDC contained certain amendments which are 
applicable to this day.124 Discipline and military legal matters were governed by chapter VI of the 
Defence Act 44 of 1957. Similar to the Defence Act of 1912, the Military Discipline Code consisted 
of the First Schedule to the Defence Act as well as the rules promulgated in terms of the Defence 
Act.125  
 
Through the promulgation of the MDC, an effort was being made to distinguish between the 
different types of offences. The MDC distinguished between military disciplinary offences and 
military criminal offences. Military disciplinary offences were those offences considered to be of a 
less serious nature for which the prescribed punishment was imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding one year, for example offences such as drunkenness, absence without leave and 
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125  Section 104 (1) of the Defence Act 44 of 1957. 
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conduct prejudicial to military discipline.126 This was an important development in influencing 
military legislation, such as the Defence Act which had been rigid for a long time. 
 
Historically, the manner in which the SADF was structured played an important part in the manner 
in which procedural fairness was applied to members of the defence force. Rowe127  is of the 
opinion that all soldiers are subject to all the laws of the country, but, owing to the fact that they 
belong to a distinctive group, certain laws have evolved to address the needs of this group. He 
admits that some acts and forms of conduct are prohibited in the military that are not punishable 
in a civilian profession and that the process of punishment is tailored for this group.128  
 
For a long time, military law had unique offences and punishments designed for, and focused on, 
maintaining discipline in a defence force normally consisting of conscripted members.129 Many 
defence forces consisted of military conscripts and this was acknowledged at an international 
level by the European Convention on Human Rights.130 This mode of recruitment was also used 
in the South African defence forces.  
 
In South Africa, the apartheid regime developed the concept of the ‘independent’ ‘black 
homelands’ of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei,131 and the South African defence 
structures had their own unique rules and regulations tailor-made for the South African context. 
The SADF comprised of citizens of the Republic who were mainly white males.  All males who 
were between the ages of 16 and 60 were compelled to join the Defence Force and to form part 
of the South African army, navy or air force.132  
 
A revolutionary armed wing of the ACN formed and introduced Mkhonto we Sizwe (MK) which 
was recognised in 1961.133 It was composed primarily of black males and a few females who were 
against the apartheid system of government. It could be suggested that, although the South 
African military law was not frequently developed in this era, it was still contextually adequate for 
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the regulation and administration of the main defence force of the Republic as well as the other 
defence forces, such as MK and other homeland defence forces, within the Republic.  
 
The administration of the defence force was based to a large extent by the system of 
administration of the Republic, which was parliamentary supremacy. Tshivhase134 is of the opinion 
that the system of apartheid also provided the administrators or ‘organs of state’ of the time, 
including commanders of defence force, with a safety net to avoid accountability for their 
actions.135  
 
Looking at the historical development of the South African military justice system, a clear pattern 
of court procedures, offences and punishments that remained static for a number of years can be 
shown.136 It is for this reason that military law was intended to accommodate the strong emphasis 
on discipline, often resulting in procedures and processes that were not always fair according to 
the views of civilians.137  
 
The practice of human rights was not only absent in the South African defence force but in 
defence forces world-wide. The adjustment that had to be made to introduce human rights into 
the military was enormous, and it cut through the core of the military tradition and practice.138  As 
part of the human rights culture of fairness, fair procedures should be equated to the common 
law rules of natural justice with the duty on the part of the administrator to act fairly, according to 
Baxter.139 The right to just administrative action, which encapsulates procedural fairness, is aimed 
at ensuring that the requirements of fairness in any disciplinary action are complied with. An 
adverse inference should not be drawn to suggest that discipline in the military will be eroded if 
procedural fairness is applied.  
 
In fact it can be argued that, through compliance with fair processes, the most minor matters in 
the military may be settled without the need to seek recourse to review proceedings. Baxter is of 
the opinion that these rules are the principles of good administration and he argues that their 
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enforcement serves as an example for future administrative action.140 In his view these rules 
facilitate accurate and informed decision making, and they also ensure that decisions are made 
in the public interest.141  
 
Public interest is especially important within the context of the SANDF because of the expectation 
of protection which exists within the society at large. The core function of the defence force to 
protect the republic and its citizens against any internal unrest and external threats also influences 
public expectation. One way to engender public confidence, and to influence public interest, is to 
ensure that justice should not only be done, but that it should manifestly be seen to be done.142 
 
The rules of natural justice were not only aimed at achieving a minimum standard for fair 
administrative hearings and enquiries, but also aimed at ensuring that the administrative bodies 
applied their minds to the matter by adhering to certain procedural requirements, by acting fairly, 
and by giving an individual an opportunity to be heard.143   
 
In terms of the audi alteram partem rule, an affected person must be afforded the opportunity to 
be heard and be granted the full disclosure of the relevant information, which includes the proper 
notice, reasonable notice, written representation, etc.144 All of these requirements should be 
available and practised within the military justice system and not only in the military criminal justice 
system as each discipline is purpose built.  
 
For example, for purposes of procedural fairness, administrative law could be considered 
relevant, and for criminal procedural matters, criminal procedural law. This construction is 
particularly important when it comes to resolving disputes that are related to transgressions which 
occur in peacetime and which are not classified as military criminal offences but which are, 
instead, labour related, such as being absent without leave, drunkenness, sleeping on the post 
and other related minor offences.  
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Brand145 is of the opinion that there is a need for the independent self-efficiency of the armed 
forces where it may become necessary to protect its operations outside the borders of the country 
where the state does not have territorial jurisdiction.146 While Brand’s opinion is noted for external 
matters, it can be argued that, for internal matters, there was no reason for the audi alteram 
partem rule not to find application in the military in South Africa even in the pre-constitutional era. 
It could be argued that this approach was a protective shield with regard to the accountability of 
administrators for their arbitrary actions, as suggested by Tshivhase.147 
 
In the SANDU 2010 judgment148 judgment, the court quoted from the Walele149 decision where it 
sought to highlight that the most important component of procedural fairness is expressed in the 
maxim of audi alteram partem, which requires that the parties affected by the decision be given 
a hearing before the decision is taken.150   
 
The court stated further that what gives rise to the right to be heard is the negative impact that 
the decision will have on the rights of a person claiming that she/he deserves to be heard.151 This 
implies that the common law rules of natural justice are not obsolete and that they still ensure 
procedural justice on the one hand, and, on the other, that the SANDF authorities cannot be 
exempted from following these rules because of the disciplinary context of the defence.  
 
The court also referred to the case of Zenzile152 where Justice Hoexter found that the fact that an 
employee may have little or nothing as a defence is a factor which should not be entertained when 
making an enquiry into whether the employee is entitled to a hearing before a decision is taken.153 
In the SANDU case, the Minister emphasised the fact that the members of the SANDF had 
committed mutiny and, in the process, he had adopted an unfair procedure to dismiss them.  
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In the case of Dhlamini,154 the court stated that the purpose of the audi alteram partem rule is to 
effect procedural fairness.155 It also indicated that there was no single model for its application to 
all conceivable cases.156 This implies that, even in the circumstances which do not seem ideal to 
apply procedural fairness, such as in the context of a defence force, these principles should still 
be applied, notwithstanding the context.  
 
Hoexter argues that the concept of fairness is flexible and can be adapted from case to case, 
implying that there is no context or circumstances which justify the exclusion of the application of 
procedural fairness.157 The emphasis on the application of the audi alteram partem rule is that, in 
the pre-democratic era, common law rules of natural justice were the mechanisms available to 
ensure procedural fairness.158 Administrative law was also applicable to dismissal cases of public 
servants before they were included in the scope of application of the current LRA.159  
 
In the context of the defence force, administrative law was not considered, although the 
application of military law acknowledged the audi alteram partem rule to a minimum extent.160 
This applicable minimum extent depended on the commander’s discretion. This aforementioned 
situation has been changed by the Constitution..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
3.2  Era After 1993 
 
The year 1994 with the advent of the Interim Constitution of 1993 was characterised by the 
election of a new democratic government which resulted in the change of the government system 
from parliamentary sovereignty to a constitutional supremacy. The government was under 
reconstruction and it required the transformation of the different departments, policies, and 
legislative acts. This included the restructuring of the executive levels of the state and the 
formulation of the proposed policies and positions of new government.  
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The Department of Defence was not spared this process. The new Minister of Defence also 
embarked on the formulation of a White Paper on Defence in 1995.161 In the history of South 
Africa only a number of Defence White Papers had been drafted.  The process of developing 
these white papers was conducted in a closed environment by parliament.162 In other words, there 
was no transparency in the manner that these white papers had been developed. Contrary to the 
previous government, the newly- established government developed a White Paper on Defence 
through the process that was to be significantly different in two regards, firstly in terms of its 
content and its inclusivity.163 After the White Paper on Defence of 1995, the 1998 White Paper on 
Defence was drafted. Its aim was to define clearly the primary function of the SANDF which is “to 
defend South Africa against external military aggression”.164  
 
Whilst the aim of the white paper was in general achieved, there were other important aspects 
that it did not address, such as the transformation of the military disciplinary code, the 
mechanisms to resolve labour related disputes, and its procedural requirements for disciplinary 
processes. 
 
Constitutional democracy in South Africa also presented new challenges for the defence force. 
One of the many challenges which were faced by the SADF authorities was to align the defence 
force and the defence legislative frameworks with the Constitution and its Bill of Rights.165 This 
meant that the defence commander’s discretionary powers were to be exercised within the 
parameters of the Constitution, which had not been the case before 1994.  
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In addition, the defence legislation empowering the commanders also had to be amended to 
comply with the Constitution.166 This means that the SANDF had to adjust not only to a new 
strategic environment, but also to a new political dispensation that affected almost every aspect 
of its existence.167 This also means that commanders could no longer exercise discretion when 
they apply procedural fairness; instead they must now exercise public power to conduct 
disciplinary processes in accordance with the Constitution. Section 33 of the Constitution, read 
with the relevant provisions of PAJA, extends the requirements of natural justice and adequately 
gives effect to the right to procedural fairness 
 
Some of the challenges experienced in the SANDF were compounded by the fact that the 
Constitution introduced what seemed to be a clash of provisions in the bill of fundamental rights 
and other provisions relevant to the defence force, such as section 201.168 On the one hand, a 
culture of human rights was introduced in the defence force. This culture was not common in the 
defence force, and the relevant legislation did not provide for it. Individual soldier’s fundamental 
rights are now protected by the Constitution, unless otherwise limited, and this limitation complies 
with the Constitution. On the other hand, other provisions of the Constitution give the mandate on 
what the functions of the defence forces and how a defence force must be structured and 
managed.169   
 
Part of the structural management which is prescribed by the Constitution is that the defence 
force must be structured and managed as a disciplined force. Chapter two of the Constitution 
contains the fundamental human rights which are granted to everyone, including members of the 
defence forces. This clash which seems to exist between some constitutional provisions means 
that all the enabling legislation, including the defence legislative framework, had to describe the 
application parameters and limitation to give effect to the rights in the Constitution.  
 
This is an exercise which requires harmony in the application of these rights and the related 
obligations. To a certain extent, some of the SANDU judgments illustrate that some provisions in 
the Defence Act still need to be developed and aligned with the Constitution. 
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Section 104 of the Defence Act 44 of 1957 and its Regulations remained in force until they were 
repealed and replaced by Defence Act 42 of 2002. Some of the provisions of the Defence Act 
were challenged for being unconstitutional as far back as 1999.170  Through the interpretation of 
the relevant provisions of the Defence Act and the Constitution, the courts granted orders which 
forced the Minister of Defence to improve the Defence Act further.171  
 
Other defence Rules and Regulations were also promulgated to align the defence legislative 
framework with the Constitution. Some of this newly-promulgated legislation still does not 
adequately give effect to other provisions in the Constitution, such as section 33, which grants 
the right to procedural fairness.172 To this end, the SANDF legislation still needs to be further 
developed to avert legal disputes between the Minister of Defence and the defence union.  
 
This is despite the fact that the legislative framework of the new SANDF has been amended 
during the past ten years in order to comply with the Constitution.173 The Interim Constitution 
provided for the establishment of a single national defence force.174 The Interim Constitution of 
1993 was superseded by the final Constitution of 1996 which deals with the structure and 
regulation of the South African National Defence Force in terms of sections 199-204.175 
   
The defence force is regulated by sections 199, 200 and 201 the Constitution which provide for a 
legislative framework and military justice system within the SANDF that espouses and enforces 
discipline as prescribed.176 In this regard the relevant legislation is the Defence Act 42 of 2002 
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which largely repealed the Defence Act 44 of 1957.177  Section 104 of this Act lists the military 
offences, while the MDSMA (as well as the rules of procedure promulgated in terms of the 
MDSMA) creates the military court system and provides for the relevant court procedures. 
Chapter XX was promulgated as part of the legislative framework of the defence force to deal 
with issues related to labour matters and to address labour disputes.178 
 
 
The provisions of the Constitution provided for the integration of all military forces or armies which 
existed separately from the SADF during the apartheid period.179 The integration of the military 
forces will not be discussed in detail in this study.180 Suffice it to mention that the new SANDF 
was established and included all the defence force arms that had existed before the constitutional 
era.181  
 
The Constitution provides for a single defence force which, according to section 200(1), must be 
structured and managed as a disciplined military force. Section 200(2) states that: 
 
“the primary object of the defence force is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial 
integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international 
law regulating the use of force”.182  
 
Furthermore, the Constitution provides that the President, as head of the national executive, is 
the Commander-in-Chief of the defence force and must appoint the Military Command of the 
defence force in terms of section 202(1). The civilian secretariat for defence must be established 
by national legislation to function under the direction of the Cabinet member responsible for 
defence.183 
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The Constitution mandated what is seen as a complete change in the defence force structure and 
administration. The democratic ideals captured in the Constitution are, however, not easily 
converted into practice. This would require a radical change of the structure of government at 
every level, aimed at service delivery, openness and a culture of human rights.184  This proves to 
be a difficult process for the defence force which lacked a culture of human rights in the past. 
 
Nel is of the opinion that, although the context of the defence force is such that soldiers’ rights 
may be limited when they join the defence force, they do not waive all their rights.185 This is an 
important fact to consider when dealing with issues related to undergoing a disciplinary hearing 
before dismissal.  
 
This is an indication that the defence legislative framework, including its rules and regulations and 
the conduct of the Minister of Defence, are not excluded from complying with the demands laid 
down in section 2 of the Constitution. This constitutional demand applies, despite the nature of 
defence force, even though the defence force is regarded by some as sui generis.186  
 
The Constitution indirectly introduced the establishment of a trade union in the defence force. 
This was foreign to many military forces across the world and, in particular, to the South African 
defence force. In South Africa, members of the defence force were not allowed to form and join 
a trade union until 1999.187  The establishment of the SANDU increased the challenges faced by 
the defence force authorities. The relationship between the defence force authorities and the 
newly-established defence trade union, as it was then, started off on a seemingly turbulent note.  
 
The defence union challenged the decisions and conduct of the Minister of Defence in Court on 
a number of occasions.  The number of Court cases which arose between the Minister of Defence 
and the SANDU (acting on behalf of the members of the SANDF who are also its members) 
increased over a number of years. Some of these cases mainly dealt with the claims related to 
the unconstitutional behaviour of the Minister and the unconstitutional provisions in the Defence 
Act 42 of 2002,188 which is the main law regulating the defence force.  
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The actions of the defence union to challenge some of the decisions of the Minister of Defence 
and the unconstitutional provisions in the Defence Act echo the view of Carnelley. 189 Carnelley 
is of the view that: 
 
“[w]hatever the practice in former times, a modern code of military discipline cannot depend 
on arbitrary decision-making or the infliction of savage punishments, nor can it depend on 
inherited habits of deference or gradations of class distinction”.190   
 
Some of the issues that prevailed in the SANDU main judgment related to the infringement of the 
rights of the members of the SANDF to fair labour practices and to fair procedure. It should be 
noted that to require the Minister to grant members of the SANDF a fair hearing in line with section 
33 of the Constitution should not be interpreted as implying that compliance with the procedural 
requirements would erode the effectiveness of the enforcement of discipline or the effectiveness 
of the related sanctions.  
 
The case of Minister of Defence v Potsane; Legal Soldier (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Defence illustrates 
that discipline within the SANDF is not taken lightly and that the enforcement mechanisms are 
not weakened.191  In this case, the court held that, in order to ensure discipline in defence forces, 
the South African military law had been developed without altering the object of the defence.192   
 
The challenge faced by the Minister of Defence was, and still is, striking a balance between the 
application of some of the provisions of the Defence Act 42 of 2002 and the Rules and Regulation 
of the Defence Force which deal with the requirements of fair procedure, on the one hand, and 
those which deal with enforcement and maintenance of discipline, on the other hand. This 
requires the intricate process of balance and the limitation of these rights in terms of section 36 
of the Constitution.193  
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Tshivhase is of the view that there are good procedural reasons for preferring specialist rules to 
resolve defence disputes pertaining to labour issues.194 He provides the example that the 
specialist rules ensure certainty and avoid the duplication of a dual system of law.195 He argues 
that, whilst it might be worth considering the possible application of the just administrative action 
clause to the Commander of Disciplinary Hearings (CODH) for example, this would not be 
desirable.196  
 
The CODH is one of the internal mechanisms of disciplinary processes in the SANDF. He states 
that the reason why it would not be desirable to consider the application of the just administrative 
clause to these proceedings is that the CODH is similar to a criminal court process which requires 
the application of section 35 of the Constitution.197 This implies that it would be unnecessary to 
apply the just administrative action clause to the CODH because a purposive approach would 
require that all criminal processes or similar proceedings be dealt with under section 35.198 
  
It is submitted that the view of Tshivhase might have the effect of limiting the development of the 
defence force legislation because of its narrow approach. Provisions of specialist rules that relate 
to labour and administrative matters can be found in both the disciplines of labour law and 
administrative law. The relevant principles are captured in section 33 of the Constitution, and they 
are given effect to by sections 1 and 3 of PAJA and by section 23 of the Constitution, whereas 
section 35 of the Constitution is given effect by the Criminal Procedure Act.199  
 
It should be noted that, in this regard, reference is made to procedural requirements which have 
to be met in the CODH and other internal disciplinary mechanisms in the SANDF that are 
designed to resolve labour transgressions that might lead to a sanction of dismissal, such as 
occurred in the SANDU judgment.200 A wider approach to the interpretation of relevant provisions 
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from both labour and administrative law might have the effect of reducing the lacuna that seems 
to exist in the Defence Act and its Rules and Regulations of procedure.  
 
This way, the Defence Act will also be adequately developed to deal with defence force labour 
relations and procedural matters effectively. Consequently, some of the legal disputes between 
the SANDU and the Minister that could originate from a contravention of the right to fair procedure 
or fair labour practices will also be averted.  
4. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MINISTER OF SANDF AND SANDU  
4.1  Establishment of the Defence force trade union 
 
Before the introduction of the democratic Constitution in South Africa, as mentioned above, 
members of the SANDF were prohibited, in terms of section 126B (1) of the Defence Act, from 
forming and joining a trade union. 201 The reason is that traditionally labour rights were not 
extended to the defence forces because the government was primarily in charge of the welfare 
of the members of the defence forces.202  
 
According to Farnham, defence forces in most countries were managed from a unitary 
perspective.203 In other words, in these states a defence force was part of government and could 
not be on the opposing side as compared to states which follow a pluralistic perspective. This 
unitary approach, which is believed to be in harmony with the military profession, was also 
followed in South Africa until 1994. After 1994, the International Labour Organisation Convention 
on the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise opened a way for the 
SANDF to be granted the freedom to create its own labour relations regulations. 204  
 
The defence force authority had predicted the situation that members of the then SADF might 
want to form and join a trade union and, in that regard, section 126B of Defence Act 44 of 1957 
was ratified. It is to be regretted that this ratification did not prevent the SANDU from coming into 
                                            
201  Section 126B of the Defence Act 42 1957.  
202  Heinecken L and Nel M (note 36) at 465. 
203  Farnham D and Pimlott J (note 60) at 46. 
204  International Labour Organisation Convention No 87 of 1948. See also Heinecken L and Nel M 
(note 36) at 468. 
39 
 
existence.205 The SANDU was established on 26 August 1994.206 It complied with all the essential 
requirements before it could be officially recognised and be able to participate and serve in the 
Military Bargaining Council.207 The SANDU is presently an established military trade union that is 
registered in terms of the provisions of Regulation 67(2) of the General Regulations for the South 
African Defence Force and Reserve.208 
  
 As a result of political circumstances in South Africa, labour relationships between employers 
and trade unions are generally adversarial; this is consistent with the pluralist dispensation 
adopted post-1994.209 The SANDU is following the same approach adopted by other trade unions 
in South Africa. Its main function, like that of other trade unions, is to present a bargaining unit 
which is in competition with the established authority or leadership, regardless of the special 
context. It could be argued that this special context is the reason the Minister of Defence opposed 
the introduction and establishment of a military trade union in the defence force.210  
4.2  The relationship on opposing sides 
 
The SANDU and the SANDF authorities seem to have had disagreements on almost every labour-
related issue. This has resulted in a number of legal disputes and subsequent court judgments. 
The genesis of some of the legal disputes that arose, which also subsequently culminated in a 
series of connected judgments, including the main SANDU judgment, seems to be the 
introduction of military union in the SANDF in 1994 and the decisions of the High Court and the 
Constitutional Court in 1999. 211  
                                            
205  Heinecken L and Nel M (note 36) at 468. 
206  Ibid. 
207  The General Regulations in Chapter 20 of the General Regulations for the South African Defence 
Force and Reserve in the Government Gazette of 20 August 1999 provided for the establishment 
of Military Bargaining Council (hereinafter referred to as MBC), Military Arbitration Board (hereinafter 
referred to as MAB) and organizational rights of military trade unions (MTU’s). A trade union must 
meet the 5000 member threshold requirement for registration and 15 000 for recognition to serve in 
the MBC.  
208  Ibid. 
209  After the introduction of the Constitution, Labour rights were provided for and protected in section 
27 of the Interim Constitution and then superseded by section 23 of the final Constitution. 
210  Lamberti T “Court overrules ban on soldiers joining union” Business Day (1998) (26 November). 
The then Minister of Defence, Joe Modise, maintained that section 26B (1) of the Act that prohibited 
members of the defence from forming and joining the union was constitutional.  
211  Heinecken L and Nel M (note 35) at 468. The foundation phase refers to the two decisions of courts 
which led to the members of the defence force to have the right to form and join a trade union. The 
first decision is the South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 1999 (3) BCLR 321 
(T) where the High Court declared that some of the provisions of section 127B of the Defence Act 
44 of 1957 were unconstitutional. In order to be valid, an application for the order of invalidity had 




In the High Court, Hartzenburg J ruled that the limitations prohibiting members of the SANDF from 
forming and belonging to trade unions were unconstitutional.212 This decision was confirmed by 
the Constitutional Court.213 The above situations created what seems to be a turbulent 
relationship between the SANDU and the Minister of Defence.214  
 
In the first place, based generally on the nature and history of the national defence force and, in 
particular, South African political history, the idea of a trade union in the SANDF was 
inconceivable. Secondly, after its introduction and subsequent recognition as the official trade 
union in the defence force, the SANDU began to challenge some of the Minister’s decisions, his 
conduct and some provisions of the Defence Act as being unconstitutional or unlawful.215 
 
Traditionally military command powers which were exercised by the commanding officers before 
1994 were undisputed and not open to either direct or indirect challenges from subordinate 
members of the defence force.   
 
The SANDU challenged the Minister of Defence on a number of issues. The first challenge was 
the dispute decided by the High Court (which was then confirmed by the Constitutional Court) 
that certain parts of section 126B of the Defence Act were unconstitutional.216 This section 
prohibited members of the SANDF from joining trade unions and participating in trade union 
activities.217 The decision by the Constitutional Court granted members of the defence force the 
right to form and join a trade union in terms of section 23(2) of the Constitution.218 It effectively 
put the members of the defence force into the same category as workers and employees.   
                                            
Force Union v Minister of the Defence and Another 1999 (6) BCLR 615 (CC) where the court granted 
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212  South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 1999 (3) BCLR 321 (T). 
213  South African National Defence Force Union v Minister of the Defence and Another 1999 (6) BCLR 
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215  Defence Act of 2002. 
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National Defence Union v The Minister of South African National Defence Force 1999 (6) BCLR 
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In his/her submission both in the High Court and the Constitutional Court, the Minister of Defence 
rejected the establishment and presence of a trade union in the SANDF.219 The SANDF 
authorities were unprepared and unwilling to recognise or negotiate with any union representing 
members of the defence force, and the Minister threatened to prosecute members for doing so.220 
  
It is submitted that the Minister was not ready to accept what Heinecken calls the ‘us-them’ 
situation in the SANDF, which is created by the establishment and recognition of a trade union in 
the defence force.221 Heinecken argues that the existence of a trade union can have the effect of 
driving a wedge in the defence force chain of command and may erode the unit’s esprit de 
corps.222 Hallenbeck concurs with this view, affirming that a military trade union will not only impair 
combat effectiveness, but will also undermine military discipline and obedience which are 
regarded as the fundamental basis on which the culture of the military profession rests. 223 
 
Notwithstanding the Minister’s concerns with regard to the establishment and recognition of the 
military trade union, the Constitutional Court224 granted military personnel the right to belong to a 
trade union and to collective bargaining, but it did not grant them the right to strike. In this regard, 
the Minister had unwillingly to acknowledge and recognise the SANDU. The statement by Lt Gen 
Pretorius J, Chief of the Army, echoes the sentiments held by the Minister of Defence towards 
the establishment, existence and recognition of trade unions in the defence force:225  
 
“Whoever is promoting the idea of a union for soldiers, is not only encouraging soldiers to 
commit an illegal act, but is also doing a disservice to our country. Unions, he went on to 
say, ‘were undesirable because mass strikes and mutinies would undermine the operational 
readiness of the armed forces, unions will politicize the forces and divide the rank and file 
along institutional lines”.226 
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 For most of the disputes that have arisen between the SANDU and the Minister of Defence, the 
SANDU approached and relied on the Courts for resolution rather than the internal process of 
collective bargaining through the Military Bargaining Forum because the issue around the right to 
collective bargaining was still in dispute. 227  This situation added to the tension that already 
existed between the SANDU and the Minister of Defence. 
 
The Minister’s apprehensions could at times be considered reasonable. The Minister of Defence 
is appointed by the President of the Republic to be responsible for defence matters in terms of 
sections 201(1) and 202 of the Constitution respectively.228 His/her main duty is to ensure that the 
defence force carries out its constitutional mandate in a manner that is prescribed by the 
Constitution.229 The Constitution commands the defence force to defend and protect the Republic, 
its territorial integrity and its people.230 The defence force is expected to be structured and 
managed as a disciplined military force.231 
 
The main functions of the SANDU and of the Minister of Defence indirectly foreshadow an 
adversial relationship. This is not strange since the employment relationships in South Africa in 
general are based on the adversarial pluralism as opposed to the European employment 
relationships.  
This adversarial stance is not only demonstrated in the relationship between the SANDU and the 
Minister of Defence, but also in military unions which are similar to professional associations and 
their employment relationship which is supposed to be based on consultation and cooperation.232 
This is in line with the more social partnership approach to employee relations in the European 
countries.233  
 
Because of this adversarial approach, the relationship between the SANDU and the Minister of 
Defence is such that, since the introduction of the 1996 Constitution, the SANDU is cited as the 
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applicant on behalf of its members challenging either the defence legislation or the conduct of the 
Minister as being unconstitutional and/or unlawful, for a number of different reasons, including 
procedural unfairness. The Minster of Defence, on the other hand, is always cited as the 
respondent, except in the appeal cases where he attempted to defend the constitutional mandate 
of the SANDF.234  
5. CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter the nature of a national defence force in general, and of the SANDF in particular, 
was traced and discussed. The historical evolution of the South African military law system and 
its legislative framework in so far as the regulation, maintenance and enforcement of discipline 
are concerned also been described. The relationship between the Minister and the SANDU was 
briefly discussed. 
 
The introduction of the culture of human rights in the defence force that was ushered in by the 
constitutional democracy after 1994 was discussed. It was stated that, in South Africa, the 
evolution of the government systems has seemingly contributed to some of the legal disputes that 
have taken place between the newly-established SANDU and the Minister of Defence. The 
relationship between the SANDU and the Minster of Defence was explained and analysed. 
 
In the following chapter some of the judgments that seemingly laid the foundation for the actions 
that led to the SANDU 2010 judgment will be discussed briefly. The facts and the decision of the 
SANDU 2010 judgment will be discussed. All other subsequent judgments that have arisen as a 
result of the court orders that were granted in the SANDU 2010 judgment will also be dealt with. 
                                            
























In the previous chapter the nature of National Defence Forces, in particular the SANDF, and the 
history of the military law system was traced. The evolution of the Military Law and Military Justice 
System from the period before 1994 which was informed by the principles of parliamentary 
supremacy was also discussed. The chapter also discussed the period after 1994, the 
Constitutional era, where the culture of human rights was introduced in South Africa and its 
extension into the Defence Force was discussed. The relationship between the Minister and the 
SANDU was also discussed. 
 
As already mentioned, the introduction of the democratic Constitution in South Africa changed 
the way in which defence forces were managed. The Defence Act 44 of 1957 was repealed and 
the New Defence Act 42 of 2002 introduced labour-related provisions and a Military Trade Union. 
These changes did not come easily, and fostering a relationship between the Minister and the 
SANDU was not an easy task. There were a number of legal disputes which arose between the 
Minister and the SANDU, the most important being the SANDU 2010 judgment.235  
 
In order to give background to the genesis of some of the legal disputes which arose between 
SANDU and the Minister, it is important to discuss some of the relevant court judgments which 
could be regarded as foundations for the SANDU 2010 judgment and the subsequent appeal 
judgments. 
 
This chapter will begin with a discussion of the High Court decision that declared section 126B 
(1)-(4) of Defence Act 44 of 1957 unconstitutional and invalid. For an order of constitutional 
invalidity granted by the High Court to have legal effect, it must be referred to the Constitutional 
Court in terms of section 172(2) of the Constitution for confirmation. In that regard, the 
confirmation order will also be discussed.  
 
Although the Constitutional Court granted the confirmation order of invalidity and members of the 
SANDF were granted the right to form and join a trade union, there is evidence indicating that the 
relationship between the Minister and SANDU as far as labour relations and collective bargaining 
are concerned did not improve. Instead, some issues related to collective bargaining could not be 
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agreed upon. This led to more legal disputes which ultimately gave rise to a trail of court decisions 
including the SANDU 2010 judgment and the two subsequent appeal decisions.236  
 
The SANDU I, II and III judgments will be discussed. These are the judgments representing the 
evidence of the continuing tug of war between SANDU and the Minister regarding labour related 
issues and issues connected to collective bargaining. This chapter will conclude with the 
discussion of the status of the internal disciplinary proceedings that commenced in 2014 and 
proceeded into 2016.  
2. THE GENESIS OF THE LEGAL DISPUTES BETWEEN SANDU AND THE MINISTER  
 
The SANDF includes the South African army, navy and air force.237 The Permanent Force of the 
SANDF consists of full-time military personnel.238  The introduction of a constitutional democracy 
in South Africa introduced the recognition of equality and human dignity in the SANDF.239 The 
responsibility for the protection of the Constitution and the democratic values from both internal 
and external unrest lies with the Defence Forces (SANDF).240  
 
The Defence Force, which was once regarded as an instrument for government aggression in 
South Africa, is now regarded as the protector of the democracy and its values.241 In order to fulfill 
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this role, the Defence Force needs to be disciplined and loyal to the Constitution. It is in this regard 
that states often face a challenge of two conflicting values of maintaining a disciplined Defence 
Force that is necessary for state security and the granting of democratic human rights, including 
the fundamental right to a trade union that is essential for effective collective bargaining.242  
 
The South African situation is not different. One of the challenges faced by the Minister was 
related to striking a balance between the maintenance of discipline and the granting of some 
fundamental rights to members of the SANDF, and, in particular, the right to form and join a trade 
union.243  
 
Trade unions are regarded as instruments which assist in bargaining with the employers who are 
often in the position of power.244 Instead of acting individually, employees act collectively to 
negotiate better working conditions and to counter managerial power.245 In most countries trade 
unions emerged as a response to exploitation by employers.  
 
The idea of having a trade union in the Defence Force is not easily welcome and acceptable in 
many countries. The position of the SANDF in this regard is not unique. Heinecken246 argues that 
SANDU is not the only military union involved in the fight for the quest for labour rights for 
members of the Defence Forces. She asserts that there is plenty evidence that indicates that this 
is also a pressing human rights issue in Europe.247  
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Members of the Defence Forces are in a delicate position in so far as labour relations are 
concerned. In the South African context; the Minister is in the position of power and members of 
the SANDF are subservient and in a powerless position. In order to gain some power, and to be 
in a better position to negotiate better working conditions with the Minister, a trade union is 
esential. The right to form and join a trade union is a human right guaranteed to everyone in 
section 23 (2) of the Constitution.248 Members of the SANDF could not, however, exercise this 
right because of section 126B of the erstwhile Defence Act which prohibited the formation of a 
trade union in the SANDF.249 
 
The first legal dispute which laid a foundation for the SANDU 2010 judgment occurred when the 
SANDU challenged section 126B to be unconstitutional. 250 This legal dispute was heard in the 
Transvaal High Court in the decision of South African National Defence Union v Minister of 
Defence.251 This decision led to a Constitutional Court decision in South African National Defence 
Union v Minister of Defence and Another which had, to confirm the order of the Transvaal High 
Court. 252 
  
Heinecken is of the opinion that the Constitutional Court could have made certain 
pronouncements to resolve matters in relation to the activities of a trade union. 253 According to 
Heinecken, this paved a way for an unsettled employment relationship between SANDU, its 
members and the Minister, which led to the court battles that ensued.254  
A second legal dispute that followed was related to the issue of collective bargaining. This legal 
dispute commenced after the Constitutional Court decision which lifted a ban on trade unions in 
the Defence Force.255  
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The main legal questions were whether there is a legally enforceable duty on the SANDF to 
collective bargaining with SANDU, a military trade union that was recently permitted to function 
as such by the decision of the Constitutional Court.256 If the answer to the question above is in 
the affirmative, the next question was whether the SANDF was unfairly refused to bargain with 
SANDU.257  
 
This legal dispute led to a trail of three different judgments, commonly referred to as SANDU I258, 
II259 and III.260 All of these Court are linked in some way to the SANDU 2010 judgment, albeit 
some of them indirectly. 
2.1  The High Court decision: SANDU v The Minister of South African National Defence 
Forces 1999 (3) BCLR 321 (T)  
 
Before 1999, there was a provision in the Defence Act 44 of 1957 which prohibited members of 
the permanent force from joining trade unions, as has already been indicated.261 This Defence 
Act was the law that regulated the Defence Forces before it was repealed and replaced by 
Defence Act 2002, also prohibited members of the Defence Forces from exercising some labour 
related rights, including the right to belong to a trade union in terms of its section 126B.262  
 
This section rendered it a criminal offence to form and join a trade union in the SANDF.263 SANDU 
challenged the constitutionality of this section in the Transvaal High Court.264 In this case, the 
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legal questions were whether it was constitutional to prohibit members of the SANDF from 
participating in public protest action, and also from forming and joining trade unions, as provided 
by section 126B(1)(2) and (4) of the Defence Act of 1957.265 
   
Commencing their arguments on the prohibition of membership of trade unions, SANDU 
(Applicant) argued the constitutional invalidity of section 126B (1) on the basis that the prohibition 
was in breach of section 23(2) of the Constitution.266 This section provides that every worker has 
the right to form and join a trade union, to participate in the activities and programmes of a trade 
union, and to strike. It does not exclude members of the SANDF.267  
 
Section 126B(1) prohibited members of the permanent force from forming and joining trade 
unions as defined in section 1 of the LRA.268 The Minister (Respondent) argued that this section 
was a limitation that is acceptable in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.269   
 
The Minister further argued that, in any event, the relevant members of the SANDF do not 
constitute workers as referred to in section 23 of the Constitution.270 Even if they did, the resultant 
infringement of their rights is one which is justified in terms of section 36(1).271  
 
The Minister also relied on section 200(1) of the Constitution, which provides that the Defence 
Force must be structured and managed as a disciplined military force.272 The argument advanced 
                                            
265  South African National Defence Union v The Minister of Defence South African National Defence 
Union v The Minister of Defence 1999 (3) BCLR 321 (T) at paras 321J, 322A-B, 330C-I.  
266  South African National Defence Union v The Minister of Defence South African National Defence 
Union v The Minister of Defence 1999 (3) BCLR 321 (T) at paras 322D, 329C-F. See also Section 
23(2) of the Constitution, which provides that “every worker has the right to form and join a trade 
union; to participate in the activities and programmes of a trade union; and to strike”. 
267  Section 23 of the Constitution is a labour relations clause. 
268  The LRA 28 of 1956 has been repealed and replaced by the LRA 66 of 1995. Section 1 of the latter 
Act defined trade union as follows: “A trade union means any number of employees in any particular 
undertaking, industry, trade or occupation associated together for the purpose, whether by itself or 
with other purposes, of regulating relations in that undertaking, industry, trade or occupation 
between themselves or some of them and their employers or some of their employers”. 
269 South African National Defence Union v The Minister of Defence South African National Defence 
Union v The Minister of Defence 1999 (3) BCLR 321 (T) at paras’ 330B-G.  
270  Ibid. 
271  South African National Defence Union v The Minister of Defence South African National Defence 
Union v The Minister of Defence 1999 (3) BCLR 321 (T) at paras 335A-J. 
272  South African National Defence Union v The Minister of Defence South African National Defence 
Union v The Minister of Defence 1999 (3) BCLR 321 (T) at paras 322E, 329A-D. See also section 
200(1) of the Constitution, 1996. 
51 
 
by the Minister was that the Defence Force could not be a disciplined military force if its members 
belonged to a trade union and wished to exercise all the rights conferred by section 23.273  
 
The Minister further argued that accepting a trade union would mean that SANDU would be 
constitutionally entitled to bargain collectively on behalf of its members and to be involved in strike 
action.274 If this were to be allowed, the disciplined character of the Defence Force as required by 
the Constitution would be undermined. The Minister also argued that, if the Defence Force were 
to be weakened in this way, it would have grave consequences for the security of the South 
African state.275  
 
On the invalidity of section 126B (2) SANDU contended that it did not assert the right to strike on 
its behalf or on behalf of its members. It opposed the constitutionality of this section in so far as it 
prohibits the participation in public protest.276  
 
SANDU conceded that the right to strike in the Defence Forces must be prohibited. It did not, 
therefore, argue that the prohibition on participation in strikes was unconstitutional or invalid.277 
Continuing its arguments on section 126B (2) and (4), which provided for the prohibition of 
participation in acts of public protest, SANDU also argued that section 126B (2), read with section 
126B (4) is a breach of the right to freedom of expression entrenched in section 16 of the 
Constitution.278 In this regard, the Court ordered the complete severance of sub-section 126B (4) 
and declared sub-section126B (2) unconstitutional to the extent that it refers to acts of public 
protest.279  
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Hartzenberg J found that the scope of the prohibition on public protest was extremely broad.280 
He concluded that it would include some forms of conduct which did not constitute public protest 
such as, for example, the complaint by a uniformed member of the Defence Force to his partner 
about conditions of service in the Defence Force.281 
 
On the unconstitutionality of section 126B (3), SANDU argued that it is unconstitutional for this 
section to render it a criminal offence for members of Defence Forces should they form and join 
a trade union.282 Contraventions of sub-sections (1) and (2) result in criminal conduct in terms of 
section 126B (3).283 In that regard, this subsection read with sub-sections (1) and (2), contravenes 
section 23 of the Constitution.284 The Court asserted that the criminal sanction which members of 
the SANDF would be liable for if they joined the trade union dissuaded many prospective 
members from joining.285 
  
In its final order, the Court completely struck down section 126B (4) of the Act and declared it 
unconstitutional and invalid.286 Section 126B (2) was declared unconstitutional and invalid to the 
extent that it refers to acts of public protest.287 On the trade union issue, the Court struck down 
subsections (1) and (3). Section 126B (1) was declared unconstitutional and invalid, and section 
126B (3) was declared unconstitutional and invalid to the extent that it refers to section 126B 
                                            
constitutional matter within its power and authorise a court to declare that any law or conduct that 
is inconsistent with the Constitution invalid to the extent of its inconsistency. 
280 South African National Defence Union v The Minister of Defence South African National Defence 
Union v The Minister of Defence 1999 (3) BCLR 321 (T) at para 332A-D. 
281  South African National Defence Union v The Minister of Defence South African National Defence 
Union v The Minister of Defence 1999 (3) BCLR 321 (T) at paras 322D-H. 
282  South African National Defence Union v The Minister of Defence South African National Defence 
Union v The Minister of Defence 1999 (3) BCLR 321 (T) at para 332A. 
283   South African National Defence Union v The Minister of Defence South African National Defence 
Union v The Minister of Defence 1999 (3) BCLR 321 (T) at paras 338C-E. 
284 South African National Defence Union v The Minister of Defence South African National Defence 
Union v The Minister of Defence 1999 (3) BCLR 321 (T) at paras 322B-D. 
285  South African National Defence Union v The Minister of Defence South African National Defence 
Union v The Minister of Defence 1999 (3) BCLR 321 (T) at para 338C. 
286  South African National Defence Union v The Minister of Defence South African National Defence 
Union v The Minister of Defence 1999 (3) BCLR 321 (T) at para 340G-H. 
287  Ibid. 
53 
 
(1).288 All the orders were suspended until 31 December 1999.289 The order was referred to the 
Constitutional Court for confirmation.290  
2.2  The Constitutional Court decision: Sandu v The Minister of Defence and Another 
1999 (6) BCLR 615 (CC)  
 
SANDU requested that all the orders of invalidity be confirmed and that none be suspended.291 
The Minister opposed the confirmation of invalidity of section 126B (1), which denied relevant 
members of the SANDF the right to form and join a trade union.292  The Minister did, however, not 
oppose the invalidity of section 126B (4) and parts of subsection (2), which prohibited relevant 
members of the SANDF from participating in protest action.293 
 
The arguments which were advanced by both SANDU and the Minister addressed three issues: 
firstly, whether military personnel can be considered to be workers; secondly, what would the 
impact of allowing trade union membership be on military discipline; lastly, what would the 
potential consequences of protest and strike action in the Defence Force be considering political 
neutrality and state security.294   
 
The Court had to consider the constitutional validity of the prohibition of the relevant members of 
the SANDF from participating in protest action as mentioned in section 126B (2) and defined in 
sub-section (4).295 The Court also had specifically to consider whether this prohibition violated the 
right of members of SANDF that is guaranteed in section 16 of the Constitution.296  
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The Court first dealt with infringement of section 23 of the Constitution. In determining whether, 
by prohibiting members of the Defence Forces from forming and joining a trade union, section 
126B (1), read with section 126B (3), infringed upon the right to fair labour practices contained in 
section 23 (2) of the Constitution, the Court held that this section indeed violated those rights. In 
this instance, the Court agreed with the court a quo.297 
  
The Court had to determine whether members of the SANDF form part of workers as contained 
in this subsection.298  In doing so, the Court held that section 23 of the Constitution in its entirety 
applies to situations where a contract of employment is entered into between parties.299 The Court 
indicated that members of the SANDF do not enter into a contract of employment, but rather they 
register into the Defence Forces as members of Permanent Force.300  
 
Notwithstanding this, the Court felt that the relationship between members of the SANDF and the 
Minister is similar to the employment relationship.301 It indicated that the difference lies in the 
consequence for misconduct, because employment in the SANDF carries certain legal 
consequences. Misconduct by members of the SANDF is punishable in terms of the Military 
Disciplinary Code.302 The Court concluded that section 23 extended to members of the SANDF.303 
The Court held that the words ‘every worker’ in section 23 of the Constitution should be interpreted 
to include members of the SANDF.304 In that regard, the Court then concluded that section 126B 
(1) infringed the right to form and join the trade union.305 
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Having found that section 126B (1) amounted to an infringement, the Court had to decide whether 
the limitation imposed by this section complies with section 36 of the Constitution.306 In doing this, 
the Court looked at section 200(1) of the Constitution, which requires that the Defence Forces 
must be structured and managed as disciplined military forces.307 The Minister argued that, if 
members of the SANDF were allowed to exercise their labour rights in terms of section 23, the 
disciplined character of the Defence Force would be eroded.308  
 
The Court disagreed with the submission and held that it was possible to grant members of the 
SANDF limited and structured trade union rights without challenging the discipline of the Defence 
Force.309 The Court further held that section 126B (1) prohibited more than was necessary to 
maintain discipline in the Defence Force.310  The Court ordered this section to be unconstitutional 
and invalid.311 
 
In determining whether the order that section 126B (1) section is invalid and unconstitutional and 
should be suspended or not, the Court held that to invalidate this section without any regulations 
might be potentially harmful.312 Regulations would be needed to avoid disruptions to discipline 
and to ensure that labour relations developed in a constructive and orderly manner.313 The 
SANDU had requested that the order take immediate effect on the basis that there had already 
been an extensive delay.314 They argued that the Minister and Defence Force administrators had 
already had five years since the new constitutional order had commenced to address this matter, 
but that they had delayed and that, during that time, members of the SANDF had been deprived 
of their constitutional rights.315  
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In addition, during that period, the SANDU had actively sought to assert the rights of members of 
SANDF without success.316 To strike a balance between the two interests, the Court held that the 
order should be suspended only for a period of three months and not twelve months as was 
ordered by the court a quo.317 The Court felt that this would give the Minister sufficient time to 
make Regulations concerning trade union rights. 318   
 
 
Finally, the Court turned to deal with the confirmation of the order of unconstitutionality and 
invalidity of section 126B (2).319 This section infringed on section 16 of the Constitution according 
to SANDU’s arguments. On the issue of prohibition to participate in protest action in terms of 
section 126B (2) and defined in 126B (4), the Court determined whether these sections infringed 
on the constitutional rights to freedom of expression contained in section 16 of the Constitution.320  
 
The Court held that freedom of expression is of fundamental importance and lies at the core of 
democracy. The definition of protest action in section 126B (4) was too extensive and unclear. Its 
grammatical structure was clumsy and the overall meaning vague.321 This definition criminalised 
a wide range of conduct without making a distinction between on- and off-duty periods of 
members of SANDF.322 The Court held that section 126B (2), read with section 126B (4), violated 
the right to freedom of expression and confirmed the order of the Court a quo.323  
 
The Constitutional Court further held that section 36 of the Constitution could not justify this 
prohibition as being a reasonable limitation. The Court considered whether it was possible to 
sever the over broad parts of the definition of public protest from section 126B (4) of the Act or 
not. The Court indicated that it was not possible to sever parts of the definition, since the definition 
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was too dense. An altered definition by the Court would also have the danger of not bearing any 
resemblance to what the legislature may originally have intended.324  
 
As a result, the whole definition in section 126B (4) was severed. With regard to section 126B (2), 
only references to public protest were severed.325 The remainder of section 126B (2), relating to 
the prohibition of strike action and the prohibition of the incitement to strike action, were left intact. 
In this way, only certain forms of public protest would be prohibited and section 126B (2) saved.326 
 
The Constitutional Court declared section 126B to be unconstitutional and invalid.327 The Court 
ordered the Minister to promulgate labour regulations consistent with the constitutional rights of 
members of the Defence Force within three months. This led to the enactment of Chapter 20 of 
the General Regulations for the SANDF, which was subsequently published in the Government 
Gazette of 20 August 1999.  
2.3  The subsequent judgments: SANDU I, II AND III  
 
 
From the time that the High Court decision removed the prohibition of trade unions in the SANDF 
and the subsequent confirmation of this order by the Constitutional Court, the history of the 
SANDF has changed. 328 For the first time in the history of South Africa, members of the SANDF 
are legally entitled to form and join a trade union.   
 
Generally, this change is commendable in a democratic South Africa. It did, however, not improve 
employee relations in the Defence Force particularly. Instead, the introduction of a trade union in 
the Defence Force seems to have triggered an adversarial relationship between the Minister and 
the SANDF employees who are members of SANDU, and SANDU itself. This relationship became 
more unsettled when the power struggles between the Minister, SANDF and SANDU increased.  
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On the one hand, SANDU adopted an aggressive style to assert the labour rights of its members 
by consistently sending out brochures which often insulted senior officers in the SANDF.329 On 
the other hand, the Minister found this approach to be unacceptable in a military context because 
of the view that the Defence Force is founded on respect for rank and higher authority.330 As a 
result, the Minister refused to include SANDU in decision-making processes on issues that 
SANDU considered to be ones of shared interest.331 This refusal by the Minister to negotiate with 
SANDU led to delays in the bargaining process.  
 
Collective bargaining became one of the problems in the relationship between SANDU and the 
Minister. It is suggested that the main reason that gave rise to this problematic relationship is that 
the Constitutional Court omitted to make a ruling on this issue. 332 This omission seems to have 
left a gap in the Defence Force Legislative Framework and its Regulations that deal with collective 
bargaining.  
 
The question which the Constitutional Court should have dealt with was whether or not the 
Minister had a legal duty to negotiate with SANDU after its official establishment in the Defence 
Forces.333 In the absence of this finding, this issue has caused misunderstandings between 
SANDU and the Minister. As a result, a trail of Court decisions, all of them trying to address this 
question, were handed down. The Court battles began in 2003 and continued until 2007. 
  
South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence and Others 2003 (3) SA 
239 (T): SANDU I      
 
In the first decision, which is referred to as SANDU I,334 the application was initiated by SANDU. 
In this application, SANDU made a request to the Court to answer the question of whether there 
is a duty on the SANDF to bargain collectively with SANDU. It also made a request to the Court 
to compel the Minister to negotiate.335 According to SANDU, the Minister has a duty to negotiate 
in terms of section 23 of the Constitution. Certain sections of the Defence Act, as well as Chapter 
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20 of the General Regulations for the SANDF and Reserve, provided for collective bargaining in 
the SANDF.336   
 
In her/his arguments, the Minister maintained that no such constitutional or legislative duty to 
negotiate exists. Furthermore, the Minister argued that, if it did, such negotiations did not extend 
to policy matters.337 
 
Van der Westhuizen J based his judgment on the interpretation of section 23(5) of the 
Constitution. This section deals with the right to engage in collective bargaining.338 Van der 
Westhuizen J decided against SANDU’s position. The Judge first distinguished between the 
wording of the interim Constitution and the final Constitution with regard to collective bargaining. 
section 27(3) of the Interim Constitution provided for the right to bargain collectively. On the other 
hand, section 23(5) of the Final Constitution recognises collective bargaining as a freedom rather 
than a right.  
 
In the Defence Force, this right is encapsulated in Regulation 36 of the General Regulations. This 
Regulation states that “military trade unions may engage in collective bargaining”.339 According 
to Van der Westhuizen J, the use of the words “right to engage in and may engage in” as it 
appears in the regulation, were important in determining whether collective bargaining is a right 
or a freedom. The Judge found that this emphasis had to some extent a suggestion. He came to 
the conclusion that section 23(5) of the Constitution simply allows for collective bargaining. 
According to the Van der Westhuizen J, this suggests that collective bargaining is a freedom 
rather than a right. As a result, there is no constitutional duty for the Minister to bargain collectively 
with any military trade union.340 
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South African National Defence Union and Another v Minister of Defence and 
Others 2004 (4) SA 10 (T): SANDU II 
 
SANDU was not satisfied with the finding of the Court of first instance in SANDU I.341 It 
immediately sought leave to appeal the decision in the same Court. In this case, referred to as 
SANDU II, the South African National Defence Union and Another v Minister of Defence and 
others,342 two issues were raised.343 The first application was for a declaratory order with regard 
to the Minister’s legal duty to negotiate with SANDU on the contents of the regulations and on all 
matters of mutual interest.344 In the second application, SANDU made a request for the setting 
aside of various Regulations, in particular Regulations 41 and 53 of the General Regulations, on 
the grounds of their unconstitutionality.345 
 
In its findings, the Court, dealing with the first issue, held that the duty to negotiate stems from 
two sources, the Constitution and the General Regulations.346 The Court viewed collective 
bargaining as an integral part of the proper exercise of the section 23(5) right in the Constitution.347 
Contrary to the findings of the Court of first instance in SANDU I, the appeal Court held that this 
confers a right to engage in collective bargaining and imposes a corresponding duty on the 
Minister in his official capacity as employer to bargain collectively.348 In addition, the right to 
collective bargaining must be viewed within the broader context of section 23(1) of the 
Constitution on the right to fair labour practices. The decision of Van der Westhuizen J in SANDU 
I was overturned in SANDU II. In this case the Court decided in favour of SANDU.349 
  
The Court’s reasoning in the SANDU II case was that the duty of the Minister to negotiate in good 
faith with the union is fundamental to collective bargaining.350 Because the Constitution confers 
on SANDU and its members the right to engage in collective bargaining in terms of section 23(5), 
the conferral of such a right must, therefore, impose a correlative duty on the Minister as the 
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employer. Furthermore, the Minister is bound in terms of section 8(1) of the Constitution.351 
According to Grogan, the parties to collective bargaining must be in agreement and, therefore, 
should display good faith in how they interact with one another.352 
  
The Court held that one may consider it unfair if the Minister as an employer refuses to negotiate 
with an acknowledged trade union.353 Smith J further disagreed with Van der Westhuizen J’s 
interpretation of the phrase ‘a right to engage in collective bargaining’ in SANDU II.354 Smith J 
found no reason why a right to engage in collective bargaining does not impose a corresponding 
duty on the Minister as an employer to engage in collective bargaining.355  
 
The Court held that the reason for this is that the trade union and its members do not have the 
right to strike and, therefore, have no other means to enforce this right.356 The Court stated that 
a right without a remedy is meaningless.357 According to Smith J, the remedy is part and parcel 
of this right.358 The Court emphasised that the General Regulations, in particular Regulation 3(c) 
read with Regulation 36, impose a duty on the Minister to negotiate.359 
 
South African National Defence Union and Others v Minister of Defence (T) 
unreported Case No 15790/2003: SANDU III.   
 
SANDU launched another application, where it requested the Court for an interdict to prevent the 
Minister from implementing a transformation and restructuring policy without consultation through 
a bargaining process. 360 This application was launched in the High Court in 2003and decided by 
Bertelsman J in South African National Defence Union and Others v Minister of Defence.361  
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The cause of action was the unilateral implementation of the transformation policy by SANDF. 
When the Department of Defence introduced the policy, SANDU requested that the Department 
bargain with it on the issue of the policy. The Department refused. SANDU then declared a dispute 
in the MBC, but the Department again persisted in its refusal to negotiate. SANDU then referred 
the dispute to arbitration. While the arbitration was pending, the SANDF indicated that it intended 
to implement the policy immediately. 
 
In this case, the Court agreed with Smith J and the SANDU II decision362 that SANDF did have a 
duty to bargain with SANDU.363 As a result, the court made an order to interdict the Minister and 
prevent him from proceeding with the implementation of the Revised Implementation Measures 
without consulting with the union.364 The Bertelsman decision is known as SANDU III.365 The 
Minister appealed the case to the SCA.  
 
South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence and Others 2007 (1) SA 
402 (SCA); Minister of Defence and Others v South African National Defence Union 
and Others 2007 (4) BCLR 398 (SCA):  
 
The battle over the right to collective bargaining was not settled by the five applications in which 
three separate decisions were made.366 As a result, appeals from SANDU I, II and III were heard 
in the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in SANDU v Minister of Defence & Others.367 The 
applications were heard as one application because of the common legal question.368  
 
SANDU was the appellant against the SANDU I decision.369 The Minister was the appellant 
against the SANDU II and III decisions respectively. The appeals from SANDU I and SANDU III 
were decided by Conradie JA in SANDU and Others v Minister of Defence and Others.370 The 
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appeal from SANDU II was decided by Nugent J in South African National Defence Union v 
Minister of Defence and Others.371 
 
Conradie JA dealt with the interpretation of the right to engage in collective bargaining that was 
also dealt with in the SANDU I by Van der Westhuizen J.372 Conradie JA also dealt with the 
interdict that was granted by Bertelsmann J in SANDU III.373 Commencing with issues from 
SANDU I, Conradie JA held that the objective of the General Regulations was to ensure that the 
Minister should bargain with the trade union.374 He, however, rejected SANDU’s arguments that 
chapter XX of the regulations or the Constitution of the MBC established a judicially enforceable 
duty on the Minister to negotiate with the union.375  
 
He held that the Constitution does not impose on employers or employees a judicially enforceable 
duty to bargain and that it does not contemplate that, where the right to strike is removed or 
restricted but is replaced by another adequate mechanism, a duty to bargain arises.376 The Court 
also rejected SANDU’s argument that the conduct of the SANDF during the consultations around 
the transformation policy constituted an unfair labour practice.377 
 
Nugent JA dealt with the appeals against the orders of constitutional invalidity of certain 
regulations that were made in SANDU II.378  He upheld all the appeals, except for the appeal for 
regulation 19, which provides that military trade unions shall not have the right to negotiate a 
closed shop or agency shop with the employer.379  
The two unanimous decisions by the SCA did not resolve the issues of collective bargaining 
between SANDU and the Minister. It was still unclear to what extent the Minister as employer is 
obliged even to consult with the unions on matters of shared concern. As a result, SANDU sought 
leave to appeal the orders made by the SCA to the Constitutional Court. 
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South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 2007 (5) SA 400 
 
SANDU was dissatisfied with the decision made by the SCA particularly the interpretation of 
section 23 (5) and the analysis of the constitutionality of some regulations. The application for 
leave to appeal was decided by the Constitutional Court in South African National Defence Union 
v Minister of Defence.380 
 
The first ground that SANDU sought leave to appeal on was on the interpretation of section 23(5) 
of the Constitution by the SCA Court.381 In terms of section 23(5), all trade unions have the right 
to engage in collective bargaining.382 The second ground was on the constitutionality of various 
regulations and rights regarding labour relations in the military.383  
 
The application in the Constitutional Court was heard on 1 March 2007.384 The Court dealt with 
two main issues. In the first place, the Court had to answer whether there is a duty on the Minister 
to bargain with SANDU in terms of section 23(5) of the Constitution, Chapter 20 of the regulations, 
or the constitution of the MBC.385 It also needed to determine whether the Minister is lawfully 
entitled to withdraw from the negotiation in the MBC unilaterally, whether the Minister can be 
compelled to bargain with SANDU on the content of the Regulations, and all other matters of 
common interest should it withdraw. In the second place, the Court had to deal with the 
constitutionality of the challenged regulations.386 
 
On the issue raised by SANDU that there is a duty on the SANDF to bargain in terms of section 
23(5) of the Constitution, the Court found that SANDU could not rely directly on the constitutional 
provision.387 This is generally known as as the subsidiarity principle.388The regulations were 
enacted to give effect to this constitutional right to collective bargaining. It is not, therefore, 
appropriate to rely on section 23(5) of the Constitution directly and avoid the relevant legislation.389 
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382  Section 25 (5) of the Constitution, 1996. 
383 SANDU III (note 259) para 45.   
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The Court held that the application for leave to appeal should have been brought in terms of the 
General Regulations and not the interpretation of section 23(5).390 The challenge of the 
constitutionality of the relevant regulations should be to determine whether they are in line with 
section 23(5). The Constitutional Court did not consider this point further.391 The Court found that 
there is no legal duty on the Minister to bargain collectively with SANDU on the content of the 
regulations itself.392 
 
On issues relating to the general conditions of service as identified in Regulation 36, however, 
the Court held that there is a duty to bargain.393 The SANDF is not entitled to implement any policy 
unilaterally.394 Furthermore, the Minister of SANDF cannot unilaterally withdraw from the Military 
Bargaining Committee without first following the prescribed dispute resolution procedures, and 
he/she may not unilaterally prescribe conditions for the union’s participation in the MBC. 395 
On the second issue, the Court also ruled that several regulations were unconstitutional. For 
example, there were the regulations that restrict SANDU from representing its members in 
disciplinary proceedings. This was considered contrary to fair labour practice.396 The regulation 
denying SANDU and its members the right to petition or picket as private citizens as long as good 
order and discipline is not risked was also considered to be unconstitutional.397 
 
The order made by the Constitutional Court suggests that once the bargaining process has 
commenced, it is important that the parties negotiate in good faith.398 It is submitted that it is this 
decision that allowed members of the SANDF to assemble and march to the Union Buildings. 
Events which would later lead to the summary dismissal of members of the SANDF without fair 
procedures resulted in another court case. The case concerning this dismissal is discussed 
below. 
                                            
390  SANDU III (note 259) at para 53 and 54. 
391  Ibid. 
392  SANDU III (note 259) at paras 57, 66 and 68. 
393  SANDU III (note 259) at para 73. 
394  SANDU III (note 259) at para 74. 
395 Ibid. 
396  SANDU III (note 259) at para 89. 
397  SANDU III (note 259) at para 97. 
398  SANDU III (note 259) at para 104. 
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3. THE SANDU 2010 JUDGMENT: SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE UNION V 
MINISTER OF DEFENCE UNREPORTED CASE NO 55100/2009 
 
The legal dispute which resulted in the main SANDU judgment399 began in 2009 when members 
of the SANDF organized a march to the Union Buildings to submit a petition listing their grievances 
to the President.400 Some unexpected and unplanned activities occurred because of some 
misunderstanding between the SANDF, the SANDU and other stakeholders.401   
 
As a result of these misunderstandings and activities, members of SANDF were given notices of 
administrative discharge from the SANDF.402 Regulation 6 of Chapter XX of the General 
Regulations of the SANDF and Reserve in the Defence Act403 provides that no member of the 
SANDF may participate in a strike under any circumstances, and that any member of the SANDF 
who will be found to be participating in a strike will be charged in terms of section 104 (13) and 
(14) of the Defence Act.404 Instead of following the procedure recommended in the Defence Act 
to charge members of SANDF who took part in the strike action, the Minister of Defence directly 
announced the mass dismissal of more than one thousand SANDF members for their alleged 
participation in what she termed an ‘unlawful protest’ or ‘mutiny’.405 The Minister neglected to 
afford members of SANDF an opportunity to state their side of the story and to present a defence 
as required by the audi alteram partem rule or section 3 of PAJA.  
 
As a result, SANDU on behalf of its members, made an application to the North Gauteng High 
Court requesting the Court to declare that the procedure adopted by the Minister as reflected in 
the ‘notice of intended administrative discharge/dismissal’ was unlawful and unconstitutional.406 
The Minister had authorised the summary dismissal notice and attached to it a list of names of 
1500 members of the SANDF who had supposedly taken part in the strike action without following 
proper disciplinary proceedings or even the audi alteram partem rule.407  
 
                                            
399  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1).  
400  Ibid. 
401  Ibid. 
402  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1) at p 2. 
403  Clause 6 of Chapter XX of the Defence Act 2002. 
404  Section 104 (13) and (14) of the Defence Act 42 of 2002 see also http://www.dod.mil.za and 
http://www.sandu.co.za (accessed 21 November 2014). 
405  Ibid. 
406  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1) at 2. 
407  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1) at p 5-7, 19.  
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There were allegations that the notice and the list did not reflect the correct information and names 
of the members of Defence Force. Some of the names which appeared on the list belonged to 
members of the Defence Force who did not take part in the strike action. Notwithstanding, the 
Minister effected the dismissal of all the members appearing in the list in terms of section 59(2) 
(e) of the Defence Act.408 
  
In the main application, the cause of action was the letter from the Minister dated 30 August 2009, 
which contained a notice of intended administrative discharge or dismissal of the members of the 
SANDF. 409 The Court was requested to declare that the procedure adopted by the respondents 
as reflected in that notice was unlawful and/or unconstitutional, and, furthermore, to interdict the 
Minister from referring the matter to the Military Bargaining Council (MBC), or the Military 
Arbitration Board (MAB) pending the finalisation of the dispute, to Interdict the Minister from 
discharging members of the Defence Force pursuant to the notice and/or similar order, bulletin or 
memorandum, and, finally, to interdict the Minister from administratively discharging members of 
the Defence Force pursuant to the notice unless a fair hearing with entitlement for parties to lead 
evidence and make representation is held.410 
 
Briefly, the dispute between SANDU and the Minister began when the chief of the SANDF refused 
to grant members of SANDF leave of absence in order to participate in the organised march. A 
march to the Union Buildings was organised by SANDU in which members of the SANDF, who 
were also members of SANDU, would take part on 26 August 2009.411 The purpose of the march 
was to hand in a memorandum of grievances at the presidency.412 All administrative requirements 
for organising this march had been fulfilled.413  
 
On 25 August 2009, however, the respondents informed the Council that all units and divisions 
of the SANDF had been placed on high security and standby from 25-30 August 2009 owing to 
                                            
408  Section 59(2) (e) of Defence Act 2002,  provides for the termination of service of members of 
Regular Force in accordance with any applicable regulations “if his or her continued employment 
constitutes a security risk to the State or if the required security clearance for his or her appointment 
in a post is refused or withdrawn”. 
409  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1) at 26.  
408 Ibid. 
411  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1) at 3. 
412  Ibid. 
413  City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipal Council (hereinafter the council). Regulation of gatherings 
Act 205 of 1993 provides for authorization to embark on strike actions or march. Obtaining 
authorisation is a prerequisite to embark on a strike action/demonstration/march. 
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the launch of the Bus Rapid Transport.414 As a result, the Council then withdrew the authorisation 
for marching. All the applications for leave that had been submitted were also rejected by the 
order of chief of the SANDF. The first application was heard on 9 September 2009 on an urgent 
basis. An agreement was reached between SANDU and the Minister in which the Minister agreed 
not to dismiss any members of the SANDF who were also members of SANDU. Pending the 
finalisation of this matter, the urgency to hear the matter was subsequently removed. 
  
Notwithstanding the refusal to approve leave and the withdrawal of the authorisation to march by 
the Council, members of the SANDF gathered at the Pretoria City Hall on the morning of 26 
August 2009.415 Members were awaiting the outcome of the urgent application that SANDU had 
re-submitted to the Court. Whilst the matter was in Court, another agreement was reached 
between SANDU, SANDF and Tshwane Metro Police that the assembled members would be 
moved to another venue under the supervision of the South African Police Service (SAPS) and 
the Metro police.416 
 
This would be the place where the outcome of the urgent application would be communicated to 
them.  
 
This, however, did not happen as the members of the SANDF marched to the Union Buildings 
and stormed the building committing various acts of misconduct and violence.417 These acts were 
contrary to the agreement entered into by the SANDU and the Minister. As a result of these 
actions, members of the SANDF were served with a notice of dismissal on 31 August 2009 and 
dated 30 August 2009. The aim of the notice was to “administratively discharge or dismiss” 
members of the SANDF. 
  
The main complaint by the SANDU was that fair procedure before their services of employment 
was provisionally terminated in terms of section 59 (2) (e) of the Defence Act 42 of 2002 was not 
followed.418 This section sets out that the termination of the services of employment of a member 
                                            
414  Bus Road Transportation (hereinafter referred to BRT). 
415  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1) at 4. 
416  Ibid. 
417  Ibid. 
418  Section 59(2)(e) provides that the service of a member of the Regular Force may be terminated in 
accordance with any applicable regulations; if his or her continued employment constitutes a 
security risk to the State or if the required security clearance for his or her appointment in a post is 
refused or withdrawn. See also SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1) at 5. 
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“may be terminated in accordance with applicable regulations”. There are no applicable 
regulations which refer to this section of the Act. The regulations which may be applicable are the 
General Regulations for the SANDF and the Reserve.419  
 
Another complaint was that the acts which members were being accused of, were vague as set 
out in the notice of administrative discharge or dismissal.420 There are no particulars set out in the 
notice which supports the allegations by the respondents regarding acts committed by the 
members of the SANDF.421 SANDU made it clear that they did not seek to evade disciplinary 
action and that they realised that such disciplinary action could lead to the dismissal of its 
members from the SANDF, and also that possible criminal charges may be laid against those 
members.422  
 
They argued, however, that this disciplinary action should be preceded by a fair process in which 
the audi alteram partem rule has to be applied before any dismissals are made or decisions 
regarding the conduct of the members of the SANDF are reached.423 
 
The Court had to decide whether the letter which was dated 30 August 2009 was illegal and/or 
unconstitutional, and whether the process followed by the Minister to dismiss members of the 
SANDF was fair under the circumstances. The Court was not interested at this stage in answering 
the question of whether the dismissal was fair or not, or in deciding on the merits of the case.424  
 
In its findings, the Court found that it was clear that members of the SANDF had had no 
opportunity to be heard prior to the notice being issued.425 The incident at the Union Buildings 
took place on the 26 August 2009. Members received the notice on 31 August 2009, five days 
after the alleged incident had taken place.426 The Court could not find any reference in the 
Minister’s papers to show how national security was threatened by the conduct of the members.427 
The Court asked the question of why the SANDF had not suspended members immediately 
                                            
419  General regulations for the South African National Defence Force and Reserve, Regulation 1043 of 
1999.  
420  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1) at 5-7. 
421  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1) at 6. 
422  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1) at 20. 
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pending the outcome of an investigation, and also why the Minister had not afforded these 
members the opportunity to state their side of the case. 428  
 
The Court referred to case law and legislation to address these issues. In its reasoning, however, 
the Court did not use any provisions of PAJA, which is the legislation that gives effect to section 
33 of the Constitution. It could be argued that, although it is not expressed in SANDU’s affidavits 
and heads of arguments, SANDU requested judicial review429 of the Minister’s decision on the 
ground of procedural unfairness. Unfair procedure is one of the grounds for judicial review in 
terms of section 6 (1) (c) of PAJA.430 One of the functions of judicial review is to encourage 
administrators to be accountable for their actions when they exercise public power using 
legislation. Another important function is that it serves as a control mechanism over administrative 
discretion.431 
 
Finally, the the Court granted two orders. Firstly, it gave a declaratory order that the procedure 
adopted by the respondents had been unlawful and unconstitutional and that those members had 
to be reinstated.432 Secondly, the Court granted an interdict that the Minister should not 
administratively discharge or dismiss those members in terms of the notice.  
 
The Court directed that the members should not be dismissed until the matter has been finalized 
by the internal process of the Military Bargaining Council (MBC). It also advised that, if the MBC 
failed to finalise the matter, the solution should be sought from the process of the Military 
Arbitration Board (MAB).433 The members were placed on special leave until 2016 when they 
were recalled for prosecution for the same actions in the military Court system.434 The military 
                                            
428  SANDU 2010 Judgment (note 1) at 10-13. 
429  Hoexter C “Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law” South African Law 
Journal (2000) 484-500 at 485. 
430  Section 6 (1) and 2(c) of PAJA provides that any person may institute proceedings in a Court or a 
tribunal and the Court or tribunal has the power to review an administrative action which was taken 
in a procedurally unfair manner judicially. 
431  Hertogh M and Halliday S “Judicial review and bureaucratic impact in future research” Judicial 
Review and Bureaucratic Impact (2004) at 277. 
432  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1) at 26. 
433  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1) at 2. The Military Bargaining Council and the Military Arbitration 
Board referred to in the order are the bodies established under regulations 62 and 75 respectively 
of Chapter XX of the General Regulations for the South African National Defence Force and 
Reserve, in the Defence Act 44 1957 and kept in force by s 106(2) of the Defence Act 42 of 2002. 
That chapter of the regulations deals with labour rights. 
434  The Minister of Defence v SA National Defence Force 2012 (161) ZASCA 110 (hereinafter referred 
to as SANDF appeal judgment I, 2012) at para 19. 
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court system referred to is a system which was established by the Military Discipline 
Supplementary Measures Act.435 
4. SUBSEQUENT JUDGMENTS AND EVENTS  
  
4.1  The first appeal (SANDF Judgment I, 2012) 
 
The Minister was dissatisfied with the decision and applied for leave to appeal in the same Court. 
The application for leave to appeal was denied. (The facts and reasons for the denial of the appeal 
do not form part of this research and will not be discussed here). 
 
The Minister applied to the SCA , which granted leave to appeal in The Minister of Defence v SA 
National Defence Force.436 The Minister accepted that the approach which was adopted to 
dismiss the members of the SANDF had been procedurally unfair.437  As a result, the Minister 
abandoned the application for leave to appeal the declaratory order and persisted in the 
application only in relation to the interdict.438 
   
The crux of the appeal was that the Court might have erred in granting this order, and the Minister 
believed that another Court would reach a different conclusion. The reasons for granting the 
interdict did not emerge from the judgment of the Court.439  The reasons which are evident from 
the judgment are those directed only to why the procedure was unlawful. Furthermore, the 
Minister was concerned that this decision might affect the management and the administration of 
discipline in the Defence Force, which would have a negative impact on national security. 
 
Another important reason was that the SANDU failed in the first place to establish that there was 
a clear right and, secondly, that the right had been, or was expected to be, infringed in the absence 
of similar protection by any other ordinary remedy.440 The appeal against the orders was, 
therefore, upheld. As a result, the second order granted by the High Court, an interdict, was set 
aside.441  
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The political reshuffling of Ministers, including that of the SANDF, did not make the relationship 
between SANDU and the Minister courteous or bring the legal disputes to an end. Five years 
later, this matter has still not been concluded. Continuing from the previous Minister’s litigation 
trail, the current Minister decided to withdraw the case from the SCA . The Minister opted to use 
the military court to charge the members of the SANDF who had taken part in the march to the 
Union Buildings in 2009.442  
  
It is noteworthy that the current Minister adopted a similar approach to deal with the disciplinary 
proceedings. The current Minister also failed to follow proper disciplinary procedures to grant 
members of the SANDF the right to a fair hearing. 443  The current Minister dismissed members 
by way of notice in a newspaper.444 This action prompted SANDU to apply to the High Court to 
request the Court to decide on whether disciplinary proceedings adopted by the current Minister 
against members of the SANDF in terms of section 59(2) (e) of the Defence Act 42 of 2002 were 
procedurally fair. The court also had to decidewhether the Minister can use unfair processes 
because of the absence of regulations as mentioned in the relevant section.445 
  
Du Toit AJ, sitting in the Court of first instance in this matter, granted the order that the procedure 
adopted by the current Minister was unfair and unlawful.446 
4.2  The second appeal (SANDF judgment II, 2014) 
 
The current Minister sought leave to appeal this order to the SCA, which was dismissed with costs 
in The Minister of Defence v SA National Defence Force.447 The SCA found that the Minister had 
not met the requirements of procedural justice and fairness over the decision to discipline 
members of the SANDF.448  
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The SCA , therefore, dismissed the application for leave to appeal and declared that the current 
Minister’s decision to dismiss 664 members of the SANDF by way of newspaper notices449 was 
procedurally unfair and unlawful.450 It is worth mentioning that, in its arguments, SANDU invoked 
the provisions of PAJA in this case compared to its submissions in the earlier case in the high 
court in 2009 on the same legal issues. SANDU submitted that the Minister’s action might be an 
administrative action.451  
5. The current position (2015-2017) 
 
The legal battle between SANDU and the Minister on the disciplinary hearing of members of the 
SANDF who had taken part in the march to the Union Building in 2009 still continues. SANDU 
has welcomed the decision of the SCA in 2014 that declared that the current Minister’s decision 
to dismiss members of SANDF by way of newspaper notices452 had been procedurally unfair, 
unlawful and unconstitutional.453  
 
SANDU is still representing members of the SANDF who took part in the strike action in 2009 in 
the disciplinary proceedings in the Military Court, in terms of the relevant regulations. More than 
780 members of the SANDF who took part in the 2009 strike action have been recalled to work.454 
The tug of war between the SANDU and the Minister still continues, especially on the issues 
related to the application of fairness by the Minister to members of the SANDF.455  
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the SANDU. See http://www.defenceweb.co.za articles published between 09 February, 04 and 15 





In this chapter, the genesis of the legal dispute and related judgment (High Court Decision of 
1999),456 the main SANDU judgment of 2010,457 subsequent judgments458 and events, the SANDF 
appeal judgment of 2012, appeal facts and issues, the declaratory order and interdict withdrawal, 
the SANDF appeal judgment of 2014, and the current situation from 2015-2017 have been 
discussed. 
 
There is evidence of a trail of legal disputes that led to a chain of court decisions that had to deal 
with the change of the legal landscape that had been introduced by the democratic Constitution 
in South Africa and, in particular, in the SANDF. Court decisions that are of particular importance 
to this study are those dealing with the application of procedural fairness to members of the 
SANDF, in particular Court decisions from 2009-2014.  
 
The competing concepts and their related legislative provisions that the courts had to tackle, 
which seem to form a thread that runs through all these judgments, are those of procedural 
fairness and other related fundamental rights versus discipline and dismissal. From the High 
Court decision of 2010 to the SCA judgment in 2014, SANDU submitted that the conduct of the 
Minister had infringed on the right to procedural fairness of members of the SANDF.  
 
On the other hand, the Minister argued, that discipline in the SANDF is paramount.  This argument 
was advanced in the 1999 Court decision which removed the ban of trade union in the SANDF. 
The view of the Minister is that the granting of fundamental rights to members of the SANDF will 
erode discipline in the SANDF.459  The inability to balance individual rights to procedural fairness 
and fair labour practices and the idea of maintaining discipline in the SANDF has led to the 
Minister and SANDU being tangled in continuous court battles. 
  
In the following chapter the concepts procedural fairness and discipline and the related legislative 
provisions will be discussed.  
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RELEVANT CONCEPTS DEALT WITH IN THE SANDU 2010 JUDGMENT AND LEGISLATIVE 
PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the previous chapter, it was demonstrated how the dawn of the democratic Constitution 
introduced fundamental rights to the SANDF, including the right to procedural fairness and the 
effects thereof.  This was done by discussing Court decisions that are relevant to the genesis of 
the legal disputes between the SANDU and the Minister, which led to the SANDU 2010 judgment. 
The SANDU 2010 judgment,460 subsequent events461 and related appeal judgments were also 
discussed.462 The above-mentionedCourt decisions form part the chain of events which unfolded 
from 2009 to 2017 and the connected issues regarding the application of procedural fairness.  
 
In order to understand the analysis of the reasoning of the SANDU 2010 judgment which follows 
in the next chapter, it is important to discuss the concepts of discipline and procedural fairness 
that the Court interpreted together with the applicable legislative and constitutional provisions.  
 
The Court in the SANDU 2010 judgment had to interpret the application of procedural fairness in 
terms of both section 23 and 33 of the Constitution and the importance of maintaining discipline 
in the SANDF in terms of section 200.463 Furthermore, the Court had to interpret various legislative 
and constitutional provisions that are also relevant to the application of procedural fairness, the 
right to fair labour practices and the maintenance of discipline in the defence force.464 For 
example, the Court interpreted sections 23, 33 and 200 of the Constitution.465 In addition, the 
                                            
460  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1). 
461  The Minister of Defence withdrew the appeal case that was lodged against the High Court judgment 
of 2010 in 2012 with a view to charge and subject all the members of the SANDF who were involved 
in the march at the Union Building to the internal disciplinary processes in the Defence Force. The 
withdrawal was welcomed by the South African National Defence Union.  
462  SANDF appeal judgment I & II (notes 432 and 445). 
463  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1) at 10, 14. Section 200 of Constitution directs the Minister to manage 
and structure the Defence Forces as a disciplined force. 
464  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1) at 6, 10, 14, 22. 
465  Section 33 is the just administrative clause, section 23 is the fair labour practice clause and section 
200 deal with the structure, administration and maintenance of Defence Forces (note 36). 
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Court had to interpret section 59(2) of the Defence Act, which deals with dismissals or discharges 
from the SANDF.466  
 
The Court had to strike a balance between the constitutional protection of the right to procedural 
fairness of members of the SANDF in terms of sections 23 and 33 respectively and the 
constitutional duty of the Minister of Defence to manage the Defence Force as a structured and 
disciplined Defence Force.467 The right to just administrative action includes administrative action 
that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.468  
 
On the other hand, the right to fair labour practices includes substantive and procedural 
fairness.469 The Court in the SANDU 2010 judgment was concerned with the unfair procedure 
that the Minister had followed when dismissing members of the SANDF.470 The Minister raised 
the duty to enforce and maintain discipline in the SANDF as the defence.471 
 
The concept of discipline in the context of Defence Forces is dealt with in various provisions of 
the SANDF legislative framework, in particular the Defence Act’s MDSMA and its Rules and 
Regulations and also in Chapter XX in Defence Act 42 1957.472 In general, discipline in the 
workplace is addressed through the application of the LRA and other relevant employment 
legislation.473 The Court in the SANDU 2010 judgment had to interpret the relevant provisions of 
the LRA,474 the Defence Act,475 and the Constitution476 to determine the applicability of procedural 
fairness to actions by members of the Defence Force. 
   
                                            
466  Section 59(2) of the Defence Act of 2002. 
467  The Constitution protects the right to procedural fairness in section 33 and also gives a mandate to 
the Minister to maintain a structured and disciplined Defence Force in section 200.  
468  Section 33 of the Constitution, 1996. 
469  Section 23 of the Constitution, 1996. 
470  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1). 
471  In their response the Minister alleged that the ill-disciplined behaviour of members of the Defence 
Force affected national security. 
472  The SANDF legislative framework includes the Constitution, Defence Act, and MDSMA, read with 
its Rules of Procedure (note 7). 
473  Schedule 8 of the LRA of 1995, Basic Conditions of Employment Act and Code of Good Practice. 
474  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1) at pages 10, 14, 23, 24 and 25. The court had to interpret sections 
187 and 188 of the LRA of 1995. 
475  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1) at pages 9 and 19. The court also had to interpret section 59(2) (e) 
of the Defence Act of 2002. 
476  Section 23 and 33 of the Constitution. See also SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1) at 11, 14 and 25. 
78 
 
Sections 23 and 33 of the Constitution and section 59(2) of the Defence Act are of particular 
importance for the analysis of the reasoning that led to the Court order477 of the SANDU 2010 
judgment.478 It must be noted that, although the LRA does not apply to members of the Defence 
Force, some of its provisions were interpreted by the Court in its reasoning.479 
 
In this chapter, the concepts of discipline and procedural fairness will be described and discussed. 
General legislative provisions that are applicable to the concept of discipline and procedural 
fairness will also be addressed. The legislative provisions that are applicable to discipline and to 
procedural fairness that were specifically interpreted in the SANDU 2010 judgment will be 
described and discussed.  
 
Sections 23 and 33 of the Constitution and other relevant legislative provisions which were raised 
by both applicants and the respondents respectively will also be dealt with in relation to discipline 
and procedural fairness. Other legislative provisions, which were not raised by the parties or by 
the Court, but which are relevant to the applicability of procedural fairness, such as sections (3)-
(7) of PAJA, will also be discussed.  The effect and influence of the Constitution on the defence 
legislation, and the application of procedural fairness to members of the SANDF in terms of the 
Defence Act will be discussed briefly. This chapter will conclude with a summary. 
2. DISCIPLINE, PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND THE APPLICABLE LEGISLATIVE 
PROVISIONS  
 
In the SANDU 2010 judgment,480 the Court had to deal with the issue of upholding discipline in 
the SANDF versus the applicability of procedural fairness to actions by members of the SANDF. 
According to Grogan,481 the power of employers to discipline their employees flows from their 
contract of employment. The employers are entitled to take action against their employees if their 
misconduct amounts to a breach of contract of employment. 482  
                                            
477  In SANDU 2010 judgment two orders were granted. The first order was that the decision of the 
Minister to dismiss members of SANDF, declared unlawful and procedurally unfair. The second 
order was an interdict. For purposes pf this study the court order refers to the first order. 
478  Sections 23 and 33 of the Constitution, section 59 of the Defence Act of 2002. 
479  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1) at 23 and 24. 
480  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1). 
481  Grogan J Dismissal 2nd ed (2014) at 345. 
482  Ibid. 
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The power of employers to discipline their employees is derived from common law and other 
statutes, and it must be exercised within the limit and scope of the law.483 Discipline is enforced 
through various sanctions or mechanisms, including dismissal. Because dismissal is the most 
severe penalty that the employer can impose on the employee who is guilty of misconduct or the 
repetition of failure to perform despite the necessary interventions or any other breach, employers 
are encouraged to deal with this form of discipline in a legally acceptable manner.  
 
In other words, workplace discipline, its fair application, processes, and fair pre-dismissal 
procedures should be taken seriously and be adhered to.484 Sometimes, employers discipline 
employees and later find themselves in a factual and legal crisis. This is the result of hasty 
decisions to dismiss employees, as was the case in the matter between the Minister of SANDF 
and SANDU.  
 
The right to discipline employees by the employers originates from the common law.485 According 
to Anderman,486 the right to give instruction and subsequently to discipline an employee for failure 
to follow the instruction finds its application in the contract of employment.487  This right is an 
implied term in the contract of employment according to the common law of contracts. He argues 
that this common law right of employers to give instruction is futile if it is not accompanied by the 
power to discipline employees in terms of contract.488 
 
The right of employers to discipline their employees is not only regulated by the common law in 
the form of the contract of employment but also by various statutes, in particular the LRA and the 
Code of Good Practice: Dismissal, annexed to the Act as Schedule 8.489  In terms of common 
law, the employer may dismiss an employee summarily if the misconduct is serious.490 Common 
law requires that, by imposing a penalty on an employee, the employer must comply with its 
principles.   
 
                                            
483  Grogan J Workplace Law 10th ed (2009) at 129. 
484  Basson AC et al Essential Labour Law: Individual Labour Law 4th ed (2005) at 110. 
485  Ibid. 
486  Anderman SD Labour Law: Management decisions and workers‘ rights (1992) at 62. 
487  Ibid. 
488  Ibid. 
489  LRA of 1995. 
490  Basson AC (note 483) at 110. 
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The employer’s unrestricted powers to dismiss in terms of common law was the foundation of the 
employer’s powers to make rules and enforce discipline.491 The LRA Code of Good Practice 
recognises this power.  It requires that all employers should adopt disciplinary rules which will 
capture the disciplinary code and standards that employees must comply with in the workplace.  
Furthermore, when such disciplinary rules exist, then disciplinary actions against the employees 
must comply with those rules. Item 3 of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissals sets out the 
minimum guidelines for discipline in the workplace.492  
 
With regard to sanction, item 3 of Schedule 8 of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissals places 
an expectation on employers to use corrective and progressive discipline in dealing with the 
misconduct of employees.493 It is also trite that, in certain circumstances, dismissal for a first time 
offence may be appropriate where such an offence is of a serious nature.  
2.1  Discipline in terms of the LRA 66 1995 
 
In Labour Law, rules that apply to parties when resolving a dispute, differ depending on the nature 
of the dispute. The starting point when there is a dispute between employer and employee is the 
contract of employment.494 This would be followed by the applicable provisions of the relevant 
statutes.  
 
A dispute related to discipline in the workplace is regulated by a number of statutes, the most 
important being the Constitution and the LRA.495 The LRA was enacted to give effect to section 
23 of the Constitution which deals with labour related rights including the right to fair labour 
                                            
491  Ibid. 
492  Item 3 of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal states that “All employers should adopt disciplinary 
rules that establishes the standard of conduct required of employees.” The form and content of 
disciplinary rules will obviously vary according to the size and nature of the organisation or 
employer’s business. In general, a larger business will require a more formal approach to discipline. 
This requires that the standards of conduct are clear and made available to employees in a manner 
that is easily understood. Some rules and standards may be so well established and known that it 
is not necessary to communicate them. 
493 Transnet Freight Rail v Transnet Bargaining Council and Others 2009 case no C644 (LAC) para 28. 
494  The relationship between an employer and employee is mainly regulated by the contract of 
employment. This relationship is still regulated by common law to the extent that legislation is not 
applicable. See also Borg-Warner SA (Pty) Ltd v National Automobile & Allied Workers Union 1991 
(12) ILJ 549 LAC at 557G. 
495  The Constitution, 1996 and the LRA of 1995. 
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practices.496 One of the fundamentals of fair labour practice is that no one should be unfairly 
dismissed. Section 185 of the LRA deals with an unfair dismissal.497 
 
Schedule 8 in the LRA, Code of Good Practice: Dismissals echoes section 185.498 This schedule 
provides for disciplinary procedures to be followed prior to dismissal.499 It forms the most important 
statutory structure within which employers can ensure fair disciplinary procedures including the 
dismissal of an employee.  
 
Item 1(3) of Schedule 8 deals with discipline in the workplace and states as the basic principle 
that employers and employees should treat one another with common respect.500 Schedule 8 
further provides for the procedural elements of a disciplinary hearing.501 When an act of 
misconduct occurs, the employer should conduct an investigation to determine whether there are 
grounds for disciplinary action and subsequent dismissal.502 
 
The LRA provides employers with clear guidelines in Schedule 8 of how to manage discipline 
when misconduct and incapacity in the workplace occur.503 An important consideration is placed 
on both employment justice and the efficient operation of business. While employees should be 
protected from the arbitrary action of employers, employers too are entitled to satisfactory conduct 
and work performance from their employees.504 In an instance where an employee fails to adhere 
to the code of conduct that is required by the employer, the employer can exercise powers to 
enforce discipline.505 The employer’s powers to discipline extends only to those acts which would 
be considered a breach of the contract of employment.506 
 
                                            
496  Section 23 (1) (5) and (6) (note 36). See also Labour Relations Amendment Act 6 2014. 
497  Section 185 of LRA provides for the “right not to be unfairly dismissed or subjected to unfair labour 
practice. It states that every employee has the right not to be (a) unfairly dismissed; and (b) 
subjected to unfair labour practice”. 
498  Schedule 8 is the Code of Good Practice: Dismissals contained in the LRA (note 21). 
499  See section 3 Schedule 8 in the LRA of 1995. 
500  See section 1 of Schedule 8 in the LRA (note 21). 
501  Ibid. 
502  Ibid. 
503  Section 3 of the LRA of 1995 provides for disciplinary procedures to be followed prior to dismissal. 
504  Section 1 (3) of Schedule 8 of the LRA of 1995. 
505  Grogan J (note 479) at 129. See also Basson AC (note 483) at 75, 76 77. 
506  Grogan J (note 479) at 350. 
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Section 188 of the LRA also sets out the requirements for dismissal for misconduct to be 
considered fair.507 The LRA recognises that, according to the concept of progressive discipline, 
dismissal should be imposed only as the last measure in a chain of punishments available for 
misconduct.508  The LRA further sets out two main requirements which must be complied with for 
a dismissal to be considered fair.509  
 
In the first place, it requires dismissal to be both substantively and procedurally fair. In this regard, 
the LRA demands that, in order to effect discipline, there must be a reason in the form of 
misconduct or another form of disciplinable conduct, and that discipline be effected in a fair 
manner.510 This entails that the procedure for dismissal as a disciplinary device must be fair. 
Sections 2, 3(4), 4 and 7 deal specifically with fair reasons for dismissal, dismissal for misconduct, 
fair procedure and guidelines in cases of dismissals for misconduct, which must be adhered to by 
the employer when contemplating disciplining an employee.511 
  
Deviation from the guidelines provided in Schedule 8 in the LRA may be justified in exceptional 
circumstances. It should be noted that, because there are no concrete principles that have been 
established regarding when an employee may be fairly disciplined, case law must serve to 
illustrate and set precedents where the line should be drawn on a case by case basis.512 
 
Further, it must be noted that the Code of Good Practice: Dismissals does not replace the 
employer’s own disciplinary code, if it exists.513 The guidelines provided in the Code are 
secondary to different guidelines provided in negotiated collective agreements.514 It is, however, 
noteworthy that, in certain appropriate instances, the arbitrator or presiding officer may apply the 
Code of Good Practice: Dismissal instead of the employer’s code.515  
                                            
507  Section 188 of the LRA provides for other unfair dismissals. It states that (1) A dismissal that is not 
automatically unfair is unfair if the employer fails to prove (a) that the reason for dismissal is a fair 
reason (i) related to the employee's conduct or capacity; or (ii) based on the employer's operational 
requirements; and (b) that the dismissal was effected in accordance with a fair procedure. 
508  LRA of 1995.  See also Grogan J (note 479) at 350. 
509  Section 188 of the LRA OF 1995. 
510  Grogan J (note 479) at 350. 
511  Sections 2, 3(4), 4 and 7 of Schedule 8 in the LRA of 1995. 
512  Grogan J (note 523) at 346. See also NUM v East Rand Gold & Uranium Co Ltd 1986 (7) ILJ 793 
(IC). See also NEHAWU obo Barnes v Department of Foreign Affairs 2001 (6) BALR 539 (P), Visser 
v Woolworths 2005 (26) ILJ 2250 (CCMA), City of Cape Town v SALGBC 2011 (32) ILJ (LC). 
513  Grogan J Workplace Law (2009) 10th ed at 132. See also Free State Buying Association Ltd t/a 
Alpha Pharm v SACCAWU & Others 1998 (19) ILJ 1481(LC). 
514  Grogan J (note 479) at 132. See County Fair Pty Ltd v CCMA & Other 1999 (20) ILJ 2609 (LC). 




For example, in Free State Buying Association Ltd t/a Alpha Pharm v SACCAWU & Others, the 
commissioner held that the penalty of dismissal at first instance contained in the employer’s code 
was too harsh.516 The Court later held that the commissioner had erred in his/her finding, because 
the negotiated disciplinary code did not provide for dismissal at first instance for such an offence 
as the one in question.517  
 
The Court in SACCAWU and Pick n Pay Hypermarket held that guidelines in the Code of Good 
Practice: Discipline are not peremptory, but that codes must be interpreted in a flexible manner.518 
A disciplinary code should not be enforced and interpreted with the strictness of a statute.519 Care 
must, however, be taken to ensure the standard required in applying disciplinary measures. The 
standard of fairness and reasonableness can be found in the common law rules of natural 
justice.520 Furthermore, the appropriateness of disciplinary action should be measured against 
the standard set by international law.521 
 
The purpose of the Code of Good Practice is to protect employees from unfair arbitrary actions 
by employers on the one hand. On the other hand, it protects an employer’s right to expect 
satisfactory conduct and performance from his/her employees in order to achieve the objective of 
the organisation.522  
 
The Code provides employers with guidance on what is required in the policy and implementation 
of a fair Disciplinary Code and Procedure.523 It is important that all employers develop rules, 
policies or standards of conduct in the workplace along with the related punishments.524 These 
rules, policies and standards must be communicated clearly to employees.  
                                            
516  Ibid. 
517  Ibid. 
518  SACCAWU and Pick n Pay Hypermarket (2004) 25 ILJ 1820 (ARB). See also Grogan J (note 525) 
at 133.  
519 Grogan J (note 479) at 134. See also Hoechst Pty (Ltd) v Chemical Workers Industrial Union & 
Another 1993 (14) ILJ 1449 (LAC), Saaiman & Another v De Beer Consolidated Mines 1995 (16) 
ILJ 1551(IC). 
520  Common law rules of natural justice are audi alteram partem and the nemo iudex in sua causa 
which is the rule against bias. See Basson AC (note 483) at 77 and 82. 
521  The most important source is the conventions and recommendations of the International Labour 
Organization, to which South Africa is a signatory. See Convention 158 of 1982 and 
Recommendation 166 of 1982. See Grogan J (note 479) at 134. 
522  Basson AC (note 483) at 77 and 82. See also Grogan J (note 479) at 130. 
523  Schedule 8 in the LRA of 1995. 




For example, in Matshoba v Fry’s Metals, the employer dismissed employees for refusing to work 
overtime when the employer had never previously acted against employees for refusing to work 
overtime.525 In Fihla & Others v Pest Control Transvaal, the Court stated that consistency in 
applying the rules is equally important, because it is possible that employees may know about 
rules in the Code, but they may also be under a justifiable impression that the rule will not be 
enforced.526 
 
The content and level of formality of such rules is dependent on the nature and size of each 
employer.527 Disciplinary Codes and Procedures should place emphasis on corrective discipline 
in the workplace and not merely on its punitive nature.528  
2.2  Discipline in the context of defence forces in general 
  
Discipline in the context of defence forces seems to be viewed differently from discipline in the 
general workplace. This is because of what could be considered the special nature of the defence 
forces.529  
 
The special nature of the defence forces was noted in the Canadian case of R V Généreux. 530 
The aim and purpose of the defence forces, which is mainly to protect and maintain security in 
any country, also has an effect of how discipline is understood.531 It is, therefore, not surprising 
that the most severe manner of enforcing and maintaining discipline in the defence force, as 
                                            
525  Matshoba v Fry’s Metals 1983 (4) ILJ 107 (IC). 
526  Fihla & Others v Pest Control Transvaal (Pty) Ltd 1984 (5) ILJ 165 (IC). 
527  See section 3(1) of Schedule 8 of LRA which provides that “the Form and Content of disciplinary 
rules will vary according to the size and nature of the employers business. In general, a larger 
business will require a more formal approach to discipline. An employer’s rules must create certainty 
and consistency in the application of discipline. This requires that the standards of conduct are clear 
and made available to employees in a manner that is easily understood. Some rules may be so well 
established and known that it is not necessary to communicate them.” See also Grogan J (note 525) 
at 132-133. 
528  Grogan J (note 479) at 133-130. 
529  R v Généreux (note 145) at 293. 
530  The court held that [t]here is a need for separate tribunals to enforce special disciplinary standards 
in the military. Recourse to the ordinary criminal courts would, as a general rule, be inadequate to 
serve the particular disciplinary needs of the military. 
531  See section 200 (1) (2) of the Constitution 1996 which provides that “The defence force must be 
structured and managed as a disciplined military force. (2) The primary object of the defence force 
is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the 
Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force.” 
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opposed to the much acceptable and humane manner found in the ordinary workplace, is 
applied.532  
 
According to Rowe, military discipline should be viewed as, and understood to be, the most severe 
form of professional discipline.533 He is of the opinion that other professional bodies, employers 
or voluntary organisations also possess some form of discipline, which is managed and enforced 
differently from that of the military.534 These organisational forms of discipline may range from an 
employer’s oral and written warnings, suspensions and dismissal.535  
For a serious breach of discipline, an employee may lose his ability to work in that profession 
again. An employee’s opportunity for promotion may also be affected.536 In contrast to workplace 
discipline, military discipline is enforced through military law, which is aimed at both dismissal 
from the military and as a deterrent function.537  
 
The idea is to prevent soldiers from behaving in an undisciplined manner. The reason is that, if a 
soldier behaves in an undisciplined manner, the possible result of this conduct does not only 
affect the individual soldier as in the ordinary workplace. This conduct is likely to affect the defence 
force as a whole, and, by extension, also the nation.538 Such conduct must, therefore, be deterred 
by criminal sanctions.539  
 
Central to the concept of military discipline, and necessary for the achievement of the military 
order, it is an accepted practice that members of the defence forces submit completely to the 
superior-subordinate relationship that exists.540 This situation is different from that in the ordinary 
workplace, where ordinary laws, which are applicable to workplace discipline, offer protection to 
                                            
532  See R v Généreux (note 145) at 293-295, where the court held that “the safety and well-being of 
Canadians depends considerably on the willingness and readiness of military men and women to 
defend against threats to the nation’s security. In order to maintain the Armed Forces in a state of 
readiness, the military must be in a position to enforce internal discipline effectively and efficiently. 
Breaches of military discipline must be dealt with speedily and punishment must be more severe 
than would be the case if a civilian engaged in similar conduct”. 
533  Rowe P (note 115) at 63. 
534  Ibid. 
535  Ibid. 
536  Ibid. 
537  Westmoreland WC “Military Justice-A Commander’s viewpoint” The American Criminal Law Review 
(1971) at 6-10. 
538  Rowe P (note 115) at 63.  
539  Gibson M “International Human Rights Law and the Administration of Justice through Military 
Tribunals: Preserving utility while precluding impunity” Journal of International Law and International 
Relations (2008) 4 (1) at 10. 
540  Westmoreland WC (note 535) at 6-10. 
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the employees. Whilst the relationship between employer and employee is also unequal in nature, 
employees are allowed to join trade unions, which protect them against unreasonable and harsh 
disciplinary sanctions by employers. 
 
Military law did not offer this protection until recently. Military law provides for military courts or 
martial courts, whose primary aim is to enforce military law and maintain discipline in the defence 
forces. This system is separate and different from ordinary labour laws. In R v Généreux, it was 
held that the purpose of a separate system of military courts is to allow the defence forces to deal 
with matters that pertain directly to the discipline, effectiveness and self-confidence of the military 
in a specific manner.541  This is because special disciplinary standards in the military are required 
when compared with the ordinary workplace.542 This is in line with the military demands of 
ensuring professional, effective and well-disciplined defence forces.  
 
Consequently, it is necessary that defence forces possess an appropriate military justice system 
within their martial courts. This is considered to be fundamental to the creation and successful 
operation of defence forces.543 It is important that a distinction should be made between the use 
of military courts for political purposes to dominate civilians and the legitimate use of those courts 
to maintain the discipline in the military.544 
  
In order to maintain order in the military, the Court in the case of United States v McCarty held 
that punishment was necessary for the enforcement of military discipline.545 Schlueter is of the 
view that in any defence force, discipline cannot be maintained by administering procedural 
justice. In order to enforce discipline, therefore, the standard of discipline should be different from 
the ordinary workplace discipline where procedural justice dominates.546  
 
It is common knowledge that standards of guilt and innocence in military law are not different from 
those in civil law, although the objectives of the two systems are different. The objective of the 
civilian criminal court or ordinary workplace is to mainly reform and rehabilitate and to a certain 
                                            
541  R v Généreux (note 145) at 293. 
542  Gibson M (note 537) at 48.  
543  Ibid. 
544  Ibid. 
545  United States v McCarty 1960 (29) 757.  




extent deter the offenders or employees, whereas the objective of the military law is to act mainly 
as a deterrent.547 
 
According to Westmoreland, military law must not only deter improper conduct, but it must also 
provide a method for the rehabilitation of as many offenders as possible.548  In his view, the military 
justice system should encompass the two elements of deterrence and rehabilitation. Other 
commentators, such as Schlueter, describe the military justice system as, among other things, a 
rough form of justice and a system that is unable to dispense justice.549  
 
Westmoreland, on the other hand, is of the opinion that the military system should be able to 
rehabilitate a delinquent soldier, and that, if rehabilitation is achieved, and the soldier is returned 
to duty, a valuable asset would have been preserved.550 He argues that discipline and justice are 
two different concepts, each with a particular purpose.551 Each should, therefore, accomplish its 
objective. According to him, the essential focus of discipline is to address task accomplishment. 
On the other hand, justice encompasses fairness to the individual who may be accused of military 
wrongdoing, and the prosecution of such an accused should only be in accordance with the law.552 
 
In any national defence force, discipline forms an important part of management, and its failure 
might lead to dire consequences. As a result, an effective soldier is proud, tough, disciplined, and 
displays morale, cohesion, trust, shared soldiering values, and high standards of military conduct 
at all times.553 It is not an easy task to balance the two values of discipline and justice in the 
defence forces.  
 
Westmoreland states that a problem for military codes is to identify and adopt those procedures 
which ensure fairness and ‘due process’ while preserving the ability of the forces to achieve their 
mission, in other words, to maintain and manage a disciplined defence force unit.554 Historically, 
it was assumed that the primary purpose of military justice was to enforce good order and 
discipline. Punishment meted out to maintain and enforce discipline was generally swift and 
                                            
547  Ibid. 
548  Westmoreland WC (note 535) at 6-10. 
549  Schlueter D (note 544) at 5.  
550  Ibid. 
551  Ibid. 
552  Westmoreland WC and Prugh G “Judges in command: The Judicialised Uniform Code of Military 
Justice in combat” Harvard Journal for Law (1980) 3 at 5.  
553  South Africa Defence Review (2015) at 12-1. 
554  Westmoreland W and Prugh G (note 550) at 5. 
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guaranteed and was sometimes severe or arbitrary.555 This brought into conflict the commander's 
responsibility for mission accomplishment and the serviceman's rights.556 
  
Military justice demands discipline, in other words, action in obedience to regulations and orders. 
This is absolutely necessary for speedy, skilled, and decisive handling of multitudes of 
individuals.557 In cases of failure to comply with this demand, the court-martial system will supply 
the sanction. The United States Supreme Court decision in O’Callahan v Parker emphasised this 
requirement for discipline by establishing court-martial jurisdiction over offences that have been 
committed by service members. 558  
 
In South Africa, in 1999, certain aspects of the courts-martial system were constitutionally and 
successfully challenged in Freedom of Expression Institute and Others v President, Court Martial 
and Other.559 The main challenge against the court-martial system was its lack of proper 
procedure to dispense justice.560 The manner in which judicial officers who presided in the court-
martial handled matters was questioned as well as how these proceedings were conducted.561  
 
Although the system still faces some challenges at different levels, it remains the platform for the 
enforcement of discipline in the defence forces.562  
 
2.3  Discipline in the context of the SANDF: The Defence Act, MDSMA and Chapter XX OF 
Defence Act 42 2002 
 
The context of the SANDF insofar as discipline is managed, maintained and enforced, is not 
different from most other countries. Before the democratic Constitution, discipline was maintained 
                                            
555  Schlueter D, (note 544) at 6. See also United States v McCarty 1960 (29) 757at 757. The court 
noted severity of punishments during World War II and that sometimes there would be proposals to 
discipline court members for adjudging inadequate sentences); See also Winthrop W, Military Law 
and Precedents (2nd ed) 1920 at 567. 
556  Bishop JW “The Case for Military Justice” Military Law Review (1973) 62 215 at 218. 
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through a developed system of South African military law within the military court system.563 Later 
on, after the dawn of the democratic Constitution, the Constitutional Court, in the case of Minister 
of Defence v Potsane and Another, recognised the Military Court System that enforces 
discipline.564 
 
The Constitutional Court stated that military discipline is the foundation of a professional and 
efficient defence force.565 Furthermore, it stated that discipline is founded upon respect for, and 
the loyalty to, properly constituted authority.566 What the Court meant by this statement is that 
military courts or court martials are constituted and specially empowered to ensure that discipline 
in the defence force is enforced. This is in compliance with section 200(1) of the Constitution.567 
  
The power of prosecution in the military court concerns three specific military offences, namely 
disobeying lawful command, insubordination, and conduct to the prejudice of military discipline.568 
Except for the offence of insubordination, the other offences mentioned above are not found in 
the ordinary workplace. In the case of The Minister of Defence vs Potsane and Another, Kriegler 
J echoed the requirements for military discipline that are found in the Defence Review.569 He 
indicated that the ultimate objective of the military in time of peace is to prepare for war.570 
According to the judge, the defence force requires, as no other system does, the highest standard 
of discipline, which can be defined as an attitude of respect for authority.571  
 
Like Rowe,572 Kriegler J is of the view that the standard of ordinary workplace discipline and the 
related sanctions for transgression of discipline differ from defence force discipline.573 Kriegler J 
stated that:  
 
                                            
563 Carnelley M (note 188) at 56. 
564  Minister of Defence v Potsane and Another Minister of Defence v Potsane; Legal Soldier (Pty) Ltd 
v Minister of Defence 2002 (1) SA 1 (CC). 
565  Minister of Defence v Potsane and Another (note 562) at para 37. 
566  Minister of Defence v Potsane and Another (note 562) at para 38. 
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572  Rowe P (note 115). 
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“[f]or instance, what would be acceptable in another employment relationship is not only 
impermissible for a soldier but may be visited by punishment as severe as deprivation of 
liberty for several years”.574  
 
According to Kriegler J, chapter 11 of the Constitution plays a vital role in the understanding of 
military discipline.575 Military discipline, therefore, is about having an effective defence force that 
is capable of defending, and ready to defend, the territorial integrity of the Republic and the 
freedom of its people.576 
 
There are various pieces of legislation that regulate discipline in the defence force.577 
The manner in which the provisions of the SANDF legislative framework is applied appears to be 
different from the application of military law in other countries. This is because of the political 
history of South Africa.578 This history has had a great effect on how disciplinary processes are 
currently applied in the SANDF.  
 
The piece of legislation, which regulated military justice in the SANDF, was the Defence Act 
1957.579 This law contained a Military Discipline Code.580 The defence legislative framework and 
the system of military justice changed after the 1996 Constitution was adopted. The prime law is 
currently the Defence Act of 2002.581 The provisions of this law and those of the Constitution must 
be read with some provisions from the Military Discipline Code and the Military Discipline 
Supplementary Measures with its Rules of Procedure and Regulations which was promulgated in 
1999.582   
 
                                            
574  Ibid. 
575  Section 198(a) of the Constitution provision provides that “National security must reflect the resolve 
of South Africans, as individuals and as a nation, to live as equals, to live in peace and harmony, to 
be free from fear and want and to seek a better life”. See The Minister of Defence v Potsane and 
Another (note 562) at para 38. 
576  The Minister of Defence v Potsane and Another (note 562) at para 31 
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579  Defence Act of 1957.  
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A new chapter XX was added to the New Defence Act of 2002 in order to deal with matters related 
to labour law and labour disputes, which is fairly unique to defence force administration.583 The 
applicants in South African National Defence Union v South African National Defence Force 
argued that, although section 59(2) of the Defence Act provides that “the services of a member 
of the Regular Force may be terminated in accordance with applicable regulations”, there are no 
regulations available in the Defence Force legislative framework.584 Chapter 14 of the Defence 
Review is another important document that provides guidelines on the maintenance of discipline 
in the Defence Force.585  
 
The Military Discipline Supplementary Measures Act (MDSMA, 1999) 
 
This is a piece of legislation that was promulgated in 1999, after some of the provisions in the 
MDC were found to be unconstitutional.586 The aim of this piece of legislation is to facilitate 
procedures that must be followed to enforce discipline in disciplinary proceedings.587 Military 
discipline in a wider sense should be distinguished from military disciplinary measures.588  
 
Military discipline is aimed at developing and maintaining an effective military force that is capable 
of protecting, and ready to protect, the territorial integrity of the country and the freedom of its 
people.589 It is not aimed at punishing individual members of the defence force for crimes 
committed. Neither is it aimed at maintaining and promoting law, order, and tranquillity in the 
society.590 On the other hand, military disciplinary measures are aimed at minor corrective 
measures and the prosecution of criminal offences that are committed by individual members of 
the defence force who are subject to the MDC.591 Both the Military Discipline Code and the Military 
                                            
583  Defence Act of 1957, did not contain any chapter or provisions that dealt with labour issues. This is 
because members of the defence forces were not regarded as workers or employees, until 1999, 
where the Constitutional Court declared them workers for purposes of collective bargaining.  In 1999 
the Minister of Defence was ordered by the Court to make regulations that dealt with labour matters. 
Chapter XX of the Defence Act 2002 was promulgated along with its Regulations. 
584  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1) at 22. 
585  Meyer R “Chairperson’s overview” South African Defence Review (2014) at 5.  
586  President, Ordinary Court Martial v Freedom of Expression Institution 1999 (4) SA 682 (CC); and 
Freedom of Expression Institute v President, Ordinary Court Martial 1999 (2) SA 471 (C). The 
provisions MDC were challenged to be unconstitutional. 
587  See the preamble of The MDSMA (note 7). 
588  Nel M (note 55) at 36. 
589 The Minister of Defence v Potsane and Another (note 562) at para 10. See also section 2 of the 
Defence Act (note 16). 
590  The Minister of Defence v Potsane and Another (note 562) at para 28. See also Morris L (note 60) 
at 3. 
591  The preamble of MDSMA (note 7). 
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Supplementary Measures Act have been promulgated specifically to deal with discipline in the 
defence force. 
  
The MDC deals with discipline in the narrow context, in other words, it sets out the standard of 
discipline and the related punishments for failure to adhere to those standards.592 The military 
disciplinary system exists to uphold good military order and discipline by using statutory powers, 
such as the provisions of the MDSMA, to achieve certain objectives in the Defence Force.593 The 
MDSMA empowers commanders to achieve the enforcement, maintenance, and regulation of 
discipline in the Defence Force.594 In addition to the MDSMA, there are Rules of Procedure and 
some of the provisions in the First Schedule of the Defence Act 44 of 1957 that deal with the 
procedure and processes to be followed when standards of discipline have been violated.595  
 
The current military disciplinary system was developed within a constitutional framework.596 This 
is what differentiates the legal framework of the SANDF from the military legal frameworks of 
other countries. In South Africa, if there is a provision in the Defence Act, the MDC or in the 
MDSMA that violates any right in the Constitution, such a legislative provision will be challenged 
for constitutional invalidity, notwithstanding the fact that such legislative provisions are meant to 










                                            
592  Chapter 17 of the Defence Act of 2002 deals with offences and penalties and offensive behavior. 
See sections 104 and 105 of MDC (note 7). 
593  The South African Defence Review, 2014 at 12-1. 
594  The MDSMA (note 7) where its preamble states that the ‘aim of the Act is to provide for a new 
system of military courts with a view to improved enforcement of military discipline, and to provide 
for incidental matters’. 
595  Chapter XX of Defence Act 2002. 
596  Section 2 of the Constitution, 1996. 
597  South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence and Another 1999 (6) BCLR 615 (CC). 
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Chapter of the Defence Act 42 of 2002 in the General Regulations of Defence Forces 
and Reserve 
 
Chapter XX598 was promulgated as a result of a Court decision of 1999.599 This chapter was 
promulgated to deal with labour related issues and labour related disputes.600  The aim was to 
address the gap that existed in the Defence Force legislative framework.601  
 
Before 1999, the legislative framework of the defence force did not contain any rules and 
regulations that dealt with labour related matters or labour related disputes. This was because, 
before 1999, members of the Defence Force were not considered to be workers or employees.602  
 
Although Chapter XX does not deal with discipline directly, it does indicate the importance of 
discipline within the labour relations environment of the Defence Forces.603 In recognition of the 
importance of discipline in the defence forces, the Constitutional Court, in the case of SANDU v 
The Minister and Another, expressly excluded the right to strike when declaring that members of 
the defence force are workers for purposes of section 23 of the Constitution.604 
3.  PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 
 
The Court, in the SANDU 2010 judgment, had to deal with the infringement of the right to 
procedural fairness of members of the SANDF by the Minister.605 Section 23 of the Constitution 
read together with section 188(1)(b) of the LRA recognises the importance of ensuring fair labour 
practices including the application of procedural fairness.606 The application of procedural fairness 
                                            
598  Chapter XX (note 17). 
599  South African National Defence Union v The Minister and Another 1999 (6) BCLR 615 (CC). 
600  The Minister of Defence has an obligation to made the regulations in the Schedule in terms of 
section 87(1) (rB), read with section 126C of the Defence Act of 1957. 
601  Defence Act (note 8). 
602  In 1999, the Court declared members of SANDF to be employees. See South African National 
Defence Union v The Minister and Another 1999 (6) BCLR 615 (CC).  
603  South African National Defence Union v The Minister and Another 1999 (6) BCLR 615 (CC) at paras 
36 and 42 where the court acknowledged that the nature of the defence forces requires that the 
court deal with matter of labour relations carefully so as to avoid disruptions in the defence forces.  
604  South African National Defence Union v The Minister and Another 1999 (6) BCLR 615 (CC) at paras 
28, 38 and 42. 
605  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1). 
606  Section 23 of the Constitution.  Section 188 (1) (b) of LRA, 1995 states that ‘a dismissal that is not 
automatically unfair, is unfair if the employer fails to prove that the dismissal was effected in 
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guaranteed in section 23 of the Constitution applies to everyone in the category of workers and 
employees.607 This meant that procedural fairness applies only to persons in a labour 
relationship.608  
In this relationship, procedural fairness requires that some form of procedure and process should 
precede the decision of an employer to dismiss an employee.609 Furthermore, a disciplinary 
hearing must be held to afford the employee an opportunity to state his or her defence.610   
 
Procedural fairness protects employees from arbitrary decisions by employers to dismiss them 
through the operation of section 188 of the LRA, which gives effect to section 23 of the 
Constitution.611 According to the LRA, procedural fairness is an independent requirement for a 
fair dismissal.612 The Code of Good Practice: Dismissals, also provides the requirements to be 
met for a dismissal to be regarded as procedurally fair in cases that involve misconduct.613   
 
Item 4 list the following requirement for procedural fairness:  
(1) The employer should conduct an investigation to determine whether there are grounds for 
dismissal. This does not need to be a formal enquiry. The employer should notify the employee 
of the allegations using a form and language that the employee can reasonably understand. The 
employee should be allowed the opportunity to state a case in response to the allegations. The 
employee should be entitled to a reasonable time to prepare the response and to the assistance 
of a trade union representative or fellow employee. After the enquiry, the employer should 
communicate the decision taken, and preferably furnish the employee with written notification of 
that decision. 
(2) Discipline against a trade union representative or an employee who is an office-bearer or 
official of a trade union should not be instituted without first informing and consulting the trade 
union. 
                                            
accordance with a fair procedure”. See also De Vos P and Freedman W (eds) South African 
Constitutional Law in Context (2014) at 636.  
607  Section 23 of the Constitution.   
608  Members of South African Defence Forces were for a long time not regarded as being in a labour 
relationship with the Department of Defence Forces. See South African National Defence Union v 
The Minister and Another 1999 (6) BCLR 615 (CC). 
609  Grogan J Dismissal (note 479) at 263. 
610  Avril Elizabeth Home for the Mentally Handicapped v CCMA 2006 (27) ILJ 1644 at 1651. 
611  Section 188 of the LRA of 1995 provides that to be fair, a dismissal that is not automatically unfair 
must be for fair reasons and in accordance with fair procedure. 
612  Section 188(1) of the LRA of 1995. 
613  Item 4 of Code of Good Practice: Dismissal in LRA of 1995. 
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(3) If the employee is dismissed, the employee should be given the reason for dismissal and 
reminded of any rights to refer the matter to a council with jurisdiction or to the Commission or to 
any dispute resolution procedures established in terms of a collective agreement. 
(4) In exceptional circumstances, if the employer cannot reasonably be expected to comply with 
these guidelines, the employer may dispense with pre-dismissal procedures.614 
 
If the employer has its own disciplinary code of conduct, it should adhere to it.615 The important 
factor is that fair processes must be available and afforded to an employee who will be adversely 
affected by the decision of the employer. Employers who do not have their own disciplinary rules 
must adhere to the principles set out in schedule 8 which is the code of conduct: dismissals in the 
LRA.616  
 
Procedural fairness is concerned with the ideas and rules of natural justice that are of a procedural 
nature. These rules are expressed in the audi alteram partem and the nemo iudex in sua causa 
rules.617 Procedural fairness in the form of the audi alteram partem is concerned with giving people 
an opportunity to participate in the decisions that will affect them, and, more importantly, giving 
them a chance to influence the outcome of those decisions.618 Such participation is a safeguard 
that not only indicates respect for the dignity and worth of the participants but is also likely to 
improve the quality and rationality of administrative decision making and to enhance its 
legality/legitimacy.619  In the context of employment, the audi alteram partem rule means that 
employers cannot take disciplinary actions against employees without affording them a fair 
hearing.620 
 
Failure to observe the rules of natural justice renders the decision of the administrator or 
employer, as in the SANDU 2010 judgment, susceptible to judicial review. Since the adoption 
final Constitution, public power is controlled by the Constitution.621  
 
                                            
614  Ibid. 
615  Grogan J Dismissal (note 479) at 264. 
616  Schedule 8 of LRA of 1995). See Black Mountain v CCMA 2005 (1) BLLR 1 (LC). See also Highveld 
District Council v CCMA 2003 (24) ILJ (LAC) on the roles of disciplinary codes of conduct. 
617  Audi alteram partem (note 145) and the nemo iudex in sua causa.  See Grogan J (note 479) at 274. 
See also Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012) at 363.   
618  Grogan J (note 479) at 274. 
619  Ibid.  
620  Ibid. 
621  Devenish GE and Govender D Hulme Administrative Law and Justice in South Africa (2001) 144.  
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In the Pharmaceutical case,622 the Court stated that judicial review is a manifestation of the 
separation of powers under which Courts regulate and control the exercise of public power by 
other branches of the government.623 This is a protection against the abuse of power. It must be 
noted that, whilst procedural fairness is regarded as an independent requirement for fair 
dismissal, the concept of fairness is flexible and open to interpretation and development.624 
  
Fairness is applicable according the circumstances of each case.625 Two judgments are indicative 
of the flexible nature of the concept of fairness. The first is that of Van der Huyssteen v Minister 
of Environmental Affairs and Tourism.626 In this case, it was held that the right to administrative 
justice encapsulated in section 24(b) of the Interim Constitution must be generously interpreted.627 
Procedural fairness, as explained in section 24, was inherently a flexible concept,628 and its 
application depended to a significant extent on the circumstances of each case. This gave the 
Courts the opportunity to act creatively in their duty to develop law.  Section 33 of the Constitution 
also gives the Courts the opportunity to develop the applicability of this concept through section 
3 of PAJA.629  
 
The Court in the SANDU 2010 judgment had to consider the sui generis nature of the SANDF, 
the concept of discipline as understood, applied and enforced in the SANDF, and then balance it 
with the application of the right to procedural fairness within the context of SANDF.630 This case 
could be viewed as one which could have been used by the Court as an opportunity to develop 
the legislative provisions relevant to the applicability of procedural fairness and those that deal 
with the enforcement of discipline, particularly in the defence force, because this idea is not 
common in that environment. 
 
                                            
622  Pharmaceutical Manufacture Association of South Africa In re: the ex parte application of the 
President of South Africa 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC). 
623  Ibid. 
624  In Moropane v Gilbeys Distillers & Vintners (Pty) Ltd 1998 (19) ILJ (LC) Labour court stated that 
pre-disciplinary procedures should not be interpreted too strictly.  See also Cornelius & Others v 
Howden Africa Ltd t/a M & B 1998 (921) ILJ (CCMA). 
625  Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2012) at 363. 
626  Van der Huyssteen v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 1996 (1) SA 283 (C). 
627  The Constitution, 1996. 
628  Corder H “Administrative Justice” in Van Wyk, Dugard, De Villiers and Davis et al (eds) Rights and 
Constitutionalism (1994) 399. 
629  Section 33 (1) of the Constitution, 1996 read with section 3 of the PAJA of 2000. 
630 SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1).  
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According to Corder and Du Plessis,631 the fact that procedural fairness depends on the 
circumstances of each case implies that, at the very least, the rules of natural justice must be 
complied with.632 The test of a procedurally fair administrative action under section 33(1) of the 
Constitution is whether the principles and procedures which were followed were right, just and 
fair.633 This test is also found in section 3 of PAJA.634 Section 3 of PAJA provides the requirements 
to be met for procedural fairness, in order effect to section 33(1) of the Constitution.635  
 
In the context of employment, the importance of the concept of procedural fairness and its 
incorporation in the LRA636 was indicated in the case of Avril Elizabeth Home for the Mentally 
Handicapped v CCMA.637 In the same way as it was under the audi rule, there is consequently an 
obligation on the administrator or employee to act fairly in regard to persons who could be affected 
by any administrative decision for fear that judicial review would ensue.638  The Court in the Avril 
                                            
631  Du Plessis L and Corder H Understanding South Africa’s Transitional Bill of Rights (1994) 169. 
632  Ibid. 
633  Section 33 of the, 1996 encourages national legislature to enact legislation that would give flesh to 
its instructions. 
634  Section 3 of PAJA 2000 states the following: section 3(1) administrative action which materially and 
adversely affects the rights or legitimate expectations of any person must be procedurally fair. Sub-section 
(2) (a) A fair administrative procedure depends on the circumstances of each case. Sub-section 2(b) In 
order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair administrative action, an administrator, subject to 
subsection (4), must give a person referred to in subsection (1): 
(a) adequate notice of the nature and purpose of the proposed administrative action; 
(b) a reasonable opportunity to make representations; 
(c) a clear statement of the administrative action; 
(d) adequate notice of any right of review or internal appeal, where applicable; and 
(e) adequate notice of the right to request reasons in terms of section 5. 
Sub-section (3) in order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair administrative action, an administrator 
may, in his or her or its discretion, also give a person referred to in subsection (1) an opportunity to: 
(a) obtain assistance and, in serious or complex cases, legal representation; 
(b) present and dispute information and arguments; and 
(c) appear in person. 
Sub-section (4) (a) if it is reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances, an administrator may depart from 
any of the requirements referred to in subsection (2). 
Sub-section 4 (b) in determining whether a departure as contemplated in paragraph (a) is reasonable 
and justifiable, an administrator must take into account all relevant factors, including: 
(i) the objects of the empowering provision; 
(ii) the nature and purpose of, and the need to take, the administrative action; 
(iii) the likely effect of the administrative action; 
(iv) the urgency of taking the administrative action or the urgency of the matter; and 
(v) the need to promote an efficient administration and good governance. 
(5) Where an administrator is empowered by any empowering provision to follow a 
procedure which is fair but different from the provisions of subsection (2), the 
administrator may act in accordance with that different procedure. 
635  Ibid. 
636  LRA of 1995. 
637  Avril Elizabeth Home for the Mentally Handicapped v CCMA (note 608). 
638  Hoexter C (note 622) at 363. 
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case639 stated that, in the context of employment, justice for an employee lies in the right to a 
speedy and independent review of the decision of the employer to dismiss, if the dismissal was 
found to be defective.640  
 
The Court in the SANDU 2010 judgment also had to determine whether the action of the Minister 
in dismissing members of the SANDF, as an administrative action or as an employer, complied 
with rules of natural justice, in particular the rule of audi alteram partem.641 This could be 
constructed to be a form of judicial review of the Minister’s decision.642 Compliance with the 
requirements for procedural fairness by an administrator is not only required by PAJA,643 which 
is applicable within the administrative law context; employers also have a duty to comply with the 
LRA which is applicable within the labour law context for their decision to dismiss.644  
 
3.1 Procedural fairness in terms of LRA 
 
The LRA was promulgated to give effect to the rights contained in section 23 of the Constitution.645 
The rights guaranteed in section 23 of the Constitution are for ‘everyone’.646 The concept of 
‘everyone’, however, when explained in a narrow sense, means only those individuals who are in 
some form of an employment relationship with the other.647 Section 188 of the LRA gives effect 
                                            
639  Avril Elizabeth Home for the Mentally Handicapped v CCMA (note 608) at para 1646. 
640  Grogan J (note 479) at 266. 
641  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1). 
642  Hoexter mentions that courts tends to use review both as a noun and as a verb. For example, a 
court reviews the decision of an administrator or in other instances it is used as an applicant bringing 
a matter for review. The appropriate definition or explanation of judicial review is a review process 
which consists of judicial scrutiny of administrator’s decision or action. See Hoexter C (note 622) at 
518. 
643  Section 1 PAJA of 2000 provides for a definition of administrative action. Section 3 of the same Act 
provide for the requirements that have to be complied with for an administrative action to be 
considered procedurally fair. 
644  Section 188(1) of LRA of 1995 provides for other automatically unfair dismissals. Section 188(1) (b) 
states that “a dismissal that is not automatically unfair, is unfair if the employer fails to prove that 
the dismissal was effected in accordance with a fair procedure”.  
645  Preamble to the LRA of 1995. 
646  Section 23 of the Constitution, 1996. 
647  De Vos P and Freedman W (eds) (note 604) at 637. 
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specifically to the right in section 23 (1) of the Constitution,648 which includes the right not to be 
unfairly dismissed. 649  
 
It must be noted that, before 1999, members of the Defence Force did not fall under the category 
of ‘everyone’ in the application of section 23 of Constitution.650 The reason for this was that the 
Defence Act 42 of 1957 did not recognise members of the Defence Force as ‘employees’ or 
‘workers’.651 The relationship that was created between members of the SANDF and the Minister 
was not regarded as being an employment relationship, but rather a membership in the Defence 
Force.652  
 
Section 126(B) of the Defence Act, which regulated the joining of, and existence in, the defence 
force, was challenged by SANDU to be unconstitutional. As a consequence, members of the 
SANDF were included in the category of ‘employee’ and ‘worker’ for the purposes application of 
section 23.653 Although the LRA gives effect to the rights in section 23, this law does not apply to 
all categories. Section 2 of the law excludes members of the SANDF from the scope of its 
application.654  
 
This means that section 188 of the LRA does not offer protection to members of the SANDF.655 
As indicated above, this case could be seen as one of the most important cases in the 
development of the defence legislative structure in that it had to interpret the relevant provisions 
of the Defence Act and its Regulations, if any, together with section 23 of the Constitution, to 
afford members of the SANDF the full protection of their right to procedural fairness. One of the 
                                            
648  Section 188 of the LRA of 1995 states that (1) a dismissal that is not automatically unfair, is unfair 
if the employer fails to prove: 
 (a) that the reason for dismissal is a fair reason- 
 (i) related to the employee's conduct or capacity; or 
 (ii) based on the employer's operational requirements; and 
 (b) that the dismissal was effected in accordance with a fair procedure. 
 (2) Any person considering whether or not the reason for dismissal is a fair reason or whether or 
not the dismissal was effected in accordance with a fair procedure must take into account any 
relevant code of good practice issued in terms of this Act. 
649  Ibid. 
650  South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 1999 (6) BCLR 615 (CC). 
651  Defence Act of 2002 defines those who are involved with the Defence Force as members, including 
officers and another ranks relevant in the SANDF.  
652  See definition of member in the Definition clause in Defence Act of 2002. See also reference to 
‘member’ instead of employee or worker throughout Defence Act (note16). 
653  South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 1999 (6) BCLR 615 (CC). 
654  Section 2 of the LRA of 1995 excludes members of SANDF, members of the National Intelligence 
Agency, members of secrete services form the scope of its application. 
655  Section 188 of the LRA of 1995. 
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crucial arguments that was submitted by the SANDU on behalf of members of the defence force 
who are also its members was that, the Defence Act, read together with its Rules and Regulations, 
has a gap in regard to the application of procedural fairness.656  
 
For purposes of this research, it is sufficient simply to mention that, whilst the LRA provides 
protection against the infringement of the right to procedural fairness, this law does not offer that 
protection to members of the SANDF. Our law rests on the principle of subsidiarity and of 
avoidance, which require litigants to rely first on the provisions of various pieces of legislation that 
give effect to the rights in the Constitution before they can rely on the rights contained in the 
Constitution itself.657  
 
In Fredericks v MEC for Education & Training, Eastern Cape,658 the Court emphasised the 
principle of avoidance and subsidiarity by stating that, if an employee’s right can be enforced 
under one or other of the statutes that give effect to the rights in the Constitution, an employee 
cannot rely directly on the Constitution.659 Our law requires that statutory provisions must be 
interpreted in accordance with the Constitution.660  
 
It can be suggested that, because of this principle, members of the SANDF might not have a full 
protection of their right to procedural fairness, unless Courts are willing to apply PAJA to 
employment related disputes in exceptional circumstances such as in this case.661 It must also be 
noted that where other pieces of legislation, such as LRA regulates an area of law such as labour 
law PAJA should serve as complimentary law as suggested by Van der Walt.662  It must be noted 
that in exceptional cases, however, our law allows members of the SANDF to rely directly on 
section 23 of the Constitution.663  
                                            
656  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1) at 23 and 24. 
657  South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 2007 5 SA 400 (CC).  See Van der 
Walt AJ “Normative pluralism and anarchy: reflections on the 2007 term” CCR 2008/1. See also De 
Vos P and Freedman W (eds) (note 604) at 635. 
658  Frederick v MEC for Education and Training, Eastern Cape 2002 (23) ILJ 81 (CC). The subsidiarity 
principle was first decided in South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 2007 5 
SA 400 (CC).  See also Brand D, De Vos P and Freedman W (eds) (note 604) at 635. 
659  Grogan J “Labour Relations’ in De Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook 6th nd ed (2015) 472-515 at 
472. 
660  Ibid. 
661  The PAJA of 2000. 
662  Van der Walt AJ (note 388) 
663  Building Bargaining Council v Melmons Cabinets 2001 (22) ILJ 120 (LC). See also Grogan J (note 
701) at 475. See also Hoexter C “Just Administrative Action “in Currie and De Waal J (eds) The Bill 
of Rights Handbook 2nd ed (2015) 472-515 at 649. 
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 Van der Walt recognises that in some instances legislations such as PAJA and the LRA apply to 
the same set of facts simultaneously. 664 In that instance he argues that the subsidiarity principle 
should be that the competing or complimentary legislation should be applied to optimally give 
effect to the Bill of Right and to promote the spirit, purport and object of the Bill.665  It is respectfully 
suggested that the court in SANDU 2010 judgment should have considered the subsidiarity 
principle and applied PAJA as a complimentary legislation to resolve the matter instead of only 
considering section 23(1) of the Constitution.666  This is because applicants in this case were not 
challenging the constitutional validity of legislation but rather the conduct of the Minister when she 
dismissed members of the SANDF.667  This implies that, according to the subsidiarity approach 
argued by Van der Walt, direct reliance on section 23 of the Constitution is prohibited.668 
 
According to Van der Walt the subsidiarity approach offers the courts the opportunity to decide 
on matters without reaching a constitutional issue.669  He reasons that this approach resonates 
with the principle of avoidance as laid in Mhlungu.670  In his analysis of the subsidiarity principle 
laid in SANDU Van der Walt opines that it is simple and attractive to apply.671  Whilst Van der 
Walt is of the opinion that the application of subsidiarity principle is unproblematic, he recognises 
that its application is attractive and justifiable in straight forward cases.672  He argues that it would 
be difficult to decide how far the subsidiarity approach should be justified and applied in other 
cases.  According to him the subsidiarity principle formulated in SANDU is for legislation that has 
been enacted to give effect to the rights in the Bill of Rights.673 He argues that the subsidiary 
principle laid down in SANDU and justified in the Clicks case, prevents two parallel streams of 
labour law jurisprudence, one under the LRA and another under section 23(1) of the Constitution 
which is contrary to the principle of one system of law governed by the Constitution.674 
 It is respectufully submitted that unless the applicants in the SANDU 2010 judgment were 
challenging section 2 of the LRA which excludes soldiers from its application or the constitutional 
validity of the Defence Act which does not adequately protect soldiers right to procedural fairness 
                                            
664  Van der Walt AJ (note 388) at 111. 
665  Ibid. 
666  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1). 
667  Ibid. 
668 Van der Walt AJ (note 388.) at 101. 
669  Van der Walt AJ (note 388) at 126. 
670  Ibid. See also S v Mhlungu 1995 3 SA 867(CC) at para 59. 
671  Van der Walt AJ (note 388) at 105. 
672 Ibid. 
673  Van der Walt AJ (note 388) at 106. 
674  Van der Walt AJ (note 388) at 102 and 114. 
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and the right to fair labour practices,then the court should have considered the subsidiarity 
principle and considered PAJA as a complimentary legislation to give effect to the spirit, purport 
and object of the Bill of Rights.675  In Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local Government Affairs, 
the Court indicated that our law also permits substitution application of statutory provisions such 
as PAJA.676  
 
3.2  Procedural fairness in terms of PAJA 
 
PAJA was promulgated to give flesh to the rights in section 33 of the final Constitution.677 Section 
1 of the PAJA contains a definition of administrative action and some exclusions with regard to 
what constitutes an administrative action.678 The PAJA also provides for a procedure to challenge 
administrative decisions.679  
 
Section 33 (2) of the Constitution does not only provide for a lawful and reasonable administrative 
action, but it also provides that the administrative action must be procedurally fair.680 Section 33 
(2), read together with section 195 (1) (f) of the Constitution, ensures accountability for actions by 
administrators when they exercise power and when they perform an administrative action.681 
Section 33(2) does not only ensure accountability, but it also extends the ambit of judicial review 
of other classes of administrative action which might otherwise not be subject to judicial 
scrutiny.682  
 
Section 6 of PAJA provide safeguards for beneficiaries of the right in section 33 of the Constitution 
against the abuse of power in the form of judicial review.683 Procedural fairness is listed as one of 
                                            
675  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1). 
676  Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local Government Affairs 2005 (3) SA 589 (CC). See also Joseph 
v City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC) at 75-76. 
677  The PAJA of 2000. 
678  Section 1 of the PAJA of 2000. 
679  Section 3 of PAJA, 2000. See also Van Zweel M, “The relationship between PAJA and the LRA with 
specific reference to Chirwa v Transnet LTD & Others 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC)” (LLM dissertation 
2008 Potchefstroom) at 16. 
680  Section 33(2) of the Constitution, 1996. 
681  Section 33 (2) and section 195, of the Constitution, 1996. 
682  Section 195 (1) (f) specifically provides that Public administration must be governed by the 
democratic values and principles that are enshrined in the Constitution, which includes as a principle 
an accountable Public administration. 
683  Section 6 of the PAJA of 2000. 
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the grounds for review. Section 6(2) (c) allows a Court to review administrative action on the 
grounds that the action was procedurally unfair.684  
 
In the case of Mandrasa Anjuman Islamia v Johannesburg Municipality, the issue of judicial review 
was dealt with, and the Court stated that, in some instances, special statutory review may operate 
as an alternative to review under the PAJA.685 In this way, litigants are provided with a choice of 
which regime of review to use to challenge a procedurally unfair administrative action.  
 
Section 3 of PAJA is an important legislative provision in so far as the application of procedural 
fairness is concerned.686 It essentially explains procedural fairness in our administrative law 
context. Further, this sectionprovides the requirements which must be met for a procedurally fair 
administrative action.687  Failure to comply with one of the requirements listed in section 3 renders 
the action procedurally unfair, unless the administrator had opted to follow the procedure listed in 
section 3(5) of PAJA.688  
 
In the SANDU 2010 judgment, it was important firstly to determine whether the decision of the 
Minister to dismiss members of the SANDF constituted an administrative action in terms of section 
1 of the PAJA.689 This would ascertain whether PAJA will be applicable in this case.690 Once it 
has been established that the action to dismiss constitutes an administrative action, section 6 of 
PAJA will provide for the review of that action if it were either substantively or procedurally unfair 
or both and when such action materially and adversely affects the rights or legitimate expectation 
of any person.691   
 
It is important to note that, although procedural fairness is an independent ground for review, 
PAJA recognises that the concept of ‘fairness’ is flexible. Section 3 (3) of PAJA provides that an 
administrator can deviate from the procedures set out in section 3(2).692 Section 3(2)(a) of PAJA 
                                            
684  Section 6(2) of the PAJA of 2000. 
685  Mandrasa Anjuman Islamia v Johannesburg Municipality 1917 AD 718 at 727. 
686  Section 3 of the PAJA of 2000. 
687  Ibid. 
688  Section 3(5) of the PAJA of 2000 provides that “[w]here an administrator is empowered by any 
empowering provision to follow a procedure which is fair but different from the provisions of 
subsection (2), the administrator may act in accordance with that different procedure. 
689  Section 1 of the PAJA of 2000 contains the definition of an administrative action and the exclusions. 
690  If the Minister’s decision falls under one of the listed exclusions in PAJA (aa)-(ff), then section 6 of 
PAJA will not find application. 
691  Section 6 of the PAJA of 2000. 
692  Section 3(2) and (3) of PAJA of 2000. 
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states that a fair administrative procedure depends on the circumstances of each case.693 The 
recognition that fairness is a flexible concept and should, therefore, be applied according to the 
circumstances of each case was further illustrated by the SCA in the case of Metro Project CC v 
Klerksdorp Local Municipality.694 
 
Section 3 of the PAJA and the content of fairness 
 
A number of South African cases recognise that what makes a hearing ‘fair’ has always depended 
on the circumstances of each case.695 The SANDU 2010 judgment would not have been an 
exception to the rule had the Court considered applying PAJA to its reasoning. This flexible 
approach is further recognised by PAJA in section 3 (2)(a) which echoes the principles of common 
law in a number of respects. It has already been indicated above that, before section 3 can be 
considered, it must first be established whether the conduct complained of constitutes an 
administrative action in terms of section 1 of PAJA.  
 
The Court in Fedsure Life Assurance v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 
held that it is important to establish and qualify the conduct as an administrative action because 
not every exercise of public power constitutes administrative action as indicated in section 1(i) 
(aa)-(ff) of PAJA. 696   
 
Section 1 defines administrative action to include any decision or failure to take a decision by an 
organ of state when exercising public power in terms of any legislation.697 The exercise of certain 
executive powers and legislative and judicial functions is excluded from the definition of 
administrative action. Section 3 applies to all administrative actions not listed under section 1(i) 
(aa)-(ff). Section 3(1) – (5) of PAJA addresses the issue of the application of procedural fairness, 
and section 6 attaches the consequences of failure to adhere to section 3.698  
                                            
693  Section 3(2)(a) of PAJA of 2000. 
694  Metro Project CC v Klerksdorp Local Municipality 2004 (1) SA 16 (SCA) at para 13. 
695  Section 3(2)(a) of PAJA. See also Du Preez v Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1997 (3) SA 
204 (A) at 231-3, Premier, Mpumalanga v Executive Committee, Association of State-Aided 
Schools, Eastern Transvaal 1999 (2) SA 91 (CC) at para 39. 
696  Fedsure Life Assurance v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 1999 (1) SA 374 
(CC) paras 41-42, See also Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO 2000 (7) BLLR 835 (CC) 
paras 12-13. 
697  Fedsure Life Assurance v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 1999 (1) SA 374 
(CC) paras 41-42. 




Section 3(5) of PAJA authorises the administrator to follow a different but fair procedure. It allows 
an administrator to act in accordance with a different procedure when he or she is empowered by 
law to follow a different procedure. This procedure, however, must still be fair although different 
and consequently it must comply with section 3(2).699  
3.3 Procedural fairness in the context of SANDF’s legislative framework: the Defence Act, 
MDSMA and chapter XX of the Defence Act 42 of 2002 
 
The application of procedural fairness in the defence force was viewed differently from a civilian 
perspective. The reason was the aim and objectives of the defence force. This made the 
application of procedural fairness problematic. According to Westmoreland, most corrective 
measures were done outside the system of military justice because of the practice of 
commanders’ discretion that existed in the military.  
 
The commanders maintained discipline by exercising their discretion rather than using the law.700 
He further holds the view that, although corrective measures were done outside military justice, 
some form of fairness was applied.701 He is of the opinion that the idea that discipline and justice 
can be balanced, particularly in the military environment, is a misconception. He reasons that the 
two are inseparable.702  
  
According to him, an unfair or unjust corrective measure could never promote the development 
of discipline.703 No matter how an individual was corrected, therefore, fairness or justice has 
always been a necessary benchmark.704  
 
In South Africa, section 102 of the Defence Act makes provision for the appearance of persons 
at the board of enquiry. 705 Upon close examination, it is evident that section 102 (6)-(8) aims to 
offer members of the SANDF some form of procedural fairness. Sub-section 6 (a) and (b)  
provides that the person who is likely to be affected by the decision of the board of enquiry should 
                                            
699  Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union and Others v Minister of Correctional Services and Others 
2006 All SA 175 para E. 
700  Westmoreland WC (note 536) at 6-10. 
701  Ibid. 
702  Ibid. 
703  Ibid. 
704  Ibid. 
705  Defence Act of 2002. 
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give oral evidence and must also be present when others are giving evidence which might 
negatively affect him/her.706 Sub-sections 7 and 8 deals with notification of the impending 
disciplinary hearing and the right to legal representation.707 
 
To a certain extent, this section resonates with section 3 (1) of PAJA discussed above.708 It should 
be noted that, unlike section 3 of PAJA, section 102 is silent on the detailed manner in which this 
process must unfold.709 In other words, it could be suggested that section 102 of the Defence Act 
was drafted vaguely. This may be one of the reasons why decisions of the Minister of Defence 
are in many instances challenged for not complying with the application of procedural fairness.710  
 
For example, in the recent case of Minister of Defence & another v Mamasedi, the SCA upheld a 
High Court decision to set aside the decision of the Minister of Defence and the board of enquiry 
not to reinstate the respondent (Mr Jonas Mamasedi).711 This follows from a High Court case in 
which the Minister of Defence and the board of enquiry were ordered to reinstate a member of 
the SANDF (Applicant), who had been dismissed in terms of section 59(3) of the Defence Act 
because he had failed to report for duty and was considered to be absent without leave.712  
The board of enquiry failed to follow procedures and to apply procedural fairness.713  The SCA 
upheld the decision of the High Court. The SCA held that the right to procedural fairness 
encapsulated by section 3(2) of PAJA applies to the applicant, and that the applicant had the right 
to give oral evidence, to call witnesses, and to be legally presented.714 This decision also indicates 
the gap that exists in the legislative framework of the SANDF.  Section 103 of the Defence Act 
excludes the application of section 102 (7) and (8) from the proceedings of the board of inquiry 
dealing with absence without leave from the defence.715 
                                            
706  Section 102 (6) (a) and (b) of Defence Act of 2002. 
707  Section 102 (7) and (8) of the Defence Act of 2002. 
708  Section 3 of the PAJA of 2000. 
709 Section 3(2) (b) of the PAJA of 2000 provide a detailed process for compliance with application of 
procedural fairness.  
710  Minister of Defence v Mamasedi 2018 (2) SA 305 (SCA); 2017 622 ZASCA 157. 
There are a number of case law which indicates that the Minister acted in a procedurally unfair 
manner. See SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1). See also Dhlamini v Minister of Defence & another 
Dhlamini v Minister of Defence & Another 2004 (25) ILJ 212 (T). 
711  Minister of Defence v Mamasedi (note 690). See also Dhlamini v Minister of Defence & Another 
Dhlamini v Minister of Defence & Another 2004 (25) ILJ 212 (T). 
712  Section 59(3) of the Defence Act of 2002 provides for a dismissal of a member of SANDF who 
absent himself/herself from official duty without permission for a period that exceeds 30 days. 
713  Mamasedi v Minister of South African National Defence Forces 2013 case no 64308/13. See also 
Minister of Defence v Mamasedi (note 690). 
714  Minister of Defence v Mamasedi (note 690) at para 21-22. 




The SANDF’s Legislative Framework has been re-worked since the dawn of a democratic 
Constitution in order to address the difficulty related to the application of procedural fairness.716 
This is not a task that can be completed in one sitting. Events as they occur will guide the 
development of SANDF legislation, in particular legislation dealing with employment relations, 
such as Chapter XX of the General Regulations for the South African National Defence Force 
and the Reserve.717  
  
MDSMA is another piece of legislation that was developed with a view to curbing the 
unconstitutional manner of enforcing discipline in the Defence Force, such as some sections of 
the Military Discipline Code that existed before the 1996 Constitution were repealed.718 The 
MDSMA was promulgated with the aim of creating a new system of military courts, improving 
military discipline, and providing for matters that are incidental thereto.719 One of the main 
objectives of this Act is to ensure a fair military trial so as to enable the accused access to High 
Courts.720  
 
The fairness test and requirements that are applicable in this Act are not relevant to this study 
because this Act is the equivalent of the Criminal Procedure Act which deals with criminal matters 
and not labour related issues or administrative actions. Although this Act provides for the creation 
of the Military Arbitration Board and the Courts Martial, which are the forums that address matters 
of discipline within the Defence Force, there are no sections that deal with the application of 
procedural fairness, other than the section that refers to the right to legal representation.721  
 
Chapters 4-6 of this Act deals with pre-trial, trial, and post-trial procedures.722 The Defence Act 
1957 contained section 104 which was retained when this Act was repealed and replaced by the 
                                            
716  On 8 February 1999, a joint committee meeting on Defence regarding Draft Defence Bill, Military 
Discipline Code and Military Ombudsman was held. See http://www.pmg.org.za  (accessed 07 July 
2014). See also https://pmg.org.za/committee meeting (accessed 04 December 2017) on the 
briefing held on 18 August 1999 regarding the introduction and presentation of General Regulations 
introducing labour Right in the SANDF to give effect to section 23 of the Constitution,1996. 
717  Chapter XX (note 7). 
718  Certain sections of Defence Act of 1957 were kept intact and Regulations made in terms of those 
sections. For example section 87 (1)(rB) read with section 126C. 
719  Preamble of MDSMA (note 7). 
720  Section 2 of MDSMA (note 7). 
721  Section 23 of MDSMA (note 7). 
722  Sections 29-32, 33, 34-37 of MDSMA (note 7). 
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Defence Act 2002.723 Section 104 is the Military Discipline Code. Labour related offences are not 
dealt with in terms of the provisions of section 104.724 
 
Chapter XX was promulgated with the aim of providing fair labour practices, including the 
establishment of trade unions, collective bargaining, and the creation of sound and healthy 
employment/service relations.725 This Chapter is divided into parts 1-6.  Part 4 of Chapter XX 
provides for the establishment of the MBC, which is the forum to deal with labour related 
grievances and disputes related to collective bargaining.726 Part 5 of the chapter provides for the 
establishment of the MAB.727 This is a forum or body that deals with labour related disputes by 
way of an arbitration process.  
 
Regulation 81 provides for the application of review to the High Court in the event that the MAB 
fails to resolve disputes satisfactorily.728 The chapter is silent on the procedure for the application 
of procedural fairness. This is part of the arguments that were submitted by the Applicant in the 
SANDU 2010 judgment.729 This is an indication that there is still a gap in South African National 
Defence Force Law, particularly in the Regulations dealing with the application of procedural 
fairness in the Defence Force.  
4. EFFECT OF THE CONSTITUTION ON THE SANDF LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK, IN 
PARTICULAR THAT REGULATING THE APPLICATION OF THE RIGHT TO 
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 
 
One of the main effects that the introduction of fundamental rights brought about in the SANDF 
was the omissions that were created in the legislative framework of the defence force. Some of 
the laws applicable to the defence force were repealed because they were found to be 
unconstitutional as they infringed on one or more of the fundamental rights in the Constitution.730 
Some provisions in the Defence Act did not comprehensively give effect to the rights in the Bill of 
                                            
723  Defence Act (note 16). 
724  Section 104 in the Defence Act of 195). 
725  Regulation 3 of Chapter XX (note 7). 
726  Part 4 of Chapter XX consist of Regulations 62-71 (note 7). 
727  Part 5 of Chapter XX consist of Regulations 72-80 (note 7). 
728  Regulation 81 in Chapter XX (note 7). 
729  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1) at 6 and 9. 
730  Defence Act of 1957. 
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Rights.731 Some rights in the Bill of Rights in the Constitution were not covered by defence force 
legislation until a legal challenge ensued.732 
 
It is evident from the discussion above that the Minister made great strides to align defence force 
legislation with the demands of the Constitution.733 However, there are still omissions that are 
apparent in the defence force legislation, particularly in the regulations dealing with labour 
relations and procedural fairness.734  
 
Section 2 of the Constitution is the supremacy clause, which should be complied with by all laws 
and conduct, including the conduct of the Minister and defence force legislation.735 Section 8 of 
the Constitution applies to all laws, binds the judiciary, executive, legislature, and all organs of 
state in the three spheres of government.736 Neither defence force legislation nor the conduct of 
the Minister is exempt from the application of section 8 of the Constitution.737  
This means that when any Court is adjudicating a dispute that involves the Defence Force or its 
legislation, the court has to interpret and develop such legislation paying attention to sections 2 
and 8 of the Constitution.738 In other words, the Court must assist the Minister in creating 
regulations that will ultimately bring the defence force legislation wholly in line with the 
Constitution. The Court in the SANDU 2010 judgment was supposed to have considered the 
effect that the Constitution has on the Defence Force when it adjudicated the matter (my 
emphasis). Furthermore, the Court was supposed to have contributed to the development of the 
                                            
731  Section 33(3) of the Constitution, 1996. 
732  Although a Schedule was included in the Defence Act as Chapter XX to give effect to the section 
23 right of the Constitution, this chapter does not adequately address issues related to the 
applicability of procedural fairness. See South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 
1999 (6) BCLR 615 (CC). 
733  Military Ombud office was created through military Ombud Act 4 of 2012. 
734  The applicants argued that, although section 59(3) of the Defence Act states that a member of the 
defence forces will be dismissed from the forces, this dismissal must be done in accordance with a 
procedure in applicable regulations; there are, however, no regulations that provide for procedures 
to apply procedural fairness before dismissal. Another example is the case of Mamasedi v Minister 
of South African National Defence Forces (note 693). See also Minister of Defence v Mamasedi 
(note 690) where section 102 of the Defence Act 2002 was followed to dismiss a member of Defence 
Forces. This section does not adequately provide the procedure to be followed to ensure 
compliance with application of procedural fairness. 
735  Section 2 of Constitution, 1996. 
736  Section 8 of Constitution, 1996. 
737  Ibid. 
738  Section 39(2) of the Constitution gives direction on how any court, forum or tribunal should 
discharges its duty when it interprets and develop any law. Section 2 of the Constitution is clear on 
the consequences of any conduct or law that are inconsistent with it. Section 8(3) (b) explains what 
the court must do in order to give effects to the rights in the Bill of Rights. 
110 
 




In this chapter, the concepts of discipline and procedural fairness, which are relevant to the 
SANDU 2010 judgment case, have been discussed. These are the concepts that were submitted 
and argued by the Applicants and Respondents respectively. Some of the applicable legislative 
and constitutional provisions that were interpreted by the Court in its reasoning were also 
discussed here. Other relevant sections of the LRA, PAJA, the Constitution, the Defence Act’s 
MDSMA and Chapter XX that were not interpreted by the Court were also discussed. The effect 
of the Constitution on the defence force laws, particularly those that regulate the application of 
procedural fairness, was briefly discussed.  
 
In the following chapter, the reasoning of the Court in SANDU 2010 judgment will be examined. 
The approach that the Court followed when it interpreted the legislative and constitutional 
provisions discussed in this chapter will also be examined. The Court did not interpret the 
provisions of PAJA. Section 3 and other relevant sections of PAJA will, however, be analysed to 
show how the Court could have contributed to the development of defence force laws, rules and 
regulations that deal with the application of procedural fairness.  
 
Lastly, the chapter will show why it is justifiable to apply administrative law in the form of PAJA to 
a dismissal case in the SANDF. In addition, it will be shown how the provisions of PAJA could be 
used to develop rules and regulations that will regulate the applicability of procedural fairness in 





APPLICABILITY OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS THROUGH PAJA: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
REASONING IN THE SANDU 2010 JUDGMENT 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
In the previous chapter, the conceptual structure of discipline, procedural fairness and dismissal 
and their applicable legislative provisions were discussed. The previous chapter showed that the 
task of the Court in SANDU 2010 to apply and interpret all relevant legislative provisions was not 
easy. The two main concepts of discipline and procedural fairness formed the basis of the 
arguments for both applicants and respondents in this case.739  
 
Because of the context of the defence forces discussed in chapter 2, the right to procedural 
fairness is inadequately provided for by the SANDF legislative framework. Discipline, on the other 
hand, is emphasized in the applicable legislation. The same legislation does, however, not 
sufficiently make provision for the standard and requirements to be followed before any action or 
decision to enforce discipline is taken. 
 
In the SANDU 2010 judgment,740 where the infringement of the right to procedural fairness was 
the cause of action, the Court did not consider the provisions of PAJA, although sections 23 and 
33(1) of the Constitution were mentioned in passing.741 The common law rule of audi alteram 
partem was also briefly mentioned and interpreted in the light of the conduct of the Minister.742 
This is rather unusual because, in order to review a decision, such as this one on the basis of 
section 33 of the Constitution, the requirements in section 1 of PAJA have to be complied with.743  
 
  
                                            
739  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1). 
740  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1) at 1-28. 
741  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1) at 6, 11. 
742  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1) at 10. 
743  Section 1 of the PAJA of 2000. 
112 
 
Perhaps this was because the applicants (SANDU) did not mention PAJA in their notice of motion 
and affidavits. Notwithstanding, PAJA still remains the pathway to rely on section 33 of the 
Constitution and to judicial review.744 This suggests that, once section 33 is relied upon, the 
provisions of PAJA, which is the law enacted in terms of section 33(3) of the Constitution, should 
be applied, unless the action in question is expressly excluded by section 1.745 This point was 
confirmed in the case of Bato Star v Minister of Environmental Affairs746 where it was held that 
there is no direct access to section 33 of the Constitution other than through PAJA.747 
  
The Court, in the SANDU 2010 judgment, commendably found in favour of the applicants and 
ordered the Minister to reinstate all members of SANDF who had been dismissed.748 The Minister 
was given an opportunity to subject members of the Defence Forces who were involved in the 
alleged misconduct to internal disciplinary processes.749 As was mentioned above, the order of 
the court is commendable. It is the approach that the court followed when adjudicating this matter 
that this chapter seeks to analyse.  
 
This chapter will show that PAJA should find application in dismissal cases of members of SANDF 
notwithstanding the existing views that administrative law should not be applied to dismissal 
cases of other public servants.750 To achieve this, this chapter will analyse the SANDU 2010 
judgment critically and demonstrate why the Court should also have, in addition to the labour law 
provisions and case law, considered the applicability of PAJA to this case.   
 
  
                                            
744 Hoexter C “The completion of Administrative Law” http://mobile.wiredspace.wits.ac.za/bitstream 
(accessed 14 January 2015). 
745  Definition of administrative action in section 1 of the PAJA of 2000. 
746  Bato Star v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 (4) SA 490 CC at paras 21-25. 
747  Ibid. 
748  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1) at page 26. 
749  The Minister of Defence v SA National Defence Force 2012 ZASCA 110 para 1(herein referred 
SANDF appeal judgment I, 2012). The Minister of Defence v SA National Defence Force 2014 
ZASCA 102 (herein referred SANDF appeal judgment II, 2014) at para 2. 
750  Richards S “Administrative Law in public sector employment relationships” 2008 SALJ 307 at 307. 
Police Union v National Commissioner of the SA Police Service (SAPU) 2005 (26) ILJ 2403 (LC), 
Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union and Others v Minister of Correctional Services and Others 
(POPCRU) 2006 (2) ALL SA 175 (E), Grogan J Administrative law in Labour Matters Annual Review 
of South African Law (2005) 605-667, Miscke C Administrative action and employment law: Do 
employeess in public sector enjoy additional remedies? “ Contemporary Labour Law (2006) 15. 
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It will be argued that the court should have at least made an evaluation of the significance of 
administrative law jurisprudence in relation to public sector employment relationships in general 
and in particular in relation to the context of the SANDF.751 This chapter will also argue that the 
Court could have discharged this adjudicative role with a view to developing a model for 
addressing matters where different labour related disputes are decided under both labour law and 
administrative law.752 The Court could have taken into consideration the applicable provisions of 
both PAJA and LRA, and the inter-relatedness, interdependence and indivisibility of sections 23 
and 33 guaranteed in the Constitution.753 
 
The analysis of the approach of the Court will be conducted through the hypothesis that the Court 
asked and answered four questions to determine whether PAJA should or should not find 
application in this matter. The first question is: what is the link between the applicability of PAJA 
to dismissal cases of members of SANDF?; the second question is: what is the relevance of PAJA 
to dismissal cases of members of SANDF? The third question is: what are the views regarding 
applicability of PAJA to dismissal cases? And, lastly, the question is whether PAJA should find 
application to dismissal cases in the context of the SANDF?  
 
To answer these questions, the Court would have dealt with: the available legislative framework 
which regulates procedural fairness and dismissals in the SANDF; the lacuna that seems to exist 
in this SANDF legislative framework; the differences between other public service employees and 
members of the SANDF; different views on the debate and different approaches followed by 
various judges in dealing with this issue in judgments such as the Chirwa v Transnet Ltd & 
Others;754 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security & Others;755 and other relevant Constitutional 
Court judgments that dealt with the question of whether administrative law should find application 
in dismissal cases.  
 
Finally, the Court would have had to interpret sections 1; 3 and 6, read with section 33 of the 
Constitution, to answer the important question of whether or not PAJA should find application in 
this matter.  
                                            
751  Olivier M “The inter-relationship between administrative law and labour law: Public sector 
employment perspectives from South Africa” (2015) 30 SAPL 319-346 at 319.  
752  Ibid. 
753  Ibid. 
754  Chirwa v Transnet Ltd & Others 2008 (2) BLLR 97 (CC). 
755  Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security & Others 2010 (1) SA 238 (CC). 
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2.  ANALYSIS OF RATIO DECIDENDI (SANDU 2010 JUDGMENT) 
 
Assuming that the court in the SANDU 2010 case had asked itself the question, what is the link 
between the dismissal of members of SANDF and the PAJA, the court would have had to deal 
with the application of procedural fairness to members of the SANDF through LRA, Rules and 
Regulations in Chapter XX of the Defence Act, and MDSMA to answer the question.756  
 
The legal position of public sector employees who challenge the employment decision taken by 
the organ of state in its capacity as employer has been a serious challenge for a number of 
courts.757 This is despite the fact that a number of Constitutional Court judgments have dealt with 
the issue of whether employment related decisions in the public sector context do or do not 
amount to administrative action, and whether administrative law should be applicable to resolve 
such disputes.758  
 
The legal uncertainty around this issue is caused by a number of factors, including the view 
against forum-shopping; jurisdiction; and the question of whether public service employees enjoy 
extra protection.759 According to Grogan, the uncertainty that continues to reign over the possible 
connection between the constitutional right to fair administrative action in PAJA and labour 
legislation designed to give effect to those rights has resulted in the emergence of two distinct 
approaches.760 He opines that the first approach draws an inflexible distinction between 
administrative law and labour law, while the second approach regards the two branches of law as 
being mutually reinforcing.761  
  
The ourt could have had to address the fact that the LRA is not applicable to this case and then 
moved on to interpret the relevant provisions of Chapter XX, MDSMA and Rules and Regulations 
of the Defence Force.762 The court addresses the position of the LRA by interpreting the decision 
                                            
756  LRA of 1995, Chapter XX and MDSMA (note 7). 
757  Olivier M (note 730) at 319. 
758  Brandt D and Murcott M “Administrative law” Annual Survey of South African Law (2014) 46-74. 
See also Masetlha v President of South Africa & Another 2008 (1) SA 566 (CC). 
759 Olivier M (note 730) at 319. 
760  Grogan J (note 654) at 605. 
761  Ibid. 
762  Section 2 of LRA of 1995. 
115 
 
of Avril Elizabeth Home for the Mentally Handicapped v Commission for Conciliation mediation 
and reconciliation and others.763  
 
The connection of the SANDU 2010 judgment to the applicability of PAJA could be inferred from 
the express exclusion of members of the SANDF from the application of the LRA.764 Both PAJA 
and the LRA were promulgated to protect the right to just administrative action, the right to fair 
labour practices in general, and the right to procedural fairness in particular.765  
 
Pillay argues that the common law principles of natural law have leaked from administrative law 
into labour law,766 and, furthermore, that the Constitution has injected a new aspect into the 
relationship between administrative and labour law through sections 23 and 33, both of which 
protect procedural fairness. Consequently, it now seems possible for the same facts to give rise 
to causes of action under the Constitution, labour legislation and PAJA.767 
 
It is for the above reasons that the Court could have considered the application of PAJA to the 
SANDU 2010 judgment. It could also be argued that, because SANDU made an application 
requesting the Court to review the decision of the Minister judicially, the Court could have 
considered the interpretation of section 33(3)(a) of the Constitution768 read with 6 (2) (c) PAJA.769  
The reason is that a review in terms of section 157(2) (a) and (b) of the LRA cannot find application 
in this instance.770  
 
According to Loots, the idea that administrative law and labour law could be applied to same set 
of facts is supported by the constitutional link of sections 23 and 33 respectively. Both sections 
protect the right to procedural fairness. She is of the opinion that the two disciplines aim to create 
                                            
763  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1) at 12. See also Avril Elizabeth Home for the Mentally Handicapped 
v Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Reconciliation and Others (note 608) at 1651. 
764  Section 2 of LRA of 1995. 
765  See Grogan J (note 654) at 330. 
766  Pillay D “PAJA v Labour Law” 2005 (20) SAPL 413-426 at 414. 
767  Ibid. 
768  Section 33(3) PAJA (note 2). 
769  Section 6(2) (c) of PAJA (note 2) states that a court or tribunal has the power to review an 
administrative action judicially if the action was procedurally unfair. 
770  Section 157 (2) (b) of LRA (note 21) provides that the Labour Court has concurrent jurisdiction with 
the High Court in respect of or threatened violation of any fundamental right entrenched in Chapter 
2 of the Constitution and over any alleged dispute on the constitutionally of any executive or 
administrative act, or any threatened executive or administrative act or conduct, by the State in its 
capacity as an employer. 
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a just society and endeavour to bridge the lacuna between law and justice.771 These interrelated 
objectives embrace the concept of fairness as the underlying principle of both sections, which is 
ultimately the idea of constitutional justice. The co-operative character of administrative law as 
procedural rules functions in combination with substantive rules which are supplied by other areas 
of law, including labour law.772 
 
After the Court had established the connection between the possible application of PAJA to 
dismissal cases and this particular dismissal case, the Court would then move on to consider the 
applicable defence force legislation such as MDSMA and Chapter XX.  
 
The challenge posed by the application of these two statutes is that they do not provide for 
procedural fairness. Chapter XX defines only what unfair labour practices means in its definition 
clause.773 It is at this stage that the Court would have realised that there is a lacuna that seems 
to exist in the SANDF legislative framework, particularly in the provisions that are supposed to 
regulate the applicability of procedural fairness.  
 
To confirm this position, the applicants argued that, although section 59(2) (e) of the Defence Act 
states that “the service of a member of the regular force may be terminated in accordance with 
any applicable regulations”, there were no available Regulations in the SANDF.774 The implication 
of this submission is that the Minister can impose the sanction of dismissal of members of the 
SANDF only after any relevant regulations have been applied.  
 
The Minister could, however, not do so, because there are no regulations that provide for the 
procedure to be followed before a sanction of dismissal. This procedure is provided by section 3 
of PAJA discussed above.775 Following the submissions by the applicants on the issue of the non-
availability of regulations, the Court would have realised that the available legislative provisions 
in the SANDF are inadequate to address the issue of procedural fairness, that LRA does not apply 
to members of the SANDF, and that the action of the Minister is an administrative action as 
defined in PAJA, and, therefore, the application of PAJA should be considered.  
                                            
771  Loots BE “Public employment and the relationship between labour and administrative law” 
Unpublished LLD thesis (2011) at 105. See also Chaskalson A “Law in a changing society-the past 
ten years: balance sheet and some indicators for future” 1989 (5) SAJHR 293.  
772  Ibid. 
773  See definition clause in Chapter XX (note 7). 
774  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1) at 9. 
775  Section 3 of the PAJA of 2000. 
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2.1  Relevance of PAJA to dismissal cases in the context of the SANDF 
 
The second question that the Court would have had to ask and answer is what the relevance of 
PAJA to dismissal cases of members of the SANDF is. To answer this question, the Court would 
have had to deal with the applicability of administrative law to dismissal cases of public servants. 
Furthermore, the Court would have to deal with the lacuna that seems to exist in the legislative 
framework that is supposed to regulate the applicability of procedural fairness in the SANDF.  
 
There seems to be an indication emanating from the arguments presented by the SANDU in the 
SANDU 2010 High Court judgment, the SCA appeal judgment I of 2012, and the appeal judgment 
II of 2014 that there are Omissions in the SANDF current legislative framework.776 In all three 
decisions, SANDU, on behalf of its members, submitted that the available mechanisms in the 
SANDF are inadequate and, therefore, unable to provide and safeguard procedural justice.777  
 
It might be argued that some form of ‘defence forces administrative regulations’ need to be 
promulgated.778 In the interim, recourse could be sought from the proper application of the 
provisions of PAJA to afford members of the SANDF procedural justice as will be shown below. 
It was important for the Court to rationalise the relevance of PAJA to this matter.  
 
According to Ngcukaitobi,779 if the main function of administrative law is the regulation of the 
exercise of public power through which legality, rationality and procedural correctness can be 
perceived, the argument that the existence of another constitutional right, such as the right to fair 
labour practices, is sufficient to deny the application of section 33 and PAJA does not have a 
sound constitutional basis.780  
 
                                            
776  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1) SANDU was the applicant. In SANDF appeal judgment I and II 
SANDU was the respondent. All three cases originate from the same set of facts. See chapter 3 on 
the trail of judgments that originated from the set of facts of SANDU 2010 High Court judgment. 
777  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1) at 10. SANDF appeal judgment I (note 728) at para 10. SANDF 
appeal judgment II (note 728) at paras 9-10.  
778  SANDF appeal judgment II (note 728) at para 10. See also on the issue of the principle of non-
compliance with the jurisdictional fact, Democratic Alliance v President of the RSA 2012 (1) SCA 
para 118 and Paola v Jeeva NO 2004 (1) SA 396 SCA para 11-14, see also on the issue of the 
exercise of discretion Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others, Shalabi and 
Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others, Thomas and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and 
Others 2000 (3) SA 936 CC para 47. Also SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1) at 9. 
779  Ngcukaitobi T “Life after Chirwa: is there scope for harmony between public sector labour law and 
administrative law?” 2008 (29) ILJ 841-862. 
780  Ngcukaitobi T (note 758) at 841 and 846. 
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The significance of PAJA in the SANDU 2010 judgment cannot be over-emphasised. It is 
submitted that had the Court considered the application of PAJA to this case, the effect would 
have been that the legal dispute could have been finalised.781 It is suggested that, if the purpose-
built systems for employment disputes provided for by the LRA were applicable to members of 
the SANDF, the approach that the court adopted would be arguably satisfactory.  
 
This is, however, not the case. There are two persuasive reasons why the Court should have 
established the relevance of PAJA to this matter. Firstly, there is the fact that the LRA does not 
apply to members of the SANDF and, even if LRA did apply to members of the SANDF, PAJA the 
subsidiarity principle should be applied.  According to Van der Walt, if more than one statute 
compete with or complement each other, as is the case with LRA and PAJA, the subsidiary 
principle should be that competing or complimentary legislation must be applied to promote the 
spirit, purport and object of the bill of rights, thus giving effect to the Constitution.782 Secondly, the 
fact that the available legislative framework in the SANDF is inadequate to regulate procedural 
fairness. This inadequacy created a lacuna that could have been bridged by the application of the 
relevant provisions of PAJA read with section 33 of the Constitution. 
 
The Court might have been encouraged to overlook the possible application of PAJA because of 
the decisions such as Gcaba, Fredericks and Chirwa.783 Given the different views and approaches 
that have been taken in this debate, however, and the distinct context of the SANDF that was not 
found in any of the aforementioned judgments, it is submitted that the Court missed an opportunity 
to develop both administrative law jurisprudence in general and, in particular, the legislative 
structure of the SANDF.  
 
The Court could have followed in the footsteps of both the High Court and the Constitutional Court 
in South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence,784 where an important contribution 
to the development of the SANDF legislative structure was made. The Constitutional Court 
                                            
781  From the SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1) there were three subsequent judgments, all flowing from 
the same set of facts. This matter dragged from 2010-2014, and then 2017. The main cause of 
action was that the Minister had failed to follow proper procedures before dismissals. 
782  Van der Walt AJ “Normative pluralism and anarchy: reflections on the 2007 term” CCR 2008/1 77 
 at 111. 
783  Gcaba v Minister of Safety and Security (note 734). See also Fredericks and Others v MEC for 
Education and Training, Eastern Cape and Others (note 653) and Chirwa v Transnet Limited and 
Others (CC) (733). 
784  South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 1999 (6) BCLR 615 (CC). 
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resolved the dispute and afforded the Minister an opportunity to promulgate Regulations that 
included labour rights.785  
 
This was another opportunity for the court to develop a Defence Force legislative structure to 
include administrative law in the Defence Force. It is trite that debate on the applicability of 
administrative law to labour matters has been decided in a number of judgments where 
contrasting and conflicting approaches of the High Courts, the SCA and the Constitutional Court 
have emerged.786   
 
Many judgments understandably follow the approach of the majority judgment of Gcaba and 
Chirwa respectively.787 It is submitted that the Court in SANDU 2010 should have preferred the 
approach followed in Administrator, Transvaal, and another v Zenzile and others.788  
 
In this decision, the Court held that the principles of administrative law could be used by public 
servants to challenge a decision terminating their employment.789 The reason was that labour law 
legislation of the time could not provide the necessary protection to public servants.790 This law 
has since been amended to expand its scope of application to public servants.791 The status quo 
still remains as far as the application of this law to members of the South African National Defence 
                                            
785  Ibid. 
786  Administrator, Transvaal, and Another v Zenzile and Others (note 151); Sidumo v Rustenburg 
Platinum Mines Ltd (note 20), Administrator, Natal v Sibiya (note142), Muller v Chairman of the 
Ministers' Council: House of Representatives 1991 (12) ILJ 761 (C), Mdingi v Minister of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Rural Development 1994 (3) LCD, Manona v Acting Commander of the Transkei 
Defence Force 1994 (3) LCD 204 (T), Administrator of the Transvaal v Traub 1989 (4) SA 731 (A); 
1989 10 ILJ 823 (A), Simelela v MEC for Education, Eastern Cape 2001 (22) ILJ 1688 (LC); 2001 
(9) BLLR H 1085 (LC), Transnet Ltd v Chirwa 2007 (11) BLLR 10 (SCA). Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 
(CC) (note 733). 
787  Gcaba v Minister of Safety and Security (note 734), Chirwa v Transnet Ltd (CC) (note 733). SANDF 
appeal judgment II (note 728) at para 16. See also Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union and Others 
v Minister of Correctional Services and Others (note 729). Police Union v National Commissioner 
of the SA Police Service (note 777), Mbayeka v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape 2001 (1) All SA 
567 (T), Dunn v Minister of Defence 2005 JOL 15881 (T), Public Servants’ Association obo Haschke 
v MEC for Agriculture 2004 (8) BLLR 822 (LC), Hlope v Minister of Safety and Security 2006 (3) 
BLLR 297 (LC) and Simela v MEC for Education, Eastern Cape 2001 (9) BLLR 1085 (LC). 
788  Administrator, Transvaal, and Another v Zenzile and Others (note 151). See also Sibiya v 
Administrator, Natal 1991 (note 142).  
789  Administrator, Transvaal, and another v Zenzile and Others (note 151). In 1990 the court held that 
the principles of administrative law provide public servants with a platform to challenge a decision 
terminating their employment, if they could show that the decision was procedurally unfair 
790  LRA of 1995. 
791  Ibid. 
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Force is concerned. 792 Various commentators have different views on this issue.793 The different 
approaches of Courts and views of commentators will be discussed below. 
 
2.2  The contradictory views and approaches on the idea of application of administrative law to 
dismissal cases 
 
The third question that the Court in the SANDU 2010 judgment would have had to ask and answer 
in order to reach a conclusion regarding the applicability of PAJA  relates to the approaches that 
were followed by different Courts  and  the views of various commentators on this matter .  
 
The Court would have had to interrogate a number of High Court, SCA and Constitutional Court 
judgments, such as the Zenzile,794 Chirwa,795 Gcaba,796 and other relevant judgments, which 
paved a way for this debate. The Court would also have had to deal with various commentators’ 
views, such as those of Grogan,797 Pillay,798 Ngcukaitobi,799 Stacey,800 and others. 
  
In order to give context to the application of administrative law to dismissal matters and the views 
surrounding this debate, it is important to discuss the position before the High Court and the SCA 
judgments in Chirwa were handed down. That is, the common law position and the Zenzile 
judgment and the position before and after Chirwa, including the current position after the 
Constitutional Court judgments of Chirwa and Gcaba. 
 
Position pre-Chirwa judgment: The common law position. 
 
                                            
792  Section 2 of LRA of 1995 excludes members the National Defence Force, the National Intelligence 
Agency, and the South African Secret Service and South African Police Services are excluded from 
its the application. 
793 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (note 622), Mischke C (note 729), Van Eck S and 
Jordaan-Parkin R “Administrative, labour and constitutional law - A jurisdictional labyrinth” (2006) 
27 ILJ 1987, and Pillay D “PAJA v labour law” (note 745). 
794  Administrator, Transvaal, and Another v Zenzile and Others (note 151). 
795  Transnet Ltd v Chirwa 2007 (11) BLLR 10 (SCA). Chirwa v Transnet Ltd (CC) (note 733). 
796  Gcaba v Minister of Safety and Security 2010 (1) SA 238 (CC). 
797  Grogan J (note 654). 
798  Pillay D (note 457). 
799  Ngcukaitobi T (note 758). 




In Boyd v Stuttaford & Co, the Court described the nature of a contract of employment as locatio 
conductio.801 In common law, the contract of employment is similar to a contract of letting and 
hiring.802 Ngcukaitobi argues that a contract of employment is the same as an ordinary commercial 
contract where termination can occur on notice or due to breach.803  
 
One party, the employee or servant, provides his or her services to the employer or master in 
exchange for remuneration from the other party. In this relationship, the employee had no 
common-law right to be heard before the termination of the contract.804 An employee has no right 
to continue in employment after the end of the notice period or the expiry date of the contract.805 
Issues related to fairness of termination of the contract are not enquired into. This position was 
the same in the employment relationship involving public servants. 
 
This common law position changed when the LRA 28 of 1956 was introduced.806 Employment 
could no longer be terminated only owing to breach of contract or on expiry of the date of contract. 
This termination had to be accompanied by fair reasons and fair procedure had to be complied 
with. The Industrial Court was empowered to order an employer to reinstate an employee where 
the dismissal was found to be unfair.807  
 
Although the change in common law was welcomed, the introduced LRA did not apply to public 
sector employees. The effect was that the common law position expressed in Boyd v Stuttaford 
& Co applied in respect of public sector employees.808 Consequently, public sector employees 
had no common law right to be heard before their dismissals. 
 
The Zenzile decision 
 
                                            
801  Boyd v Stuttaford & Co 2008 (29) ILJ 73 (CC) at 150. 
802  Pretorius J The South African Law of Contract (2010). Boyd v Stuttaford & Co (note 830) at 150. 
803  Ngcukaitobi T (note 758) at 842. 
804  Brassey M “Back off but back up! Administrative law rightly yields to Labour Law” Constitutional 
Court Review (2009) 2 209. 
805  Ngcukaitobi T (note 758) at 842. 
806  The LRA of 1995. See also Ngcukaitobi T (note 758) at 842. 
807  Ngcukaitobi T (note 758) at 842. 
808  Boyd v Stuttaford & Co (note 779) at 150. Ngcukaitobi T (note 758) at 842. 
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The decision of Administrator, Transvaal & Others v Zenzile & Others, altered the position of 
public sector employees.809 In this case, the Court had the opportunity to examine whether, in 
addition to the principle of ultra vires, another basis, namely audi alteram partem, could be used 
to control the exercise of dismissal power by public sector employers.810  
 
It found that the principle of audi alteram partem applied in respect of dismissals of public sector 
employees, even though such principles were not specifically incorporated in any statute.811 The 
effect of the Zenzile decision was that it extended the application of the audi principle to public 
sector employees and that a contract of employment of a public servant comprised two separate 
and distinct but interwoven branches.812  
 
The contract of employment was subject to the requirements of legislation and the common law 
rule requirements of audi alteram partem.813 The Zenzile approach was soon followed by 
Administrator, Natal & another v Sibiya & Another, where the Court had to answer the question 
concerning the applicability of the audi rule to employment matters.814 The Zenzile judgment 
paved the way for the protection of public servants from unfair labour practices through the 
application of administrative law.815 
 
This contribution was, however, overshadowed by judgments, such as Chirwa and Gcaba.816 
Brassey is of the opinion that Zenzile might have lost its relevance to the law of dismissal in the 
public service owing to the Courts choosing not to consider it when making decisions.817 He 
argues that this approach is institutional and misconceived,818 and, furthermore, that it will not be 
known to what extent the Zenzile judgment might still be applicable in other areas involving issues 
or people such as soldiers, for example, who fall outside this complicated debate.819  
                                            
809  Administrator, Transvaal, and Another v Zenzile and Others (note 151). See also Brassey M (note 
782). 
810  Ngcukaitobi T (note 758) at 842. 
811  Administrator, Transvaal, and Another v Zenzile and Others (note 151). 
812  Ngcukaitobi T (note 758) at 842. See also Brassey M (note 782). 
813  The audi alteram partem (note 171). 
814  Administrator, Natal v Sibiya (note 156). 
815  Administrator, Transvaal, and Another v Zenzile and Others (note 151). 
816  Chirwa v Transnet Ltd & Others (CC) (note 733). Gcaba v Minister of Safety and Security (note 
734). 
817  Brassey M (note 782). Administrator, Transvaal, and Another v Zenzile and Others (note 151). 
818  Brassey M (note 782) at 219. 
819  Ibid. 
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It is submitted that Brassey’s opinion correctly advocates that the Zenzile judgment is still 
relevant with regard to the applicability of administrative law to dismissal cases.820 The 
importance of this opinion is that it demonstrates that the applicability of administrative law in a 
form of PAJA to dismissal cases in the context of defence forces is not only possible but also 
desirable or recommended.  
 
According to Ngcukaitobi, the Zenzile judgment rendered the contract of employment of a public 
servant to be compliant with the common-law principles of administrative law.821  
Other judgments, such as Fredericks v MEC for Education and Training, Eastern Cape,822 also 
followed the example of Zenzile to allow public sector employees to rely on the right to just 
administrative action.823  
 
The Chirwa decision: The Supreme Court of Appeal approach: Transnet Ltd v 
Chirwa 2007 1 BLLR 10 (SCA). 
 
 
In Transnet Ltd v Chirwa,824 Transnet appealed the High Court decision that held that the 
dismissal of Chirwa amounted to administrative action.825 The applicant (Transnet) appealed on 
the grounds that the High Court did not have jurisdiction and that the actions of Transnet, as the 
employer, did not amount to administrative action.826 The matter originated from the High Court 
where Chirwa challenged her dismissal on the basis that it violated her constitutional right to fair 
labour practices.827  
 
The High Court was requested to review and set aside the dismissal. The High Court decided 
that the dismissal amounted to administrative action.828 The Court further found that Transnet 
failed to comply with the audi alteram partem rule.829 The dismissal was set aside. The SCA in 
                                            
820  Ibid. 
821  Ngcukaitobi T (note 758) at 842. 
822  Fredericks v MEC for Education and Training, Eastern Cape (note 653). 
823  Ibid. 
824  Transnet Ltd v Chirwa 2007 (11) BLLR 10 (SCA). 
825  Ibid. 
826  Ibid. 
827  Chirwa v Transnet Ltd unreported case no 03/01052 (2005) WLD. See also Transnet Ltd v Chirwa 
(SCA) (note 802). 
828  Ibid. 
829  Ibid. 
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Transnet Ltd & others v Chirwa830 was requested to consider whether or not PAJA applied in the 
case of a dismissal of an employee of Transnet.831  The SCA had to answer two questions, 
whether the dismissal constituted administrative action as defined in PAJA, and whether a 
dismissal matter should be reviewed exclusively in terms of section 157(1) of the LRA by the 
Labour Court. Five separate judgments were delivered on this matter.832 
  
Mthiyane JA, agreeing with Jafta JA for the minority, held that termination of Chirwa's employment 
by Transnet was not an administrative action as defined in PAJA and that there was no exercise 
of public power involved.833 The judge further held that the decision to terminate employment did 
not violate any of the constitutional rights in section 33, and that Transnet was not exercising 
public power nor performing a public function in terms of any legislation when it dismissed Chirwa.  
 
The majority however held further that the Zenzile decision could not be followed, because it had 
been decided before PAJA and that employment contracts of the employees were regulated by 
the LRA. The decision of Transnet was, therefore, not reviewable under PAJA.834 The dismissal 
of Chirwa should have been challenged under the LRA and not PAJA.835 
  
Conradie JA delivered a separate judgment from that of Mthiyane JA and Jafta JA.836 The judge 
disagreed with the approach followed by the majority to the question of whether the decision was 
administrative action or not. The judge regarded that the dismissal of Chirwa was administrative 
action.837 Conradie JA, however, held a different view when considering whether PAJA applied 
or not.838 According to this judge, legislation must be construed to give effect to its purpose. The 
intention of the legislature behind the LRA is that labour disputes, including complaints about 
unfair dismissals, must be subjected to its structure.839 On the relevance of Zenzile, the judge 
recognised that Zenzile had been decided before the Constitution and PAJA.840 The judge, 
                                            
830  Transnet Ltd v Chirwa (SCA) (note 802). 
831  Ibid. 
832   In Transnet Ltd v Chirwa (SCA) (note 802) Mthiyane JA, Jafta JA, Murphy JA and Conradie 
delivered the majority judgment.  Cameron DA and Mpati JA delivered a minority judgment. 
833 Transnet Ltd & Others v Chirwa (SCA) (note 802) at para 14. See also President of RSA v South 
African Rugby Football Union 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC).   
834  Transnet Ltd v Chirwa (SCA) (note 802) at para 26-29. 
835  Transnet Ltd v Chirwa (SCA) (note 803) at para 49. 
836  Transnet Ltd v Chirwa (SCA) (note 8(SCA) 03) at para 53. 
837  Transnet Ltd v Chirwa (SCA) (note 803) at para 26. 
838  Transnet Ltd v Chirwa (SCA) (note 803) at para 53. 
839  Transnet Ltd v Chirwa (SCA) (note 802) at para 27. 
840  Ibid. 
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however, held that promulgation of both the Constitution and PAJA did not render Zenzile 
irrelevant. Instead it seems that both PAJA and the Constitution reinforce its authority.841  
 
The minority judgment, delivered by Cameron JA and Mpati DP, agreed with Conradie JA that 
public sector employment decisions amount to administrative action.842 Unlike Conradie JA, 
however, the minority judges held that there is no reason to withhold the protections of 
administrative law from the subjects of labour dispute matters.843 The minority judgment focused 
on two questions: if there were no LRA, would public sector employees bring their claims under 
PAJA, and, if affirmative, did the LRA take away that protection?844  
 
It was held that the existence of a contract between Ms Chirwa and Transnet did not change the 
public relationship. The reason is that one deals with a public entity created by legislation which 
exercises public power in the ordinary course of administering the business of Transnet.152  
 
The Constitutional Court approach: Chirwa v Transnet Ltd & Others [2008] 2 BLLR 
97 (CC). 
 
The Chirwa matter was escalated for clarity to the Constitutional Court. In this Court, the majority 
judgment of Skweyiya J, with Moseneke DCJ, Nkabinde J, Madala J, Van der Westhuizen J, 
Navasa AJ, Ngcobo J, and Sachs J were in agreement in so far as the applicability of PAJA to 
employment related matters was concerned.845   
 
The Constitutional Court was requested to answer the question of whether or not dismissal of 
public sector employees amounts to administrative action.846 The Court agreed with Conradie 
JA’s approach in the SCA, although its focus was on jurisdiction.847 Skweyiya J held that, since 
he found that the High Court did not have concurrent jurisdiction with the Labour Court, he did not 
have to decide whether the dismissal in question amounted to administrative action.848  
                                            
841  Transnet Ltd v Chirwa (SCA) (note 802) at para 28. 
842  Transnet Ltd v Chirwa (SCA) (note 802) at para 56. 
843  Transnet Ltd v Chirwa (SCA) (note 803) at para 52. 
844  Transnet Ltd v Chirwa (SCA) (note 803) at para 54. 
845  Chirwa v Transnet Ltd & Others (CC) (note 733) at para 142. 
846  Chirwa v Transnet Ltd & Others (CC) (note 733) at para 143. 
847  Conradie JA held that the dismissal of Chirwa was an administrative action. That LRA should apply 
to employment matters and not PAJA. See Transnet Ltd v Chirwa (note 823) at para 74. Chirwa v 
Transnet Ltd & Others (note 19). 




Ngcobo J filed a separate judgment, in which he emphasised that the application of the labour 
law regime to public-sector employees removes the need for the application of administrative law 
to public-sector employment decisions.849  
 
The approach of the Constitutional Court did not resolve the issue of whether public sector 
employment decisions are administrative actions or whether the applicability of labour law through 
the LRA excluded the application of PAJA and the protections of administrative law for purposes 
of resolving an employment related matters.  
 
According to Cameron JA in the SCA, there is no suggestion in the Constitution that beneficiaries 
should be restricted to only one legislative scheme where there is more than one right.850 This 
reasoning suggests that one cause of action can give rise to both a dismissal in terms of the LRA 
and an administrative action in terms of PAJA.851 The minority held that, without a clear and 
significant legislative provision to the contrary, PAJA cannot be ignored purely to make way for 
the LRA.852 The uncertainty that was created in the Chirwa case on the question of whether 
administrative law should find application in dismissal or employment matters was dealt with in 
the Gcaba judgment.853  
 
The position post-Chirwa: Gcaba v Minister of Safety and Security 2010 (1) SA 238 
(CC)854 
 
In Gcaba, the applicant approached the bargaining council for the resolution of his problem.855 
The applicant was unsuccessful. The applicant sued the Minister in the High Court. Following in 
the footsteps of Chirwa, the High Court held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear labour matters. 
 
In the Constitutional Court, the Court was requested to answer the question of whether 
employment and labour relationship issues amounted to administrative action within the meaning 
                                            
849  Chirwa v Transnet Ltd & Others (CC) (note 733) at para 142. 
850  Chirwa v Transnet Ltd & Others (CC) (note 733) at para 175. 
851  Chirwa v Transnet Ltd & Others (CC) (note 733) at para 148. 
852  Chirwa v Transnet Ltd & Others (CC) (note 733) at para 176. 
853  Gcaba v Minister of Safety and Security (note 734).  
854  Ibid. 
855  Gcaba v Minister of Safety and Security (note 734). Gcaba sued the Minister for Safety and Security 




of PAJA and whether indeed the High Court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate labour matters. 
Briefly, the Court was requested to answer the question whether the decision by a public service 
employer not to promote an employee amounted to administrative action. 
Just before the Gcaba judgment, but after Chirwa, the High Court in Mkumatela v Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan Municipality856 had held that the applicant could approach the CCMA through the 
application of the LRA or approach the High Court on the basis of a claim of a right to just 
administrative action in the Constitution.857 The Court in Mkumatela followed the approach of 
Fredericks and not the approach followed in Chirwa to reach its conclusion.858  
 
After a long-awaited decision of the Constitutional Court on the question of whether administrative 
law applies to employment matters, the Court held that public servants could no longer have 
claims based on administrative law to resolve employment disputes. Public sector employees 
must resolve their employment related matters in the same way as private sector employees.  
 
In other words, they must base their claim on labour law under the LRA. The Gcaba judgment 
highlighted the differences and similarities between Chirwa and Fredericks.859 In determining the 
issue of whether the decision about the Minister for Safety and Security was an administrative 
action, the Court followed in the footsteps of Chirwa and held that failure to promote and appoint 
the applicant did not amount to administrative action.860  
 
Mupangavanhu861 is of the opinion that the Court preferred to follow the approach of Chirwa 
because of the principle of stare decis.862 This principle aims at creating legal certainty and 
equality before the law, and, therefore, the Court must stand by its decisions rather than to 
                                            
856  Mkumatela v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality 2008 unreported case 2314/06. 
857  Mkumatela v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality (note 835) at para 9-11. 
858  Mkumatela v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality (note 835), Chirwa v Transnet Limited (note 
19), Frederick’s v MEC for Education and Training, Eastern Cape (note 653). 
859  Chirwa v Transnet Limited (CC) (note 733); Frederick’s v MEC for Education and Training, Eastern 
Cape (note 654). 
860  Chirwa v Transnet Ltd & Others (CC) (note 733). 
861  Mupangavanhu Y and Mupangavanhu B “Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security: Concurrent 
jurisdiction now settled law?” 2012 (1) STELL LR 40 at 45. 
862  Lawson G “Stare Decisis and the Constitutional Meaning: Panel II - The Constitutional Case against 
Precedent” 1994 (17) Harv JL & Pub Pol’y 23 at 24. The purpose of stare decisis is to ensure legal 
certainty and equality before the law and hence courts ought to stand by their decisions and not 
disturb settled matters. 
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overrule itself.863 The legal effect of overruling a previous decision occurs when the Court corrects 
a mistake made by the earlier Court, and it is not making the law.864  
 
As a result, the Court reinforced the decision in Chirwa and decided that the decision not to 
promote did not constitute administrative action in terms of section 33 of the Constitution.865 The 
court in Gcaba was expected to clear the confusion that many High Courts have been saddled 
with when deciding whether administrative law applies to dismissal or employment matters and 
whether employment-related decisions are administrative actions for purposes of PAJA.866   
 
Brickhill is, however, of the opinion that, according to the approach followed in Gcaba, the Chirwa 
judgment did not overrule Fredericks, but made a comparison only, and that, in addition, Gcaba 
did not overrule Chirwa or Fredericks but rather showed the similarities and differences of these 
judgments.867 Instead of clearing the confusion, the Court left it to the legal representatives and 
other stakeholders to interpret its judgment.868 According to Brickhill, the task is left to High Courts, 
the legislature and academics to decide whether Gcaba departed from Fredericks or Chirwa and, 
if affirmative, to what extent did it do so?869  
 
What appears to be clear from this judgment is that Gcaba proclaims its own authority over the 
earlier judgments.870 As in Chirwa before it, Gcaba has been read by different Courts to mean 
different things. In three subsequent cases,871 the SCA has seemingly interpreted Gcaba to mean 
that the High Court enjoys jurisdiction in public sector dismissal disputes founded in administrative 
law.  
 
For instance, in Tshavhungwa v National Director of Public Prosecutions872 Nugent JA held that 
a claim that a public sector dismissal was an administrative action is justiciable in the High Court. 
                                            
863  Mupangavanhu Y and Mupangavanhu B (note 839) at 45. 
864  Wille G, Du Bois F and Bradfield G (eds) Wille’s Principles of South African Law 9th ed (2007) at 88. 
865  Gcaba v Minister of Safety and Security (CC) (note 733) at para 5. 
866  Gcaba v Minister of Safety and Security (CC) (note 733) at paras 11, 19. 
867  Gcaba v Minister of Safety and Security (CC) (note 733) paras 20, 22, 26,44,48,77. 
868  Brickhill J “Precedent and the Constitutional Court” (2010) (3) CCR 79-109 at 85. 
869  Brickhill J “Precedent and the Constitutional Court” (note 846) at 86. 
870  Brickhill J “Precedent and the Constitutional Court” (note 846) at 87. 
871  City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Engineering Council of South Africa 2009 unreported 
151 (SCA) at para 38. See also Mkumatela v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality (note 835) 
at para 15; Tshavhungwa v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2009 unreported SCA.  
872  Tshavhungwa v National Director of Public Prosecutions (note 849) at para 22. 
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In Sibeko v Premier for the Province of the Northern Cape873, on the other hand, the High Court 
interpreted Gcaba to exclude the High Court’s jurisdiction in labour matters.874  
 
It can be seen above from the decisions of Langa CJ and Ngcobo J that there are different 
approaches to deciding cases that are related to the application of administrative law to dismissal 
cases.875 The main difference in the approaches adopted by Langa CJ and Ngcobo J in the 
Chirwa case is that Ngcobo J follows the Constitution as a basis for the infringement of section 
33 only.876 On the other hand, Langa CJ reasons that a dismissal of a public servant affects both 
the administrative law and labour rights of an employee.  
 
In that context, a public sector employee has a choice to either challenge the dismissal through 
administrative law or labour law.877 These two judges are not the only judges who differ in their 
approach to dealing the application of administrative law to dismissal cases.878 It is, therefore, not 
surprising that the judge in the SANDU 2010 judgment also chose an approach which seemingly 
avoids the applicability of administrative law to dismissal cases.879  
 
It is submitted, however, that, in this case, the judge might have followed the approach of Langa 
CJ in the Chirwa case.880 Procedural fairness can best be dealt with through the application of 
administrative law, in particular PAJA.881 This is particularly important in the SANDU 2010 case 
because members of the military are not protected by the LRA as already stated above.882  
 
Regardless of the complexities surrounding the applicability of administrative law to dismissal 
disputes, Ngcukaitobi883 correctly holds a view that any conduct which impacts on various 
constitutional rights, such as sections 23 and 33 of the Constitution, should be approached by the 
                                            
873  Sibeko v Premier for the Province of the Northern Cape 2009 unreported 66 (NCHC).  
874  Sibeko v Premier for the Province of the Northern Cape (note 851). 
875  Chirwa v Transnet (CC) (Ltd) (note 733). 
876  Ibid. 
877  Chirwa v Transnet (CC) (Ltd) (note 733). 
878  Ibid. 
879  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1). 
880  Chirwa v Transnet (CC) (Ltd) (note 733). See also SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1). 
881  The PAJA of 2000. 
882  The LRA of 1995. 
883  Ngcukaitobi T “(note 758). 
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Courts on the basis that these rights are supportive, interdependent, interrelated, and 
indivisible.884 
2.3 The applicability of PAJA to dismissal matters in the context of SANDF 
 
To test whether PAJA could be applied in employment related matters, such as the dismissal of 
members of the SANDF, the Court would have had to answer the fourth question. The questions 
that the Court in the SANDU 2010 judgment would have had to respond to are: ‘Does 
administrative law apply to dismissal matters?’; ‘Can PAJA find application in this matter?’; and, 
’Was the conduct of the Minister to dismiss members of the SANDF an administrative action in 
terms of section 1 of PAJA?’  
 
To consider these, the Court would have had to decide to follow some of the conflicting 
approaches in the judgments discussed above, in particular Chirwa, Gcaba, Fredericks, SAPU 
and POPCRU. The Court would also have had to interpret section 1 of PAJA. The requirements 
of procedural fairness are contained in section 3 of PAJA, and the review procedure is contained 
in section 6 of PAJA. The Court would have had to interpret both sections 3 and 6 together in 
relation to section 33 of the Constitution.885  
 
It is noteworthy to mention that the Court would have had to deal with the issue of the applicability 
of PAJA to this dismissal matter regardless of the popular view that PAJA should not be applied 
to employment disputes. The reason for this popular view is that employment disputes are 
regulated by a comprehensive framework of labour legislation.886 Also, there are reasons 
advanced by academics why PAJA should apply. 
 
This suggestion was endorsed by the Labour Court in Public Servants Association on behalf of 
Haschke v MEC for Agriculture & others887 and a number of SCA and Constitutional Court 
judgments. There is also a reasoning that PAJA cannot be excluded from employment disputes 
                                            
884  Ngcukaitobi T (note 758) at 861. See also Government of the RSA & Others v Grootboom & Others 
2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) para 23. 
885  Section 1, 3, and 6 of the PAJA of 2000.  Section 33 of Constitution, 1996. 
886  Chirwa v Transnet (CC) (Ltd) (note 733) at paras 73. Ngcobo J filed a separate judgment where he 
made reference to the reasons for the enactment of the LRA. 




because of the availability of the LRA.888 Commentators such as Ngcukaitobi criticizes the 
approach that was followed by the majority in Constitutional Court decision of Chirwa889 which 
favoured the exclusion or non-aplication of PAJA to employment disputes, by reasoning that the 
existence of one right negates the other.890  According to Ngcukaitobi, the Court’s reasoning is 
not in line/consonant with the principles underlying the Constitution.891 He argues that section 23 
and 33 are mutually reinforcing. 
 According to Ngcukaitobi and Brickhill the question whether or not PAJA should apply at all in 
employment disputes which are regulated exclusively by labour law depends on policy reasons.892  
They argue that policy reasons cannot be advanced in some employment relationships such as 
public sector employment. They hold a view that all public power derives its force from the 
Constitution. Therefore to argue that PAJA cannot be applied to public sector employment does 
not have a constitutional basis.893 They further argue, that whilst it is not desireable that PAJA 
should not apply to employment disputes in general, in certain specific employment relationships 
PAJA should apply.894   
 
In dealing with the question whether or not PAJA should apply to employment disputes, 
Ngcukaitobi and Brickhill argue that it is difficult to sustain the argument that PAJA should not 
apply, because of the current formulation of PAJA.895  They argue that a sensible approach is not 
to adopt a blanket approach but to recognise the differences in various decisions which may be 
taken by public sector employers and to analyse on a case by case basis the nature and impact 
of those decisions, including the decision by the Minister to summarily dismiss members of the 
SANDF.896 
 
Pillay argues that PAJA could find application to causes of action and relationships akin to 
employment where the LRA does not apply. For example PAJA could apply to employment 
disputes involving soldiers, the intelligence and secrete services.897 
                                            
888  Ngcukaitobi T and Brickhill J “A Difficult Boundary: Public Sector Employment and Administrative 
Law” (2007) 28 ILJ (4) 769.  
889  Chirwa v Transnet (2008) 29 ILJ 73 (CC). 
890  Ngcukaitobi T (note 758) at 841. 
891  Ngcukaitobi T (note 758) at 841. 
892  Ngcukaitobi T and Brickhill J (note 888) at 789. 
893 Ngcukaitobi T and Brickhill J (note 888) at 790. 
894  Ngcukaitobi T and Brickhill J (note 888) at 769. 
895 Ngcukaitobi T and Brickhill J (note 888) at 792. 
896 Ibid. 




In Transnet v Chirwa Cameron JA found that in the Constiution there is no suggestion that, where 
more than one right, such as section 23 or 33 may be in issue, its beneficiaries should be confined 
to a single legislatively created scheme.898 This approach was endorsed by the Chief Justice in 
Chirwa v Transnet stating that “both PAJA and the LRA protect important constitutional rights and 
we should not presume that one right should be protected before another or presume to determine 
that the essence of a claim engages one right more than another . A litigant is entitled  to the full 
protection of both rights, even if they seem to cover the same grounds”.899  Plasket J in Popcru 
also warned against formalistic attempts to compartmetalise administrative law and labour law 
because this is just a classification of convenience.900  In her analysis of the decisions of 
Masetlha,901 Chirwa902 and Sidumo,903 Hoexter concludes that although the Constitutional Court 
was provided with an opportunity to  to expound on the relationship between constitutional rights 
concerned, that is, sections 23 and 33 of the Constitution and their associated legislation, that is, 
PAJA and LRA, this was a wasted opportunity.904 She echoes the sentiment of Plasket J in Popcru 
decision against compartmetalising administrative law and labour law.905   
 
Hoexter reasons that the dismissal of employees is as much a matter of administrative law as 
much as labour law.  She argues that the audi alteram partem principle is well established in 
general and specifically established in the context of dismissal in administrative law.906  Therefore 
to view administrative law and labour law as distinct rather than interdependent as found in 
Masetlha is a retrogressive approach.907  
 
This reasoning is endorsed by the SCA in Rustenburg Platinum Mines v CCMA & others908 and 
in many other SCA and some minority judgments of the Constitutional Court.909 These are some 
of the seemingly conflicting precedents that the Court would have had to consider. 
                                            
898  Transnet Ltd v Chirwa 2006 27 ILJ 2294 (SCA) at para 65. See also Hoexter C note 29) at 229 
899  Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 29 ILJ 73 (CC) at para 175. See also Hoexter C (note 29) at 229. 
900   POPCRU v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 4 BLLR 385 € at para 61. See also Hoexter (note 
 29) at 228. 
901  Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa & another 2008 1 SA 566 (CC). 
902  Chirwa v Transnet Ltd & others 2008 29 ILJ 73 (CC). 
903  Sidumo & Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & Others 2008 SA 24 (CC). 
904  Hoexter C (note 29) at 234. 
905  Hoexter C (note 29) at 228. 
906  Hoexter C (note 29) at 231. 
907  Hoexter C (note 29) at 234. 
908  Rustenburg Platinum Mines v CCMA & Others 2006 (27) ILJ 2076 (SCA). 
909  Transnet Ltd v Chirwa (SCA) (note 802), Chirwa v Transnet (CC) (Ltd) (note 733), Gcaba v Minister 




The main factor which should have encouraged the Court to consider the applicability of PAJA to 
this matter is that the LRA does not offer the protection for the deviation of the employer from the 
procedural standards that must be followed before a decision to dismissal can be taken.910 The 
SANDF legislation, such as MDSMA and Regulations in chapter XX on the Defence Act discussed 
above are inadequate to effectively deal with the issues related to procedural fairness. These 
pieces of legislation do not espouse the complete standards set in employment legislation such 
as LRA. The question is whether the PAJA could be a solution to this omission in SANDF as 
suggested by Pillay.911  
 
Could the context of the SANDF be an exception to the popular view that administrative law in 
the form of PAJA should not be applicable to employment and labour related matters, including 
dismissal? The Court’s first point of departure would be the Administrator, Transvaal v Zenzile 
judgment.  
 
In this judgment discussed above, the Court held that, when dealing with an administrative action, 
the Court is not concerned only with a mere employment under a contract of service between two 
private individuals but also with a form of employment which vests the employee with a particular 
status which the law will protect.912 In this instance, the employer and the decision-maker is a 
public authority whose decision to dismiss involved the exercise of a public power.  
 
The Court concluded that the element of public service provided for by the statute means that the 
respondents were eligible for the benefit of the application of the principles of natural justice before 
they could be summarily dismissed for misconduct.913 
 
Does PAJA apply? 
 
Section 33 of the Constitution: The threshold requirement 
  
                                            
910  Section 2 of the LRA of 1995. 
911 Pillay D (note 745) at 417. 
912 Administrator, Transvaal, and Another v Zenzile and Others (note151).  
913  Ibid.  
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It has already been mentioned that the Court, in the SANDU 2010 judgment, mentions section 
33(1) in passing, but the Court does not mention the relevant sections of PAJA.914 It is submitted 
that the Court’s approach not to use PAJA seems to be misguided in this instance because PAJA 
is a gateway to rely on section 33 of the Constitution.  
 
Pillay correctly argues that relying directly on the Constitution without interpreting and applying 
the relevant provisions of the enabling legislation, such as PAJA, could distort such enabling 
legislation.915 This is also known as the first subsidiarity principle confirmed in SANDU.916 Besides 
this, the Court in Bato Star v Minister of Environmental Affairs confirmed the fact that PAJA is the 
gateway to relying on section 33. 917 The Court held that there is no direct access to section 33 of 
the Constitution other than through PAJA.918  
 
It is submitted that, even if the applicant’s notice of motion did not invoke the provisions of PAJA, 
it was the Court’s duty to interpret section 33 of the Constitution with the relevant provisions of 
PAJA when reviewing the Minister’s decision, for the reason mentioned above. 919 It is suggested 
that it is the intention of the legislature that, once section 33 is relied upon, the provisions of PAJA 
should be applied, unless the action in question is expressly excluded by section 1 of PAJA.920  
 
In terms of section 33(3), PAJA was enacted to give flesh to the fundamental rights contained 
therein.921 The Court in Bato Star held that judicial review of administrative action arises from 
PAJA and not from the common law (ultra vires, audi alteram partem rule and nemo iudex in sua 
causa) as it used to be before PAJA was enacted.922  
  
In Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local Government Affairs, the Court applied section 33 
directly.923 The Court held that the reason for the direct application of section 33 of the Constitution 
was that the cause of action was the evaluation of the constitutional provision. PAJA cannot be 
used to resolve matters relating to the assessment of a constitutional challenge. This assessment 
                                            
914  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1) at 10. 
915  Pillay D (note 745) at 417. 
916  South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 2007 5 SA 400 (CC). 
917  Bato Star v Minister of Environmental Affairs (note 726) at paras 21-25. 
918  Bato Star v Minister of Environmental Affairs (note 726) at paras 21-25. 
919  Hoexter C (note 658). 
920  Section 33(3) of the Constitution read with the section 1 of the PAJA of 2000. 
921  Ibid. 
922  Bato Star v Minister of Environmental Affairs (note 726) at para 25. 
923  Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local Government Affairs 2005 (3) SA 589 (CC). 
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must be done under section 33 of the Constitution. The Court held that PAJA applies when an 
administrative action is reviewed.924  
 
It is submitted that the matter in the SANDU 2010 judgment was a request to the Court to review 
whether the decision of the Minister to dismiss members of the SANDF summarily was lawful, 
constitutional and procedurally fair.925 The Court could, therefore, not correctly interpret sections 
23 (3) and 33(1) of the Constitution without interpreting the relevant provisions of laws, such as 
PAJA and the LRA, which give effect to sections 23 and 33 respectively.  
 
In The Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd, the Constitutional Court held that a 
litigant cannot seek to rely on the protections of the right to administrative justice in section 33 of 
the Constitution without relying on PAJA. 926 It is not possible to go behind PAJA and rely directly 
on section 33.927   
 
Pillay argues that sometimes the Constitutional Court, in judgments such as NUMSA v Bader 
Bop, SA National Defence Union v Minister of Defence and NAPTOSA v Minister of Education 
Western Cape, allows that the fundamental rights, including labour rights, and their protection in 
the Constitution, be relied upon and accessed directly. He, however, views these Constitutional 
Court judgments be controversial in relation to the attachment of enabling pieces of legislation to 
fundamental rights in the Constitution.928 
 
Section 1 of PAJA: Administrative Action 
 
In determining that the Minister’s decision was an administrative action, the court needed to 
interpret section 1 of PAJA. This section defines administrative action as any decision or failure 
to take a decision by an organ of state when exercising public power in terms of any legislation.929  
                                            
924  Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local Government Affairs (note 881) at para 99. 
925  SANDU 2010 judgment (note 1) at 2, 6, and 8. 
926  Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC) at para 96, 436, and 
586.  
927  Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd (note 884) at para 96. 
928 NUMSA v Bader Bop 2003 ILJ 305 (CC) at paras 62 and 67; NAPTOSA v Minister of Education 
Western Cape 2001 (22) ILJ 889 (C) at paras 896D-G. See also Pillay (note 745) at 416. See also 
Hoexter C “Comparing Administrative Justice across the commonwealth: Administrative Action in 
Courts” (2006) Acta Juridica 303. 
929  Section 1 of the PAJA of 2000. 
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PAJA explicitly excludes some decisions from this definition.930 It is logical for practical reasons 
to conclude that PAJA cannot apply to every exercise of public power and to the performance of 
a public function.  
 
As a result, the exercise of certain executive and legislative powers and judicial functions is 
excluded from the definition of administrative action.931 The exclusions are identified by reference 
to their subject matter and not by the person or organ of state performing the function.932 The 
decision to dismiss public servants does not form part of the listed exclusions.933  
 
The questions that the Court in the SANDU 2010 judgment Sould have asked were, therefore: 
‘Was the decision of the Minister to dismiss members of the SANDF an administrative action for 
purposes of PAJA?’ and ‘Was the Minister exercising public power when making the decision?’ 
The Court, having interpreted the definition of administrative action in section 1 of PAJA, would 
arguably answer these questions in the affirmative. Having concluded that the Minister’s decision 
was an administrative action, the Court would proceed to determine whether PAJA applied to this 
matter. 
 
PAJA would apply both where the Minister’s conduct was found to be an administrative action 
and where this decision was exercised as public power authorised by legislation or empowering 
provision.934 In the SANDU 2010 judgment, the Minister was empowered by section 59(2) (e) of 
the Defence Act 42 2002 to terminate the employment services of members of the SANDF.935 
The question of whether PAJA applies to employment disputes seemingly remains confusing for 
many High Courts and the SCA to resolve. This issue seems to be unresolved despite the 
Constitutional Court judgments of Chirwa, Fredericks and Gcaba.936 Although these judgments 
attempted to resolve this issue, different approaches were followed within each judgment.937 The 
Constitutional Court judgments of Chirwa and Gcaba were particularly anticipated to produce a 
solution to this dilemma.938 This, however, did not happen.  
                                            
930  Section 1 (aa)-(ii) the PAJA of 2000. 
931  Pillay D (note 745) at 419. 
932  Currie I and Klaaren J The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act Benchbook (2001) at 53. 
933  See section 1 (aa)-(ii) of the PAJA of 2000.  
934  Section 1 of the PAJA of 2000. 
935  Section 59(2) (a)-(e) of Defence Act of 2002. 
936  Chirwa v Transnet (Ltd)  (CC) (note 733) Minority and Majority in Chirwa resulted in different views 
to the resolution of the matter. Gcaba v Minister of Safety and Security (note 734). 
937  Ibid.  See also Frederick’s v MEC for Education and Training, Eastern Cape (note 653). 




Commencing from an assumption that PAJA is not generally inapplicable in the employment 
context, it would be necessary for the Court to determine whether any given decision amounts to 
a reviewable administrative action in terms of PAJA.939 A key question will be whether the decision 
to dismiss involves the exercise of public power or the performance of a public function.940 It was 
indicated that the Minister was empowered by section 59(2) (e) to take a decision to dismiss 
members of the SANDF. One of the judgments that the Court could have used as precedence, 
although for persuasive value, is POPCRU & others v Minister of Correctional Services & 
others.941  
 
In this case, the High Court considered the question of whether or not the provisions of PAJA 
applied to dismissals of government employees. The Court held that provisions of PAJA applied 
and, as a result, the decision of the Minister of Department of Correctional Services to dismiss its 
employees was reviewed and subsequently set aside.942 In interpreting section 1 of PAJA, the 
court found that the decision was an administrative action as defined.943 In addition, the Court 
reasoned that the concept of public power is not confined to the exercises of power that affects 
the public at large.944 The Court decided that it was bound by the decision of the Appellate Division 
in Administrator, Transvaal & others v Zenzile & others because that set a precedent.945  
 
In terms of the definition of administrative action in section 1 of PAJA, PAJA applies only when 
the decision was taken when exercising a power in terms of the Constitution or a provincial 
constitution, or exercising a public power, or performing a public function in terms of any 
legislation.946 The question of whether a decision was taken in the exercise of public power is, 
therefore, important. Here the Court in the SANDU 2010 judgment would come to the conclusion 
that PAJA applies because of the presence of section 59(2)(e), which authorised the Minister to 
make a decision.  
                                            
939  Not all decisions are reviewable in terms of section 1 of PAJA, some decision are excluded from 
review in terms of (aa)-(ii). Section 157 of the LRA 66 of 1995 regulated reviewable decisions of 
employer, including decisions of the state as an employer. 
940  Section 1 of the PAJA of 2000. 
941  POPCRU & Others v Minister of Correctional Services & Others 2006 (27) ILJ 555 (E); 2006 (2) All 
SA 175 (E).  
942  POPCRU & Others v Minister of Correctional Services & Others (note 729) at para 53. 
943  Ibid. 
944  Ibid. 
945  Administrator, Transvaal, and Another v Zenzile and Others (note151). See also POPCRU & Others 
v Minister of Correctional Services & Others (note 729) at para 53. 




In Chirwa v Transnet & others,947 the Court reconciled the decisions of Cape Metropolitan and 
Logbro Properties CC.948 In reconciling these judgments, the Constitutional Court held that these 
two decisions established the principle that a decision to terminate a contract concluded by a 
public authority from a position of superiority is governed by the principles of administrative justice 
if it is framed by statute.949  
 
Section 3 of PAJA: Procedural Fairness  
 
Another issue that the Court would have had to deal with is the standard that is applicable to a 
decision to dismiss members of the SANDF. For a dismissal, both substantive and procedural 
fairness are required, as was indicated in the SANDU 2010 judgment. These requirements to 
meet the standard are encapsulated in labour legislation (LRA), read with codes of good practice, 
and in administrative law in section 3 of PAJA.950 Actions or decisions of the state as an employer 
must comply with these standards.951  
 
Ngukaitobi and Brickhill argue that, if PAJA were to apply to some employment disputes, it can 
arguably apply only to decisions where terms of contract, including the terms guiding dismissal, 
were dictated by the employer.952 Furthermore, these terms of contract must have been framed 
by statute in the sense that the public body was empowered by statute to contract. It is submitted 
that the Minister is in a position of power to dictate the terms of service in the SANDF, including 
the terms for termination of those services.  
 
These terms are captured in the Defence Act, where section 59(2) (e) dictates the termination of 
service of members of the defence forces. It is possible to distinguish between dismissals of public 
sector employees employed and dismissible under statute, such as in the SANDU 2010 judgment 
and POPCRU, and other employees, employed and dismissible only under contract, such as in 
Chirwa.  
 
                                            
947  Chirwa v Transnet (Ltd) (CC) (note 733) at para 20.  
948  Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO & Others 2003 (2) SA 460 (SCA). 
949  Chirwa v Transnet (Ltd) (CC) (note 733) para 20. 
950  Section 3 of the PAJA of 2000. 
951  Section 3(1) of the PAJA of 2000. 
952  Ngcukaitobi T and Brickhill J (note 866) at 792. 
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It is submitted that, after applying the standard that must be met and requirements for procedural 
fairness, by interpreting section 3 of PAJA in SANDU 2010, the Court would have arguably 
complied with both sections 33 (3) and 39 of the Constitution. By doing this, the Court would have 
given effect to the right to procedural fairness of members of the SANDF captured in section 33(1) 
discussed above, and complied with the mandate for all courts, tribunals and forums in section 




Section 6 of PAJA: Review of administrative action 
 
It was stated above that the actions or decisions of employers, including those of the state in its 
capacity as employer, must conform to certain standards, including substantive and procedural 
fairness. Failure to do so renders these decisions reviewable either under the LRA or under 
PAJA.953 Sections 158(h) and 157(2) of the LRA deal with the review of employment actions and 
decisions by the Labour Court or High Court, as the case may be.954  
 
Section 158(h) of the LRA empowers the Labour Court to review any decision taken or any act 
performed by the state in its capacity as employer on such grounds as are permissible in law. 
Although this section provides for review of decisions of the state in its capacity as an employer, 
this review is not applicable in the SANDU 2010 matter because of section 2 of the same Act 
(LRA).955  
 
One of the main reasons that the Courts, in matters such as Chirwa and Gcaba, reject the 
application of PAJA to employment related matters is that the actions and decisions on employees 
are reviewable under the LRA through the jurisdiction of the Labour Courts.956 It is submitted that 
this argument, in view of the relationship between members of the SANDF and the LRA, cannot 
be supported and relevant.  
 
                                            
953  Sections 157 and 158(h) of LRA of 1995 regulates review of decisions. Section 6 of the PAJA of 
2000 regulates reviewable administrative actions. Grounds of reviewable action are listed in s 6(2). 
954  Sections 158(h) and 157(2) of the LRA of 1995. 
955  Section 2 of the LRA of 1995. 
956  Chirwa v Transnet (Ltd) (CC) (note 733) at para 20. 
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Section 6 of PAJA, on the other hand, could and should apply to the labour-related matters in the 
SANDF. This section lists the grounds for the judicial review of administrative action.957 These 
listed grounds emphasise the important constitutional protections given to the exercise of public 
power, without exclusions, except that the decision to be reviewed must comply with section 1 of 
PAJA.  
 
Section 6(1) provides that any person, including members of the SANDF, may institute 
proceedings for the judicial review of an administrative action. This section protects any person 
from the arbitrary decisions by organs of state by requiring that the exercise of public power be 
authorised by law, be rational and not arbitrary, and be preceded by a fair process.958 It is 
submitted that, in interpreting section 6 of PAJA, the Court would have arguably concluded that 
this section affords adequate protection to the right to procedural fairness of members of the 
SANDF and is consequently applicable. 
3. CONCLUSION 
 
The Court in the SANDU 2010 judgment might have had its reasons why it was silent on the 
application of PAJA to this matter.959 It could be that the Court followed the Chirwa or Gcaba 
approach discussed above.960 In doing this, however, the court missed two important issues with 
regard to the applicability of procedural fairness to members with regard to actions by members 
of the SANDF: (1) that the right to procedural fairness of members of the SANDF is not protected 
by the LRA and even if the LRA did protect members of SANDF, the subsidiarity principle is 
another point to consider (2) that the legislative framework that is available in the SANDF is 
inadequate to ensure protection of the right to procedural fairness of members of the SANDF.961  
 
The Court might have also missed a number of important considerations when it adjudicated this 
matter, viz. the fact that administrative law in the form of PAJA is meant to regulate the exercise 
                                            
957  Section 6 of the PAJA of 2000. 
958  Plasket C “Administrative Action: The Constitution and the Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000” 
(unpublished paper presented at an LRC Seminar on 23 October 2001) at 10. 
959  Stacey R (note 778). Brassey M (note 782). See also Administrator, Transvaal, and Another v 
Zenzile and Others (note 151). 
960  Chirwa v Transnet (Ltd) (CC) (note 733), Gcaba v Minister of Safety and Security (note 734). 
961  Chapter XX (note 7). 
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of public power,962 and also that, in order to claim the protection to just administrative action in 
section 33 of the Constitution, the pathway is through PAJA.963   
 
Notwithstanding the debate surrounding the applicability of administrative law to employment 
matters, common law and the administrative law have been applicable to public sector 
employment relationships and are still relevant.964  As Partington and Van der Walt argue, if the 
legislature had intended to exclude PAJA from employment matters, the legislature could have 
done so expressly when PAJA was enacted to give effect to section 33 of the Constitution.965  
 
Pillay correctly argues that relying directly on the Constitution could have the effect of distorting 
the LRA and other enabling pieces of legislation, such as PAJA in this instance. Pillay also holds 
a view that it is surprising that the Constitutional Court allows direct access to section 23, but not 
to section 33, as it was held in Bato Star.966 
  
It is suggested that the Court, in the SANDU 2010 judgment, could interpret this to mean that the 
Constitutional Court in Bato Star correctly advocates a single manner for application of 
administrative law rather than a parallel system of law, where PAJA and the Constitution could 
apply independently of each other. The confirmation in the Bato Star case that there is no direct 
access to section 33 of the Constitution other than through PAJA, therefore, remains important 
for the application of section 33 of the Constitution.967  
 
It follows from this judgment that the right to just administrative action may be invoked in labour 
matters only if PAJA applies. It is submitted, in agreement with Pillay’s argument, that in 
circumstances where section 23 of the Constitution, read with the labour laws, offers no 
                                            
962  Ngcukaitobi T (note 758) at 841. See also Farina CR “Administrative law as regulation: The paradox 
of attempting to control and to inspire the use of public power” 2004 (19) SAPR/PL 489 at 490 and 
503, Pillay D (note 745). See Minister of Health & Another v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd & 
Others (note 884). 
963  Bato Star v Minister of Environmental Affairs (note 726) at para 22. 
964  Ngcukaitobi T, Stacey R, Brassey M, Mischke C, Pillay D, Partington JP and Van der Walt JA and 
others. 
965  Minority judgment of Chirwa, Gcaba. See also Partington JP and Van der Walt JA "Does the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act Apply to Dismissals in the Public Sector? Transnet Ltd v 
Chirwa 2007 (11) BLLR 10 SCA Obiter 388 at 390 
966  Bato Star v Minister of Environmental Affairs (note 726) at para 22. See also Pillay D (note 745) at 
417. 
967  Bato Star v Minister of Environmental Affairs (note 726) at para 22. 
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protection, such as in this case, administrative law amongst other constitutional guarantees can 
be invoked to fill the lacuna.968  
 
It has been shown above that the decisions of Chirwa and Gcaba, which have been regarded as 
the solution to the problem that the Courts are faced with when dealing with applicability of 
administrative law to dismissal cases, have not offered a complete and concrete solution to this 
issue.969 The Constitutional Court’s tendency to rely on the policy-based reasoning which aims to 
exclude the application of PAJA from employment related matters has not been effective.970  
 
Quinot also has doubts about the helpfulness of these Constitutional Court judgments in so far 
as this question is concerned.971 According to Quinot, the overlap between administrative and 
labour law has not been resolved, and the High Court continues to review public-sector 
employment issues under administrative principles.972   
 
Both PAJA and the LRA apply to public employment, because, in the first place, the employer’s 
action or decision falls within the definition of administrative action in PAJA, and, in the second 
place, because the LRA expressly permits this duplication in section 158(1) (h).973  PAJA could 
also apply to causes of action and relationships that are similar to employment, where the LRA 
has no application, such as in the case of soldiers, intelligence and secret services.974  
According to Ngcukaitobi and Brickhill, the argument that PAJA in its current structure does not 
apply to all employment-related decisions cannot be legally sustained.975 In their view, a sensible 
approach is not to adopt a blanket approach, but rather to deal with this question on a case by 
case basis recognising differences in the context in which decisions may have been taken by 
public sector employers.976 Dismissal decisions, which seem to have generated the largest 
                                            
968  Pillay D (note 745) at 417.  
969  Chirwa v Transnet (note 19); Gcaba v Minister of Safety and Security (note 782). The journey to 
resolve the question of whether administrative law applies to employment matters begun at the 
Constitutional Court with Chirwa. It seems that, even after the decision of Chirwa, this issue was 
still not resolved. Many courts hoped that the Constitutional Court in Gcaba would provide a clear 
and permanent solution to this issue. 
970  Ngcukaitobi T and Brickhill J (note 866). 
971  Quinot G (ed) Administrative Justice in South Africa: An Introduction (2015) 92. 
972  Ibid. 
973  Pillay D (note 745) at 423. 
974  Section 2 of the LRA of 1995). See also Pillay D (note 745) at 423.  
975  Ngcukaitobi T and Brickhill J (note 866). 
976  Ibid.  
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amount of litigation, seem to meet the requirements of administrative action in PAJA. As a result 
there is no legally sound reason to exclude the application of PAJA to such decisions.977 
 
Although, according to Hoexter, Chirwa presented the Constitutional Court with opportunities to 
pronounce on the intersection of labour law and administrative law in employment matters, and 
to expound on the relationship between the constitutional rights concerned and their associated 
pieces of legislation, the Constitutional Court did not clear the intersection as expected.  
 
Furthermore, Chirwa raised fundamental questions about the concept of administrative action and 
the nature of public power, but these questions were not answered in order to offer a permanent 
solution to the question of whether administrative law should or should not apply to employment 
matters.978 
 
The matter of SANDF 2010 began and continued from this judgment, with the 2012, 2014 and 
2017 decisions. Could and should PAJA have found application in resolving this dispute? Tuswa 
answers this question in the affirmative, arguing that, if the internal remedies are inadequate or 
inappropriate, then relief can be sought in terms of PAJA.979 It was shown that the internal 
legislation in the SANDF, such as MDSMA and Chapter XX and its regulations, are inadequate 
to regulate procedural fairness.  
 
The answer to the question of whether PAJA should find application with regard to actions by 
members of the SANDF is, therefore, that PAJA could and should find application only when there 
are no other specific, appropriate and purpose-built systems to provide relief, or when other 
exceptional circumstances exist.980 
  
                                            
977 Ibid.  
978  Hoexter C (note 658) at 234. 
979  Tuswa Z “To PAJA or not to PAJA” Without Prejudice (2008) 10-11 at 11. 




SUMMARY OF RESEARCH, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1.  SUMMARY OF RESEARCH  
 
Chapter one of the research study briefly introduced the SANDU 2010 judgment.981 This chapter 
described the problem statement which described how all military forces including SANDF are 
based on a code of discipline and that there seem to be an imbalance when it comes to the 
protection of rights to procedural fairness and the enforcement of the required discipline.982  
 
This chapter also looked at the aims and objectives of the study.983 It explained that the aim of 
the study has been to investigate whether there is adequate legal provision within the legislative 
framework of the SANDF which regulates the applicability of procedural fairness when disciplinary 
actions are taken against actions by members of the SANDF.984   
 
The other aim of the research has been to examine whether the Court in SANDU 2010 followed 
the best approach when it chose not to consider the provisions of PAJA when it adjudicated the 
matter. The objective of the research has been to show that the Court should have considered 
the provisions of PAJA to resolve the infringement of procedural fairness985 and that the Court 
should have answered the question of whether the action of the Minister to dismiss members of 
the SANDF amounted to administrative action as defined in section 1 of PAJA.986  
 
This chapter introduced the concept of “Military Administrative Justice” and also explained 
administrative Justice.987 This chapter posed the research questions that the research study 
sought to answer.988 The chapter further briefly looked at the sui generis nature of the SANDF 
                                            
981  Ch 1 at 3. 
982  Ibid.  
983  Ch 1 (note 939) at 6. 
984  Ibid. 
985  Ch 1 (note 939) at 7. 
986  Ibid. 
987  Ch 1 (note 939) at 2. 
988  Ch 1 (note 939) at 8. 
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and the reasons why it could be difficult to incorporate and apply procedural fairness in its pure 
administrative law form within the SANDF disciplinary processes.989  
 
It was submitted, however, that, notwithstanding the nature of the SANDF, the Minister cannot 
act without observing the requirements of procedural fairness.990  
 
Chapter 2 of the study traced the nature and historical background of the South African National 
Defence Force and the Military Law System in general.991 This chapter also traced the historical 
development of procedural fairness in the military context in general and in the particular context 
of the SANDF.992 It is evident, from the discussion, that in the military the most important principle 
is discipline and its maintenance. The chapter discussed the historical development of South 
African Military Law System and its Legislative Framework, from the Union Defence Force to 
SADF and to SANDF.993  
 
Chapter 2 also traced the history from the era before the enactment of the democratic Constitution 
and after the introduction of the democratic Constitution in South Africa.994 It discussed how 
procedural fairness was understood in the military context in general.995 There seems to be a 
difference in the manner in which procedural fairness is applied in the ordinary workplace and in 
the defence forces. Rowe argues that generally military fairness and military justice cannot not 
be separated,996 and that they go together, notwithstanding the fact that stricter forms of 
punishment for transgression of a Military Disciplinary Code are applied compared to the civilian 
application of punishment for a similar offence.997    
 
Schlueter, on the other hand, argues that military discipline is crucial for the existence of the 
military, and that commanders of the military had discretionary powers to enforce that discipline. 
Military justice was, therefore, dependent on the commander rather than on a formalised legal 
framework. 998  
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The opinions of both Rowe and Schuelter are also true within the South African context. In the 
SANDF, discipline is crucial for the maintenance, management and existence of a disciplined 
force.999 This SANDF stance on discipline is also confirmed by the Constitution which requires 
that the SANDF be managed as a discipline defence force.1000 This chapter discussed how the 
introduction of the democratic Constitution affected the relationship between the Minister of the 
SANDF and SANDU.1001 This chapter looked how SANDU was officially established and 
recognised as a Military Trade Union.1002 
 
In addition, chapter 2 discussed how the South African political situation before 1994 influenced 
the way in which procedural fairness was applied in the SANDF. The chapter looked at how the 
introduction of the Constitution influenced the applicability of procedural fairness in the Defence 
Forces.1003  
 
Chapter 3 focused on the effect of the introduction of the Constitution in South Africa and, in 
particular, in the SANDF.1004 The Constitution enabled the SANDF to allow a military trade union 
in the Defence Forces (SANDU).1005 This chapter discussed the how the relationship between the 
Minister and the SANDU together with members of the SANDF who are also members of the 
SANDU was affected.1006  
 
The effect of the Constitutional Court decision to allow a trade union in the defence forces was 
that SANDU requested the Minister to recognise it as such and allow members of the SANDF to 
affiliate to it and participate in SANDU’s activities. In other words, the Minister had to recognise 
the existence of SANDU in the SANDF.1007 This was arguably a difficult transition for the Minister, 
given the sui generis nature of the defence forces, as was evidenced by the extent of litigations 
that ensued between the Minister and SANDU.1008 
 
                                            
999  Ch 2 (note 949) at 24, 25. 
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This chapter further discussed a number of court decisions which originated between the Minister 
and SANDU (representing its members) owing to a number of allegations of infringements on the 
fundamental rights of the members of the SANDF.1009 The court decisions that were discussed 
were from the period 1999-2017. This chapter also discussed the facts of the SANDU 2010 
judgment to set the tone for the discussion of the reasoning of the Court in Chapter 5.1010  
 
It is suggested that the trail of judgments that began in 1999 between the Minister and the SANDU 
led to the main judgment of this research. After the SANDU 2010 judgment, the issues between 
the Minister and SANDU regarding the application of procedural fairness to actions by members 
of the SANDF were not resolved. This chapter discussed the subsequent judgments which took 
place from 2012-2015, and the current situation on the matter.1011 From the discussion of this 
chapter it is clear that there is a need to promulgate rules and regulations of procedure that are 
in line with the Constitution which will adequately deal with the application of procedural fairness 
in the SANDF. 
 
Chapter 4 looked at the main concepts and the applicable legislative provisions that the Court 
had to interpret and apply in the SANDU 2010 judgment.1012 This chapter discussed the concepts 
of procedural fairness and discipline and the relevant legislative and constitutional provisions as 
submitted by both respondents and applicants respectively.1013 These two concepts seems to be 
understood differently by both the applicants and respondents.  
 
The applicants alleged that the Minister infringed on the rights to procedural fairness of members 
of the SANDF who are also members of the SANDU by summarily dismissing them without 
affording them an opportunity to state their cases. The Minister defended the allegation by 
asserting that discipline in the SANDF is of paramount importance and, therefore, failure to 
behave in a disciplined manner warranted summary dismissal. This chapter also looked at how 
the concept of discipline is understood within the context of defence forces and in the workplace 
in general.1014   
 
                                            
1009  Ch 3 (note 963) at 24. 
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1013  Ch 4 (note 970) at 4. 
1014  Ch 4 (note 970) at 5-7. 
148 
 
It was shown as Rowe argues that, in the context of defence forces, procedural fairness was as 
important as discipline, and ought not to be separated or distinguished from it.1015 The two 
concepts should not be treated as mutually exclusive, but, rather, he argues should be seen as 
two sides of the same coin and that, if there is a need to enforce discipline, it must be done in a 
procedurally fair manner.   
 
This resonates with Grogan’s view that, although discipline is enforced through various sanctions, 
including dismissal, employers must exercise caution when they choose this form of discipline by 
observing all the processes of fair procedure because of its severity.1016 This chapter looked at 
how the Minister emphasized that discipline in the defence force is important and that any member 
who behaved in an undisciplined manner must immediately be disciplined.1017  
 
This chapter further discussed discipline in terms of the relevant provisions of the LRA, Chapter 
XX of the Defence Act and the Military Supplementary Discipline Measures Act.1018 The chapter 
discussed also procedural fairness in general and within the particular context of the SANDF. 1019 
This concept was discussed with the relevant provisions of the LRA, PAJA, the Military Discipline 
Supplementary Measures Act and Chapter XX of the Defence Act.1020  
 
It was clear that Chapter XX of the Defence Act does not contain any section which addresses 
the application of procedural fairness before dismissal. There are also omissions in the Defence 
Act and MDSMA and the rules and regulations of the defence respectively.1021  
 
This chapter also looked at the influence of the Constitution on the application of procedural 
fairness in general and within the particular context of the SANDF.1022 It is clear that section 23 
and 33 of the Constitution guarantees protection of the right to procedural fairness and the right 
not to be unfairly dismissed to everyone, including the members of the SANDF.1023 The challenge 
that the Court was faced with when interpreting and applying the relevant legislative provisions to 
the concepts of discipline and procedural fairness is that, although sections 23 and 33 of the 
                                            
1015  Ch 4(note 970) at 11,16 
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Constitution protect everyone, the empowering legislation which gives effect to section 23 does 
not apply to members of the SANDF.1024  
 
The other challenge is that the Minister might have found it difficult to apply procedural fairness 
to actions by members of the defence forces because there are no rules and regulations in the 
SANDF that deal with procedural fairness.1025 Furthermore, the Court was faced with the dilemma 
that the only empowering legislation that deals with procedural fairness which gives effect to 
section 33 of the Constitution is PAJA and the fact that there are no rules and regulations available 
in the SANDF to deal with the application of procedural fairness. 
 
Chapter 5 introduced the idea that PAJA should find application to deal adequately with the issue 
of procedural fairness with regard to actions by members of the SANDF.1026 This chapter critically 
analysed the ratio decidendi of SANDU 2010 Judgment.1027 This chapter also looked at the nexus 
between the SANDU 2010 judgment and applicability of PAJA to dismissal matters in the 
SANDF.1028  
 
The debate on the applicability of PAJA/administrative law to dismissal cases and employment 
disputes is regarded as having been settled by the Constitutional Court in the Gcaba judgment.1029 
Although the debate could be regarded as closed, it could be argued that the application of 
administrative law/PAJA to dismissal matters and employment related disputes within the context 
of SANDF presents a different aspect.   
 
This chapter looked at the relevance of PAJA to dismissal matters or labour disputes in the 
SANDF.1030  The main argument for the closing of the debate about whether administrative 
law/PAJA should be applicable to dismissal matters and labour-related disputes is that the 
legislature promulgated the LRA with the purpose to of dealing with labour-related disputes 
including dismissals.1031 Whilst this legislation is promulgated to deal with labour-related disputes, 
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it excludes the labour-related disputes that arise within the context of the SANDF the NIA the 
SASS and SAPS.1032  
 
This chapter looked at the views by different commentators on the debate about whether 
administrative law should find application with regard to dismissal and employment-related 
disputes as well as the approach chosen by different Courts to address the question of whether 
administrative law should be applied.1033 The chapter looked also at commentators such as 
Ngcukaitobi, Brickhill, Hoexter, and Grogan.1034 From the discussion of these commentators’ 
views, it is clear that the debate is not completely settled and that this question still needs further 
deliberation by Courts.  
 
There were many judgments handed down which dealt with the question of whether 
administrative law should be applied to employment-related disputes.1035 This chapter discussed 
only the common law position on this question before the Chirwa judgment, and then the Zenzile 
decision, the position in Chirwa judgment, and Chirwa decisions handed down by both the 
Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) and the Constitutional Court (CC).  
 
This chapter further discussed the position after Chirwa which is the Constitutional Court decision 
of the Gcaba judgment. These decisions showed the varying approaches that Courts followed 
when they answered this question. This chapter showed that, despite the current position on this 
issue, the context of the SANDU 2010 decision differed from all the Court decisions discussed 
above.1036 Whilst the courts are in favour of the argument that administrative law should not find 
application to labour related matters, including dismissals, because the LRA was promulgated to 
deal with labour-related matters including dismissals, this law does not apply to members of the 
SANDF.1037  
 
This chapter looked at the possibility of applying PAJA to dismissal matter involving members of 
the SANDF.1038 This chapter also posed four question which it assumed that the Court would have 
asked to establish whether or not PAJA should find application to dismissal or labour related 
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disputes in the SANDF.1039 This chapter also asked and answered the question of whether 
administrative law in the form of PAJA should find application in labour-related matters including 
dismissals, if the LRA does not apply and in the event that the law promulgated to deal with 
labour-related matters in the SANDF is inadequate to address issues of procedural fairness in the 
labour related disputes.1040  
 
This chapter discussed sections 1, 3 and 6 of PAJA, read with section 33 of the Constitution 1996, 
to reach a conclusion about the possibility that, had the court in the SANDU 2010 judgment 
interpreted and applied the above mentioned sections of PAJA, it might have come to the 
conclusion that PAJA could find application to dismissal matters and employment disputes in the 
SANDF.1041 This chapter also showed how the court could have developed military administrative 
law in the Defence Act, particularly Chapter XX which was promulgated specifically to deal with 
labour-related matters in the SANDF.1042 
2.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The South African Courts1043 contribute immensely to the development of South African Law. This 
they do when they adjudicate on a matter. The South African Constitution requires that, when a 
Court interprets or develops the law in accordance with section 39(2), it must take into 
consideration the spirit, purport and objects of the bill of rights in the Constitution. 1044 Furthermore, 
in terms of the Constitution, the role of the Courts is not only confined to the interpretation of the 
law, but this role also extends to the making or development of a new law or laws in the event 
that such a law is found to be unjust, inefficient, inadequate or obsolete due to changing 
circumstances.  
 
This implies that, when the Court is adjudicating a matter, its role is not only to resolve the matter 
before it, but also to develop the law. The High Court in the SANDU 2010 judgment was presented 
with an opportunity to develop administrative law that would be suitable for SANDF labour 
relations.  
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It is worthy of mention that South African Courts have come a long way in developing the Law 
since the apartheid era. Through the adjudication of various matters from different disciplines, the 
Courts have been able to develop laws and align them with the Constitution. This includes the 
laws for the South African Defence Forces which arguably could be regarded as being difficult to 
develop because of the nature of the defence forces. 
  
It was shown in chapter 5 that, had the Court considered the application of administrative law in 
the form of PAJA to adjudicate the matter, this would have assisted not only in the development 
of SANDF Administrative Labour Law’ but also Defence Forces Regulations. It was also shown 
that owing to the gap that seems to exist in the Defence Forces legislative framework, PAJA 
would be appropriate to protect the right to members of SANDF guaranteed in section 33 of the 
Constitution.  
 
The approach of the court in the SANDU 2010 judgement is not surprising because the issue 
regarding the applicability of administrative law to labour related matters including dismissal is 
regarded as having been settled by the Constitutional Court in the Gcaba decision, as discussed 
in chapter 5. 
 
Although several judgments were handed down in favour of the application of LRA in relation to 
to labour related disputes, including dismissals of public servants as opposed to the application 
of PAJA to these matters, there is evidence of other judgments which indicate that PAJA can be 
applicable to dismissal matters of public service employees.1045   
 
This suggest that not all Courts are in agreement on the question whether PAJA or administrative 
law should find application in labour-related disputes or dismissal cases of public sector 
employees.1046 Furthermore, as argued by Ngcukaitobi, it is not a good idea for Courts to oust the 
application of PAJA to employment-related matters only because the LRA is applicable.1047  
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Whilst the arguments of different Courts are noted with regard to the applicability of administrative 
law to labour-related disputes, including dismissal cases, it was shown that, in the context of the 
SANDF, these arguments cannot be sustainable because the LRA does not apply to members of 
the SANDF. 
 
PAJA was promulgated to give effect to the right to just administrative action.1048 It was shown in 
chapter 5 that the Court do not favour direct reliance on the Constitution. If members of the 
SANDF are not afforded the protection of just administrative action under PAJA, they have to rely 
directly on sections 23 and 33 of the Constitution to counter the infringement of their right to 
procedural fairness.1049  
 
The idea that PAJA should not find application in labour-related disputes and dismissals, as was 
held by some Courts, implies that the Courts are prevented from interpreting and applying the 
provisions of PAJA under the circumstances such as those in the SANDU 2010 judgment. As a 
result of this, the Court missed an opportunity to develop administrative law in accordance with 
section 39 (2) of Constitution in general and to develop military administrative law in particular, so 
improving South African National Defence Force administrative labour law.1050 
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